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The thesis examines the effects of the privatisation process on 
productivity. competitiveness and performance in two major Brazilian steel 
companies which were privatised in between 1991 and 1993. The case study 
method was adopted in this research due to its strengths as a useful technique 
allowing in-depth examination of hte privatisation process, the context in 
which it happened and its effects on the companies. The thesis has developed a 
company analysis framework consisting of three components: · management. 
competitiveness/productivity and performance and examined the evidence on 
the companies within this framework. 
The research indicates that there is no straightforward relationship 
between privatisation. competitiveness and performance. There were many 
significant differences in the management and technological capabilities. 
products and performance of the two companies, and these have largely 
influenced the effects of privatisation on each company. 
Company Alpha's strengths in technological and management 
capabilities and high value added products explain strong productivity and 
financial performance during and after privatisation. Company Beta's 
performance was weak before the privatisation and remained weak 
immediately after. Before the privatisation, weaknesses in management. 
commodity type low value added products and shortage of funds for investment 
were the major problems. These were compounded by greater government 
interference. Despite major restructuring, the poor performance has 
continued after privatisation largely because the company has not been able to 
improve its productivity sufficiently to be cost competitive in commodity type 
markets . 
Both companies state that their strategies have changed significantly. 
They claim to be more responsive to market conditions and customers and are 
attempting to develop closer links with major customers. It is not possible to 
assess the consequences of these changes in the short time that has elapsed 
since privatisation but Alpha appears to be more effective in developing a 
coherent strategy because of its strengths. 
Both companies accelerated their programme of organisational 
restructuring and reducing the number of their employees during the 
privatisation process to improve productivity and performance. Alpha has 
attained standards comparable to major international steel companies. Beta has 
had to make much bigger organisational changes and cuts in its labour force 
but its productivity levels still remain low in comparison with Alpha and 
international competitors. 
Key words: iron and steel industry. privatisation. restructuring. technological 
capability . productivity. performance. competitiveness, 
management. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
1.1. The research project 
This research is about how privatisation and restructuring 
affect the competitiveness and performance of manufacturing 
ente~prises in Brazil. The study focuses on the Brazilian steel industry 
which has an important role both economic and social. As an example, 
iron and steel products account for 14.0% of the total Brazilian 
exports (Exame, June/1996:21). Brazil is the world's eighth largest 
steel producer and accounts for 3% of the world's production. It is 
the main Latin America steel maker (Baring Securities/Brazilian 
Company Report, 22 June 1993). Just as a matter of comparison, in 
1994, the Brazilian steel indus.try output was approximately 50% 
higher than the British (The Economist, 29 April 1995:21). In 1994, 
the twenty largest steel producers employed over 85,000 employees 
and turnover was approximately $13.2bn in US dollars for that year 
(Exame Melhores e Maiores, August 1995:241). 
This investigation has two main objectives. They are: 
• Within the Brazilian steel industry, to examine two steel 
producers that underweni privatisation and the consequences 
this may have for performance and competitiveness 
• To identify the characteristics that lead some companies to 
improve their competitiveness and performance under 
privatisation and others not to do so 
This thesis reports the findings of a research project which 
began at the end of 1992 and finished in 1996. The aim was to 
analyse the changes in performance and competitiveness of 
companies that underwent a privatisation process. 
The research examines the privatisation process, 
competitiveness and performance outcomes in two major Brazilian 
steel companies located in the state of Minas Gerais. These 
enterprises carried out privatisation between 1991 and 1993. All the 
major changes started before 1991 and carried on after that as well. 
The Brazilian steel industry has been totally privatised since the end 
of 1993, when the last company went into private hands. 
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The examination of the evidence and analysis seeks to make a 
contribution to the growing literature on the impact of privatisation 
on enterprises in developing and industrialising countries. See for 
example, Shirley (1993). 
1.2. Research framework and privatisation 
In order to investigate the relationships between restructuring 
and privatisation and its implications on performance and 
competitiveness, this study has devised a framework based on 
Buckley, Pass and Prescott (1988). A detailed explanation of the 
research framework adopted is given in Chapter 4. 
The privatisation of Brazilian state-owned steel companies 
started in the mid 1980s under the supervision of the Brazilian 
Development Bank (BNDES). However, privatisation only gained 
momentum after the introduction of structural reforms initiated by 
the Brazilian Government in 1990. The privatisations of Alpha and 
Beta, the two firms studied, are a consequence of that reform and 
change of people's attitude. 
Preparations for privatisation of Alpha and Beta demanded a 
restructuring: programme that began a few years before privatisation 
itself and is still continuing. The restructuring process was important 
to give to the then-state-owned companies financial viability and a 
shape that could attract as many buyers as possible. From the steel 
industry, Alpha was chosen as a show-case since it was considered by 
experts to be the best "performer" in the steel industry. Doing so, the 
government of the day expected to raise the privatisation process 
profile in the general public and encourage a wider share ownership. 
Beta was the last steel company to be privatisated after it underwent 
a rigorous restructuring programme. 
Privatisation is a widely discussed and controversial issue. The 
debate and subsequent implementation of the privatisation 
programme first started in the United Kingdom under the 
Conservative Government in the early 1980s. After that, privatisation 
has been a focus of attention and argument all over the world. 
Nowadays, privatisation is an integral part of business restructuring 
of a great number of state-owned companies worldwide. For many 
2 
governments, it is a means of reducing the burden on public finances 
and easing the problem of controlling public expenditure. 
The key question, of course, is to what extent the privatisation 
process enhances competitiveness and performance capacity of an 
organization. This appears a deceptively easy question to address at 
first sight. However, the multiple definitions and criteria for defining 
organizational performance and the multiple levels of analysis 
through which one might examine competitiveness (industry, firm 
and international levels, for example) create a complex and intricate 
web of possible relationships. Before outlining the framework for this 
research, it is first necessary to examine in some detail what is meant 
by the terms competitiveness and performance - and at which level 
of analysis any potential links between privatisation and 
performance might be empirically revealed. 
1.3. Competitiveness and performance 
Over the last decade sweeping changes have affected the whole 
world economy, characterised by a structural shift in most 
international markets (Dicken, 1992). New players have appeared in 
the international arena, countries such as South Korea, Taiwan, 
Singapore, Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, Brazil, Mexico, China, India, 
and so on that are willing to improve their profile and their role as 
distinguished players in the world economy. A way such countries 
devised to achieve that has been through a range of economic and 
political measures to help their enterprises to succeed. Economic 
reforms, reduction of import tariffs on hardware and technology, 
incentives to export, introduction of economic stabilization 
programmes, privatisation of state-owned enterprises, and so on. 
Economic activity is becoming increasingly globalized, the 
world is facing an unusual and more sophisticated integration of 
scattered activities. Globalization of economic activities has led to an 
'era of turbulence and volatility in which economic life in general is 
being restructured and reorganized both rapidly and fundamentally' 
(Dicken, 1992: 1). The economic and social certainties of the 1950s 
seem to have vanished. 
The last two decades have been inundated with transnational 
corporation cases that have failed to keep up with the competition. 
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Companies such as IBM, General Motors, ICI, GEC, Olivetti, Phillips 
once considered the "prima donnas" by industry, are now struggling 
to survive and compete against newcomers (Doyle, 1994). They did 
not realize or maybe did not want to recognize how fast things had 
changed over the past decades making products, companies, 
economies outdated in a very short period of time. The increasing 
globalization of economic activities has demanded an almost total 
different approach from most economic player s. The econom1c 
environment has never ever been like that before. 
Readiness, planned and quick adjustments or sometimes 
radical shifts are far too important to be left to chance. Due to the 
relentless and swift changes that are takjng place worldwide one 
needs to build and improve constantly to keep abreast with the new 
realities that come up so quickly and in such generous doses. · Anyone 
that wants to survive in this 'global village' should be concerned with 
those factors that allow growth and prosperity to take place, in spite 
of the fierce and sometimes fatal competition. Such factors are 
flexibility, strategic vision, integration, partnerships, environmental 
pressure, competitiveness and performance. 
Competitiveness has been considered the key issue to economic 
success and future prosperity in this new globalized economic 
reality. The astonishing economic growth of Far Eastern countries has 
led the USA, the European Community, Australia, Brazil, and others, to 
consider competitiveness as the number one priority. There is no 
light at the end of the tunnel if one is not able to produce goods and 
services that will meet the needs of potential clients. 
To understand competitiveness one is required to look at 
different levels of analysis, productivity, the role of government, the 
standard of living, the institutional reality, education and training, 
quality of management, innovation and technology, creativity, risk-
taking attitudes, entrepreneurship, and so on. It is clear that 
competitiveness is not a one-shot goal since it involves and requires 
multidisciplinary and multifarious viewpoints . 
This research argues that, even when studying firms which 
trade internationally, competitiveness is more fruitfully studied at 
the level of the firm. The assumption here is that without the basic 
competences and resources in place at the level of the individual 
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firm, competitiveness at the international level will be at worst, 
impossible and, at best, extremely short lived. 
A key question, therefore, is what factors might constitute 
competitiveness at the level of the firm to enable some degree of 
advantage when trading in an international context. Buckley, Pass 
and Prescott (1988) argue generally that the firm level of analysis is 
crucial since competitiveness comprises a combination of firm 
performance, potential and management. . More specifically, such 
factors can be narrowed down interalia to the ability of a firm to 
transform and renew; to innovate; to learn and to develop a culture 
or climate to foster competitiveness. The research question, at this 
level of analysis; thus becomes to what extent government macro 
strategies, such as privatisation, facilitate or hinder such firm level 
factors of competitiveness. In the extreme, it may be that 
privatisation has virtually no influence over these factors. This 
research addresses these questions from the context of two Brazilian 
firms in the recently privatised steel manufacturing sector. Figure 1.1 
depicts the overall plan and structure of the thesis. Chapter 3 
expands the competitiveness debate in detail. 
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Figure 1.1 STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS 
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2. PRIVATISATION 
2.1. Introduction 
This chapter starts by examining the concept of privatisation 
and related aspects. This is followed by an overview of some of the 
main issues related to privatisation such as ownership, competition 
and deregulation, and natural monopolies. In addition, the chapter 
provides a section reporting the international experience on 
privatisation. There is a brief section on the Brazilian privatisation 
experience. 
As Parker (1993) states, privatisation has been changing the 
economic, social and political environment for business. It has created 
new opportunities and challenges for governments and business 
people worldwide. Privatisation appears to be an attractive and 
feasible alternative to public ownership. It apparently allows 
companies freedom and flexibility to operate and succeed in a 
competitive environment. 
2.2. Definitions and principles 
Privatisation has been an integral part of business restructuring 
in many countries. It has been considered as a means of reducing 
expenditure in the public sector and creating favourable conditions 
for the newly privatised companies to improve performance, 
increase autonomy for strategic decision-making, while creating more 
flexibility, gain the freedom to negotiate and form business alliances 
and response rapidly to changes and opportunities in the market 
place. 
The word "privatisation" is used in a broad sense to represent 
the reduction of public sector involvement in production of goods and 
services including liquidation of state enterprises, sale of publicly 
owned assets as going concerns or otherwise and the introduction of 
private operators into the public sector through leasing, management 
contracts and contracting out (World Bank, 1994; Ramanadham, 
1988). In the narrow sense, "privatisation" is the sale or transfer of 
ownership of a state enterprise or agency as a going concern to the 
private sector (Molz, 1990; Thompson, 1988). In this sense, an 
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enterprise is normally deemed to have been privatised if more than 
50 per cent of share ownership is transferred to private hands. 
Kirkpatrick ( 1988) describes privatisation as consisting of two 
components: 
(a) a change in the ownership of an enterprise from the public to 
the private sector (i.e. the narrow definition), and 
(b) deregulation of activities previously restricted to public sector 
firms with the intention of increasing competition. 
Privatisation is a widely discussed and controversial issue with 
much debate on the pros and cons. However, there are relatively few 
studies of changes in the strategies and international scope of 
industrial enterprises as a consequence of privatisation. This research 
examines the privatisation of two Brazilian industrial enterprises 
and its implications for competitiveness and performance. 
One of the main reasons why privatisation has been adopted in 
many countries is largely due to a reaction to the flaws in the public 
companies in terms of bad performance, profitability, and failure to 
assure proper transparency in their management and operations 
(World Bank, 1983). Through privatisation it is expected that 
companies will be accountable for their results, with increasing 
efficiency and better management. Additionally, the government's 
revenue needs have been fulfilled by the money coming from the 
privatised enterprises helping to ease the public budget. Even more 
benefits can be reached, in political terms, with the broadening of 
share ownership throughout the whole of society. Also, it is worth 
saying, the reduction of restrictions on market entry would help the 
competition process to move forward. One of the best means to be 
sure that the scarce resources available will be properly used it is 
through increasing the level of competition between firms. It will 
force the proper use of all resources physical as much as human 
capital. 
2.3. International experience 
The current increase in privatisation activity and the related 
debate originated in the United Kingdom when the Conservative 
Government initiated the privatisation programme in the early 
1980's (Kay, May er and Thompson, 1986). Nevertheless, the 
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enterprises that were privatised in the 1980's worldwide were 
concentrated in a relatively narrow range of countries. According to 
Shirley (1993), the World Bank database indicates that there were 
6800 privatisations in the world between 1980 and 1991. 
Table 2.1 shows that 78 percent of the privatisations were in 
Eastern Europe (including GDR). In Latin America, the bulk of 
privatisation activity was focused in Mexico and Chile. Mexico 
privatised or liquidated 400 of its 1155 State Owned Enterprises 
(SOEs) during this period. Between 1973 and 1989, Chile privatised 
all but 23 of its 524 SOEs. During the early 1990s, the pace of 
privatisation has accelerated with many more countries such as Brazil 
and Argentina introducing privatisation programmes. 
Table 2.1 Number of SOE's Privatised Worldwide, 1980-1991 
Regions Enterprises privatised 
Number % 
* Former GDR (a) 4500 66 
* Eastern Europe 805 12 
(excluding GDR) 
* Latin America and 804 12 
the Caribbean 
* Sub-Saharan Africa 373 5 
* OECD countries 170 2 
* Asia 122 2 
* Middle East and 58 1 
North Africa 
* Total 6832 100 
Source: Adapted from Shirley, M. (1993) 
a. GDR: German Democratic Republic 
To the proponents, privatisation is an integral part of business 
restructuring of SOEs. For the government and the public sector, it is 
a means of reducing the burden on public finances of subsidising 
loss-making activities and easing the problem of controlling public 
sector pay and providing appropriate incentives. In addition, the 
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government may have wider objectives such as developing private 
capital markets and widening share ownership. For the enterprises 
themselves, the move from public to private ownership and 
management is expected to improve commercial performance 
through changes tn efficiency, quality, cost consciouness, 
responsiveness to markets and customers, organisational and 
technological effectiveness and rationalisation of business (Goodman, 
Loveman, Gary, 1991; Hammer, Hinterhuber, Lorentz, 1989; Kay, 
Mayer, Thompson, 1986; Kirkpatrick, 1988; Parker, 1993; Soares, 
1993). 
It is generally recognised that for privatisation to lead to 
improved enterprise performance and to benefit consumers, it must 
be within a competitive market framework (Bishop and Thompson, 
1992). In the absence of a competitive market structure, an adequate 
regulatory regime is required. 
In order to improve its performance, a privatised enterprise 
normally has to make major changes in its strategy and operations 
taking account of aspects such as competition, capacity extension, 
broadening a product line, know-how, research and development 
capability and patents, access to markets, long-term or short-term 
investment, guaranteed sales and so forth. The main arguments in 
favour of privatisation for the enterprise include an opportunity to 
be free of the ties and knots of the state-owned management and 
freedom to 'shake' the organizational and cultural structure. There is 
also an opportunity to eliminate the excessive reporting norms and 
procedures characteristic of SOEs. Privatisation allows a significant 
rationalization of the working processes in many functional areas, 
contributes to a more focused approach on cost efficiencies in 
production, allocating and exploiting available resources. Other maJor 
changes due to privatisation are related to greater autonomy for 
handling financial transactions, better access to capital markets and 
finance (Hammer, Hinterhuber, Lorentz, 1989). 
At the broad national level, improving economic performance 
and increasing living standards through more efficiency, competition 
and delivery of better products with fair prices are often put forward 
as the main objectives of privatisation. To the Malaysian Government 
the objectives of privatisation are to promote competition and 
improve efficiency, stimulate economic growth, reduce the role of 
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government and bureaucracy, relieve the burden of public 
enterprises and increase the opportunities for entrepreneurship and 
ownership (Parker, 1993). In practice, in many industrialising and 
developing countries, notably in Latin America, the Caribbean and 
Africa, privatisation is often a consequence of the government's need 
to reduce public sector budget deficits or the debt burden. 
2.4. Ownership 
The ownership issue is very relevant when privatisation is 
under discussion. Moore (1992) states that state ownership itself is to 
blame for the poor performance of SOEs because of three reasons: 
(a) their survival is not dependent on success; 
(b) their commercial objectives often conflict with, or are 
subordinated, to political objectives, and 
(c) there is a failure to control the pursuit of self interest by 
politicians, managers and employees. 
There are numerous cases of waste, corruption, bribery and 
inadequate management in state-owned enterprises and agencies 
(Parker, 1993). According to the Reason Foundati'on (1991) "The shift 
in ownership or control from public to private hands will necessarily 
lead to cheaper, better services for the citizenry." However, this is not 
always true . 
The simple transfer of ownership from public to private hands 
by itself is not sufficient to improve the performance of an 
enterprise. The experience in the United Kingdom shows that there is 
much public concern about the transfer of monopoly power from 
public ownership to private and the consequences of the abuse of 
such monopoly power. From time to time, there is public outcry 
against the abuses of monopoly power by the British privatised 
public utilities, notably in the water supply, electricity and gas 
industries. However, systematic research on the implications of 
privatisation on the various stakeholders is limited. 
This research examines the transfer of ownership of two 
industrial enterprises in the Brazilian steel industry which presents 
a certain degree of competition. There is not a monopoly power as in 
the public utilities. 
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2.5. Competition and deregulation 
Competition is indisputably the most effective means - perhaps 
ultimately the only effective means - of protecting the 
consumers against monopoly power. Regulation is essentially a 
means of preventing the worst excesses of monopoly; it is not a 
substitute for competition (Littlechild, 1983 ). ' 
Competition is considered by many as one of the most 
important mechanisms available to a government to deal with 
monopoly power and maximising consumer benefits (Beesley and 
Littlechild, 1986; Moore, 1983, 1992; Kirkpatrick, 1988; Linowes, 
1991; Ramanadham, 1988; Thompson, 1988; BNDES, 1991). Its 
fundamentals are based on freedom to enter and to withdraw from a 
market as well as contest against other competitors. The aim is 
increased rivalry between companies that brings about better 
products and services, providing good quality and reasonable prices. 
Moore (1983) is enthusiastic when he points out the benefits of 
greater competition. He argues it is a mechanism with extraordinary 
efficiency. It makes sure that goods and services available and 
desired by customers can be bought at the lowest cost. Hence, it does 
not need politicians or civil servants to intervene. As a result, there 
will be a greater chance that success will be achieved. In fact, Moore 
states that 
'the long term success of the privatisation programme will 
stand or fall by the extent to which it maximises competition. If 
competition cannot be achieved, an historic opportunity will 
have been· lost. ' 
As Moore (1983) and Kay et al (1986) believe the competitive 
process can make a great contribution to stimulate much more 
efficient production which is one of the . central arguments in support 
of privatisation. Competitive forces operate in many ways within the 
private markets. First, there is competition in the marketplace to 
fulfill consumer needs. Second, competition for firms via takeovers. 
Third, there is competition amongst shareholders to influence 
managerial decision-making. Finally, the threat of bankruptcy. In 
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short, two broad conclusions are shown by Kay et al. First, the 
economic performance of all firms is supposed to increase when 
there is a competitive environment. Second, if competition is absent 
private companies will be at a disadvantage to public ones. 
Only elimination of restrictions (deregulation) to market entry 
will allow an increase in competition and through this improvement 
in quality, price and delivery can occur. Protected markets tend to be 
sluggish and not concerned with needs of customers. Companies and 
their managers become complacent because they are not frightened 
of the possibility of being expelled from the marketplace. 
To Linowes (1991), competition should be present in all 
economic and social human activities. Consumers should have a 
choice when they want to buy goods and services. In general, when 
there is choice there is competition. When competition prevails there 
will be greater chance that customers will come first, not the 
interests of a minority. A state-owned company which fails to attend 
to customers' demands normally does not go bankrupt, as a private 
firm does. It is well-known that public companies without financial 
and commercial pressures tend to be less efficient and slower to 
respond to changes when compared with private ones. Indeed, if 
government presence is overwhelming in the marketplace there will 
be all the conditions to gag the private sector and bring about a less 
effective business environment. 
There is no better way to protect the consumers' interests than 
by allowing companies to compete with each other. The marketplace 
in general offers the right environment to keep prices down and 
quality and service up. Without competition, a private company can 
abuse its monopoly power as well as a state-owned enterprise can. 
For that reason, the government must have some kind of control to 
avoid negative market manipulation by potential monopolies. 
Unfortunately, there is not so-called perfect competition. 
As addressed by Beesley and Littlechild (1986), if there is a 
genuine interest from the government to increase competition, there 
will be a price to pay in terms of augmenting of production costs and 
reduction of economies of scale or scope related to public utility 
industries. In fact, the breaking up of a company, a monopoly for 
example, can be a solution to allow potential competitors to come 
along. By dloing that, the government will create the incentive for the 
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formation of new companies, increase competition, and permit 
market forces to settle down. Political and administrative forces 
interference will die away. Moreover, companies should expand or 
contract according to what market forces impose. When there are 
few competitors the government should intervene to allow 
newcomers to dispute their share of the market. 
In sum, competition is the means that will bring about the 
benefits of privatisation for the whole of society. It is . the way to 
avoid products and services of bad quality flooding the market. In 
the end, a competitive environment will be built up based on 
elimination or reduction of barriers to foreign trade and investment, 
breaking up monopolies and increasing deregulation (BNDES, 1991). 
2.6. Natural monopolies 
Many publicly owned companies can be considered natural 
monopolies. This is clear in industries like railways, airports, 
telecommunications, electricity, water and gas supply. According to 
Sharkey (1982), natural monopoly occurs when a single company 
produces the total supply of an industry more cheaply than a number 
of competing firms. Due to cost reasons there is no justification to 
have more than one transmission and distribution system of, for 
example, water, electricity, and gas in a specific area. It is not 
sensible to have many pipelines from different suppliers on the 
same street available to clientele. Economies of scale and scope 
should prevail allowing a single firm to supply the market at lower 
costs than several firms. For that reason, the probability of having 
more than one supplier of any public utility is quite difficult. The 
problem that arises from that concerns the risks of exploitation by 
private monopoly supply in terms of poor quality service and higher 
prices. At this moment, government must be present to keep 
pressure on suppliers to avoid damaging customers' interests. 
Unfortunately, companies exploiting sectors with natural monopoly 
characteristics tend to be quite powerful and have much clout with 
the Government. 
There are two important questions to be analysed. Firstly, it is 
feasible to introduce a sort of competition for some of the products or 
services supplied by natural monopolies. Secondly, if is not possible 
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to have any kind of competition, which measures should be set in 
place in order to have some kind of regulation? (Kay at al, 1986). 
In the case of British Gas, Hammond, Helm, and Thompson 
( 1986) argue that transmission and distribution networks are a 
typical case of natural monopoly. Since a single firm is able to 
delivery the outputs more efficiently and cheaply than a group of 
firms . Taking this into account government must introduce tough 
regulation to curb any movement from the private monopoly towards 
a market dominance. However, activities related to the sale of gas, 
the sale and servicing of gas appliances (boilers, cookers, and central 
heating) should have a different approach. Here, it is possible and 
feasible to stimulate the entry of new suppliers. The entry barriers 
should be eased to allow the emergence of several competitors. 
Backed by the examples above, the possibility of introducing 
competition into certain products and services offered by natural 
monopolies is possible. Nevertheless, when the implementation of 
competition is impossible the government must introduce strict 
regulation to avoid the misuse of the market by private monopolies. 
In the UK, the regulatory system has been successful, to a certain 
extent, in controlling the prices of the utilities. For example, British 
Telecom calls have been reduced by about 40 percent since 
privatisation in 1984. The regulatory model approved asserts that 
prices are restricted each year by a formula connected with the retail 
prices index. As Littlechild (1983) argues, regulation is a stop-gap 
waiting for full implementation of competition. This is, according to 
him, the best way to fight monopoly. 
2. 7. Strengths and weaknesses 
Generally speaking, the main arguments in favour of 
privatisation include the opportunity to be free of the entanglements 
of state-owned management and the freedom to 'shake' the 
organizational and cultural structure. There is also the opportunity to 
eliminate excessive reports, standards and procedures, characteristics 
of public companies. Privatisation allows a significant rationalization 
of the working processes in many functional areas, contributes to a 
more focused approach on cost efficiencies in production, allocating 
and exploiting of available resources. Other major changes due to 
15 
privatisation are related to greater autonomy for handling financial 
transactions, better access to capital markets and finance (Hammer, 
Hinterhuber, Lorentz, 1989). 
The benefits of privatisation are many, according to Moore 
(1983) . Managers have more freedom to use their expertise and 
exploit new opportunities. Companies are more aware of the needs of 
their particular business and clientele and tend to rely more on 
capital markets rather than on government advice and help. In 
general, privatisation brings more freedom to run businesses, since 
company managers are free to seek better opportunities for the 
company's interests. When a company becomes private it is not 
submitted to excessive government red tape. There will probably be 
an environment where people will be free to explore all their 
potential to bring about the best they are capable of, in order to 
achieve better results with fewer resources. Creativity is usually 
stimulated, supported and rewarded through a meritocratic system. 
In general, it is assumed that employees from private 
companies tend to be more productive and efficient than their 
colleagues in public-owned companies, maybe due to much more 
pressure to get results and a smaller number of people to do the 
same amount of work. Another possible benefit from being in the 
private sector is concerned with market. Differently from many 
state-owned companies, a private enterprise is expected to be tuned 
to market needs and changes. Constantly, private companies should 
monitor the market to foresee the trends and ways the public is 
shifting in, in terms of their demands. At least, companies should 
keep pace with the changes that are going on to avoid being 
surprised. Nowadays, increasingly, the pace of change is such that 
almost no one can afford to pay the price of not adopting a proactive 
approach. In fact, it is a question of survival in a world where, 
basically, only the fittest can carry on in business. It has been a very 
tough time for companies. Being proactive has become imperative in 
modern times. Bearing this in mind, the companies most likely to 
survive will be those focused on customers' needs and capable of 
delivering what their clientele does not yet know what they will need 
or use in future. For this reason, private companies, in general, are 
more flexible and manageable than public-owned enterprises to fill 
the gap. 
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Privatisation has brought about benefits for a great number of 
companies and for theirs employees. To promote wider share 
ownership, offers of shares are made to employees in very 
favourable conditions. This allows _ them to become owners and 
workers at the same time. As a result, tens of thousands of 
employees have taken advantage of the opportunities that have been 
made available. As a consequence of that, workers-turned-owners 
have become more motivated and concerned about issues like cost 
reduction, product quality and delivering. Most of them have begun 
to switch off unnecessary lights, take much more care of vehicles and 
equipment than they used to. Now, they know if the company makes 
a profit they will be compensated through dividends. 
However, privatisation may be a way to increase job 
satisfaction and pride. Private companies workers sometimes are 
viewed being more involved, have greater self-esteem and 
motivation. On the other hand, in many public compantes, 
regrettably, employees are regarded having low-esteem and morale; 
maybe due to lack of drive, low consumer-attention and institutional 
constraints. 
The benefits that can be conveyed by privatisation are not only 
for the employer and employee, but basically, the consumer. The 
process is concerned with giving clients a bigger range of products, 
supplied with better quality and at a reasonable price. It means 
breaking the monopolies, increasing competition and deregulation 
and promoting efficiency. 
On the other hand, the main arguments against privatisation 
state that a public company does not necessarily have to make a 
profit; the interests of a private company are attached to the 
shareholders' interests more than those of the stakeholders; a state-
owned firm is much more concerned about the needs of the public as 
a whole than a private company. Usually, public companies have a 
greater long-term perspective, are more concerned with employment, 
the environment and national security whereas private companies 
have short-term objectives related to profit-making. 
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Figure 2.1 PRIVATISATION: STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES 
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Figure 2.1 summarises the main strengths and weaknesses of 
privatisation. Of course, privatisation has a slightly different meaning 
and range according to the context in which it is happening. For 
example, in some countries it has been an alternative to reduce the 
interference of government and politicians on the SOE's management. 
2.8. Overview of the Brazilian Privatisation Programme 
The structural reforms of the Brazilian economy started in 1991 
by the Government aimed at the modernization of the economy 
through economic stability, trade liberalisation, opening up of the 
economy, improving foreign relations and fiscal adjustment (BNDES, 
1994 ). The country has been witnessing a great number of changes 
over the last years in terms of ending the trade barriers on 
computers, reduction of import tariffs, opening up of 
telecommunications and electricity to private sector competition, 
concession of public utilities, agreements with the Paris Club, private 
banks, and International Monetary Fund (IMF). Nevertheless, much 
remains to complete the process to cut government spending, reform 
the state, the social security system and civil service, reduce the red 
tape and lower the gap between rich and poor. 
As an essential part of the structural reform, the privatisation 
program is expected to play a fundamental role as a means to reduce 
the participation of the state in the economy as well as helping to 
decrease the public deficit. The Brazilian Privatisation Program 
"allows the government to focus resources and efforts into areas such 
as education, health, housing, security and sanitation where its 
presence is essential, contributing to redefine the role of the state in 
the Brazilian economy" (BNDES, 1993). 
The Brazilian Government states as a main objective of its 
privatisation programme the redefinition of the role of the state in 
the economy via reducing its size and limiting its scope to specific 
government obligations such as health, education, and welfare. The 
broad objectives of the programme are summarised in Table 2.2. 
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Table 2.2 Brazilian privatisation programme objectives 
• Objectives 
* Transfer to the private sector all economic 
activities not adequately developed by the state 
* Concentrate efforts and resources on the basic 
government activities such as education, health, 
infrastructure, policing, housing and defense 
* Lower domestic and foreign public indebtedness 
* Foster domestic competition among local 
companies through a programme of modernisation 
* Promote an increase in share ownership so that 
the domestic capital markets get stronger 
Source: BNDES, March/1994 
Table 2.3 displays the main stages of the privatisation 
operation. According to a BNDES (National Bank for economic and 
social development) report (1991), the first stage consists of choosing 
and recommending a company to the Republic President and, after 
that, formally adding it to the process. The following steps consist of 
hiring private consultants and auditors, submission and approval of 
candidates' proposals, analysis, and so on. The last stages are made 
up of approval of the method of sale, publication of sales notices and, 
finally, public auction (BNDES, 1991:13). 
Currently, the privatisation process has become painfully slow. 
Trade unions, left-wing parties, state-owned company employees are 
among those that are against privatisation. Other restrictions are 
related to regulation of natural monopolies. There is little experience 
on this subject. Most probably, some external advice will be 
necessary to speed up the whole process. However, according to the 
Government, a quick sell-off could bring in too much foreign money 
at once, so affecting the exchange rate. 
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Table 2.3 Privatisation operation procedures 
• Stages 
* A company is chosen by a selected committee to 
be submitted to the President and formally 
included in the process 
* Private consultants and auditors are hired by 
public tender 
* Submission and approval of candidates' proposals 
* Analysis of proposals, selection of consultants 
and signing of contracts 
* Consultancy work is performed 
* Method of sale is approved 
* Sales notices are published 
* Public auction 
Source: BNDES, May/1991 
2.9. Conclusions 
This chapter intended to provide the background for a better 
understanding of the privatisation process as the two industrial 
enterprises of this research underwent a change in ownership in 
recent years. 
Privatisation has been considered one of the last means to work 
out the fortunes of the state-owned companies fortunes . A policy 
that was embraced simply by accident, but turned out to be a central 
issue for Mrs Thatcher's Government. "A policy which has no clear-
cut objectives, but has become almost an end in itself" (Bishop and 
Kay, 1988). A policy that started in Britain and ended up sweeping 
the whole world. Almost all governments from all corners and shades 
have been preaching the benefits of privatisation to their citizens, 
companies and to their societies as a whole. However, it is worth 
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remembering that "had the Thatcher Government failed to be re-
elected in 1983, it is unlikely that any other country would have 
taken on the mantle in promoting the virtues of privatisation and 
deregulation" (Curwen, 1994 ). The amount of effort some 
governments put into this issue to give support to the ideology of a 
leaner state, dynamic and less involved in non-typical governmental 
activities, has been overwhelming. 
There have been significant improvements in many privatised 
enterprises. Performance has been raised, however without 
significant difference from those companies that are still publicly 
owned (Bishop and Kay, 1988). There is not a straightforward answer 
to the benefits of privatisation. As a matter of fact, privatisation 
must be carried out under certain considerations and precautions. As 
addressed by Curwen (1994 ), mistakes can and will almost inevitably 
occur during the introduction of privatisation. Nevertheless, due to 
lack of sufficient time to learn and absorb other countries' 
experiences, some Eastern Countries have been forced to introduce 
privatisation as quickly as possible as a means to instigate the 
recovery of their economies, after the fall of communism. 
Privatisation by itself is not enough without taking into 
consideration interests of the society as a whole not just 
shareholders~ and chief executives' interests. It is regrettable that in 
some cases governments are using privatisation as a tool to keep 
themselves in power and gather political support for their causes and 
personal interests. 
Finally, another claim by privatisation supporters is that it has 
been a useful instrument in reducing corruption, irregularities, 
excesses as well as helping former state-owned companies to become 
much leaner, more efficient, flexible, swift and competitive. The 
future still seems interesting to privatisation. 
Alpha and Beta are enterprises in a manufacturing industry 
facing an environment which has been made more competitive 
through market liberalisation measures. Therefore some of the 
disadvantages related to transfering public enterprises with 
monopoly power to the private power sector are less serious. The aim 
of the study is to provide greater insights into the internal changes in 
enterprises undergoing privatisation than is usually provided by the 
debate on this subject. 
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3. COMPETITIVENESS AND PERFORMANCE OF ENTERPRISES 
3.1. Introduction 
This research, as previously mentioned, takes the level of the 
firm as its main point of departure for examining competitiveness. 
However, it is clear that such a level of analysis needs locating in the 
intellectual terrain of other perspectives such as the industry or 
cross-national levels. This chapter attempts to summarise the multi-
level perspectives on competitiveness and to locate the firm level 
perspective within them. 
Several academic groups, government, businessmen, managers, 
economists, and the public in general, have been discussing the issue 
of competitiveness on different levels. Maybe the most important 
change in relative position this century has been Japan's move to the 
top in world competitiveness. In 1993, for the eighth consecutive 
year, Japan was considered the best despite its declining domestic 
business confidence and increasing protectionism. Many other 
countries have followed Japan's path: Hong Kong, Singapore, Taiwan 
and South Korea. More recently, countries like China, Thailand, 
Indonesia, Malaysia have been trying to improve their 
competitiveness level. Both Europeans and Americans are concerned 
about the decline of their competitiveness. In the United States 
scholars from leading universities and management schools, devoted 
to research and teaching on the improvement of the competitive 
performance of the USA in the global economy, have founded a 
network called Consortium on Competitiveness and Cooperation. The 
CCC has received benefits from the major American corporations, 
including IBM, General Motors, Xerox, General Electric and Hewlett-
Packard. It is dedicated to spreading its ideas and findings to 
industry, government and professionals from many areas of 
knowledge. 
Most Western industrialised countries are looking for answers 
to improve competitiveness in pri vale-ownership business, 
management, institutional arrangements and national infrastructure 
' 
education and training, cultural restraints, government policies and 
long-term investment. 
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3.2. Definitions 
There are many different definitions of competitiveness and 
competitiveness means different things to different people, finding a 
single definition is not an easy task. See, for example, European 
Management Forum, 1984; Harvard Business Review, 1987; Scott and 
Lodge, 1985; Porter, 1990; HMSO, 1985,1994; Krugman, 1994. 
Different authors stress different aspects and sometimes have a 
totally singular concept of competitiveness. The problem is to decide 
which qualitative and quantitative aspects should be stressed. For 
some competitiveness is a question of increasing the nation's living 
standard, for others it is connected with a firm's ability to compete 
and successfully market its goods and services worldwide. Apart 
from understanding the factors affecting competitiveness, · it is 
necessary to identify indicators, for example costs, prices, 
productivity, profitability, balance of trade, export market share and 
technology capability, by which changes in competitiveness can be 
assessed. 
According to the Chambers English Dictionary, competitiveness 
is related to or characterised by competition, eg giving a chance of 
successful results in conditions of rivalry. However, this definition 
does not clarify whether the rivalry is at the · tevel of enterprises, 
industry or nations and the role of government policy 
Many definitions have stressed competitiveness at the . ·national 
level and company level. The Report of the President's Commission on 
Industrial Competitiveness (US GPO, 1985) and Scott and Lodge 
( 1985), on their definitions of competitiveness, emphasizes the role 
of a nation as a fundamental factor in increasing the living standard 
of the population. The more a nation augments its capacity to 
compete in the worldwide arena the more probable its people will 
enjoy a better quality of life. In other words, it means 
'a nation state's ability to produce, distribute, and service goods 
in the international economy in competition with goods and 
services produced in other countries, and to do so in a way that 
earns a rising standard of living. The ultimate measure of 
success is no~ a ''favorable" balance of trade, a positive current 
account, or an increase in foreign exchange reserves: it is an 
24 
., 
increase in standard of living. To be competitive as a country 
means to be able to employ national resources, notably the 
nation's lab or force, in such a way as to earn a rising level of 
real income through specialization and trade in the world 
economy (Scott and Lodge 1985).' 
On the other hand, The Report of the President's Commission 
on Industrial Competitiveness outlines a definition of competitiveness 
based on free and fair market conditions, whereby a nation can 
increase its degree of competitiveness through products and services 
that meet the tastes, quality and price demanded by the international 
markets and, at the same time, uphold or augment the real incomes 
of its people. 
Another way to understand competitiveness is at the company 
level. The Aiding ton Report (HMSO, 1985) and the European 
Management Forum (1984) both have concepts of competitiveness 
based on a company. The Report from the Select Committee of the 
House of Lords on Overseas Trade (The Aldington Report) 
understands competitiveness of a firm as follows. 
'A firm is competitive if it can produce products and services of 
superior quality and lower costs than its domestic competitors. 
Competitiveness is synonymus with a firm's long-run profit 
performance and its ability to compensate its employees and 
provide superior returns to its owners.' 
This definition highlights the importance of a firm being 
capable of supplying the market with products and services that 
give good value for money, through better quality and lower costs 
than other companies. It 1s worth stressing the long-term 
perspective, the need to recognize the role of the employees in the 
success of the undertaking, as well as the need to offer adequate 
remuneration to investors. 
Likewise, the European Management Forum sees a firm's 
competitiveness as being very much related to its ability to surpass 
both national and external competitors using price and quality as the 
main factors. It means that 
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'the immediate and future ability of, and opportunities for, 
entrepreneurs to design, produce and market goods worldwide 
whose price and non-price qualities form a more attractive 
package than those of foreign and domestic competitors 
(European Management Forum 1984).' 
Porter, during his period as a member of The President's 
Commission on Industrial Competitiveness during Ronald Reagan's 
Presidency, had some difficulties clarifying the meaning of the term 
In question. These were his words: 
'What became clear to me during the term of the Commission 
was that there was no accepted definition of competitiveness. 
To firms, competitiveness meant the ability to compete in world 
markets with a global strategy. To many members of Congress, 
competitiveness meant that the nation had a positive balance of 
trade. To some economists, competitiveness meant a low unit 
cost of labor adjusted for exchange rates. Partly because of 
these differences, much energy has been expended in the 
United States debating whether there is a competitiveness 
problem at all. The debate about competitiveness raged on, and 
still does today (Porter,1990).' 
Porter clearly recognizes the existence of different approaches 
to the meaning of the term ranging from firm level to national level, 
from cost of labour to positive balance of trade. However, whatever 
the definition of competitiveness chosen it will not be generally 
accepted and capable of embracing all interpretations and 
viewpoints. It is quite difficult to reconcile many of the explanations 
already available. For Porter, the answers to competitiveness are 
related to improving capabilities and performance of specific 
industries and industry segments. 
As far as this research is concerned, the definition of 
competitiveness to be based upon the Aldington Report. Namely, a 
firm is competitive when it is able to offer products and services of 
greater quality, lower costs, and make customers happier than when 
served by rivals. 
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Different competitiveness frameworks and approaches and the 
role of government and related issues are discussed next. 
3.3. Competitiveness frameworks and approaches 
'The diversity of the measures of competitiveness used by 
researchers, suggests that ideas about this complex concept 
vary greatly .. ... When statistical measures have been used to 
show, for example, that one firm performs better in the market 
place than its competitors, and has generated and sustained 
more competitive potential, the qualitative information derived 
from researching management processes helps to explain the 
reasons for success.' (Buckley, Pass and Prescott, 1988). 
The competitiveness issue has been focused on by a great 
number of practitioners and researchers over the last few decades at 
the individual firm, industrial sector or national level (Beckerman, 
1979; Pettigrew, 1985; Coates and Hillard, 1986,1987; Buckley, Pass, 
Prescott, 1988; Francis, 1989,1992; Best, 1990; Pettigrew and Whipp, 
1991; Georghiou and Metcalfe, 1993). 
3.3.1. Buckley, Pass and Prescott 
Buckley, Pass and Prescott (1988) question the validity of using 
single measures alone that cannot explain the complex dynamics of 
competitiveness and the meaning of the term in the presence of 
uncertainties . Measures have to determine the level of analysis 
(country, industry, enterprise or product) and comprise key 
elements. These key elements can be categorised into three groups 
(Tables 3.1 and 3.2): competitive performance, competitive potential, 
and management process. 
According to the authors, these three (3Ps) groups 
(Performance, Potential, Process) describe different stages in the 
competitive process. Performance measures the results of the 
operation with respect to percentage of manufacturing in total 
output, sales, profitability, balance of trade and so on. 
Potential measures delineate the inputs into the operation in 
terms of technology, productivity, access to resources, comparative 
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advantages, and so forth. Finally, management process indicators are 
items such as government policies, commitment to international 
business and education and training. 
The interrelationship between the 3Ps is considered to be a 
dynamic process. The three groups of measures are interdependent. 
Competitive performance group measures help the management 
process to take decisions based on relevant information that can 
bring better results for the firm, the industry and the country. In its 
turn, management process has an important role in terms of actions 
that will create the right environment to improve the competitive 
potential measures. The latter makes the competitive performance 
measures sustainable and at the same time can generate the 
resources that will be controlled by the management process. 
3.3.2. Scott and Lodge 
Scott and Lodge ( 1985), in their research on USA 
competitiveness, point out that the fundamental measure of success 
in competitiveness is an increase in the standard of living of a nation. 
Therefore, national competitiveness implies, by using national 
resources, specially the nation's labour force, an augmenting of the 
real income of the 
In spite of 
problems as being 
workers. 
the fact that they emphasise the competitive 
at national level, they do recognize the role of 
companies in the whole process of competing. Scott and Lodge stress 
that the current industrial activity is much more science-based (e.g. 
electronics, pharmaceuticals, chemicals, electrical equipments, 
biotechnology, etc .) than before, which means, in other words, 
national competitiveness depends on technology, capital investment, 
a well qualified workforce to be able to reach the demands of a 
modern and competitive economy. 
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Table 3.1 
LEVEL OF 
ANALYSIS 
• OOUNIRY 
Group of measures by level of analysis 
COMPETITIVE 
PERFORMANCE 
* export market share 
* % manufacturing in total 
output 
* balance of trade 
* export growth 
* profitability 
GROUPS 
COMPETITIVE 
POTENTIAL 
* comparative advantage 
* cost competitiveness 
* productivity 
* price competitiveness 
* technology indicators 
* access to resources 
(may vary by industry) 
MANAGEMENT 
PROCESS 
* commitment to 
international business 
* government policies 
* education/training 
------------------------ -------------------------------------- ------- ------------------------- -------------------------------
• INDUSTRY 
* export market share 
* balance of trade 
* export growth 
* profitability 
* cost competitiveness 
* productivity 
* price competitiveness 
* technology indicators 
* commitment to 
international business 
(trade associations, etc.) 
------------------------ -------------------------------------- -------------------------------- -------------------------------
* export market share 
• export dependency 
• export growth 
• FIRM • profitability 
* cost competitiveness 
* productivity 
* price competitiveness 
* technology indicators 
* ownership advantage 
* commitment to 
international business 
* marketing aptitude 
* management relations 
* closeness to customer 
* economies of scale and 
scope 
------------------------ -------------------------------------- -------------------------------- -------------------------------
• PRODUCT 
* export market share 
* export growth 
* profitability 
Source: Adapted from Buckley, Pass and Prescott (1988) 
* cost competitiveness 
* productivity 
* price competitiveness 
* quality competitiveness 
* technology indicators 
* product champion 
Table 3.2 Measures of competitiveness at firm level and their 
meamngs 
MEASURES 
• export market share 
• export growth 
• profitability 
• cost competitiveness 
• productivity 
• price competitiveness 
----------------------------------
• technology indicators 
----------------------------------
• ownership advantage 
• marketing aptitude 
• management relations 
-------~--------------------------
MEANING 
* percentage that one firm or 
industry, etc. has of the global 
volume of goods or services 
* increase of sales abroad by one 
nation, industry, firm or product 
* profit over investment 
* a firm/industry is more 
competitive when it has one of the 
lowest costs 
----------------------------------
* output per person, value added 
per employee 
* a firm/industry, etc. is more 
competitive when it has one of the 
lowest prices 
* research and development 
expenditure, number of patents, 
number of qualified scientists and 
engineers employed, royalty 
income, licensing, etc. 
-----------------------------------
* ability of firms to guarantee and 
to keep profitable market share 
-----------------------------------
* to satisfy the consumer needs 
through a better product design, 
product performance, positioning, 
servicing, delivering, etc. 
-----------------------------------
* it is connected to improvement 
on internal and external relations 
-----------------------------------
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• economies of scale and scope * economy of scale: bigger 
production that allows cost 
reduction 
economy of scope: greater number 
of products that allows reduction 
on production costs 
---------------------------------- -----------------------------------
• commitment · to international * more involvement in 
business international affairs by 
government, companies, and 
education system (proficiency in 
foreign languages and cultures) 
• closeness to customer * closer relationship with 
customers so that their needs can 
be understood and met 
Source: Buckley, Pass and Prescott (1988) 
According to Scott and Lodge, national competitiveness cannot 
be measured by a single dimension. Several dimensions (see Buckley 
et al.) must be taken into account when analyses of competitiveness 
are being carried out, since competitiveness raises so many 
questions in terms of past achievements, overall performance, goals 
and commitments, and comparison with foreign' results. 
Measurements of competitiveness should not be circumscribed 
in the past, but on the contrary, should embody both present and 
future, as well. For that reason, the key indicators are almost the 
same, whatever the level of analysis. 
3.3.3. Pettigrew and Whipp 
Adopting a multi-dimensional approach towards a better 
understanding of competitiveness, Pettigrew and Whipp (1991 ), 
recognize two key dimensions of competitiveness: the level of 
analysis and the element of time, as showed in Table 3.3. The former 
is comprised of three different levels of analysis: firm, sector and 
national/international economy. Each level has its major 
characteristics and measures. 
According to the authors a competitive capacity occurs when a 
group of characteristics act together. It is not enough to identify only 
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the measures related to a firm's competitive position. To know what 
is going on in the whole process a recognition of the measures related 
to industry and economy dimensions must be considered. What can 
be inferred from the authors' viewpoint is that competition is 
something that should be understood as a whole. Rarely can one 
single fact or single dimension explain the overall picture. The 
competitive performance depends on that recognition. 
Pettigrew, Whipp and Buckey et al. have a similar 
understanding of the concept of competitiveness. They agree that the 
concept cannot be viewed as anything static but dynamic as the rules 
and facts concerning competition can change suddenly through time. 
Changes can happen at any moment, at any level of analysis, although 
varying across the whole spectrum. 
Further, the multi-dimension and dynamic view of 
competitiveness is related and complemented 'by a contextual and 
processual understanding of strategic change.' So, for Pettigrew and 
Whipp, there is a link between competitive performance and capacity 
to adapt to important changes that happen over time in the· firm's 
environment (Table 3.4). Thus a firm's ability to compete within a 
certain industry/economy relies on two aspects: 
•. competence to recognize and comprehend the competitive 
"~- forces that are in place and how they are modified according to 
the circumstances 
• capacity of a business to organize and manage all resources 
available towards a chosen competitive way. 
Whatever the strategy chosen, the authors recognize the 
importance of undertaking the changes that need to be made. They 
consider that a critical aspect. They stress the role of management as 
crucial to evaluate the environment, decide which options to be 
followed and carry out the necessary actions that must be taken to 
achieve successful results. Management attitudes can explain 
varying performances between companies. 
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Table 3.3 Dimensions of competitiveness: level 
over time 
of analysis 
LEVEL OF 
ANALYSIS 
TIME 
---------------------------------------
BASES OF COMPETITION 
* cost structure 
• ECONOMY * exchange rate 
(national/international) * finance/industry relationship 
* government intervention 
• SECIOR 
(industry) 
• FIRM 
* market structure 
* industry mature 
* commercial networks 
-------------------------------------
* chosen strategies/capacity to 
change 
* bases on which firm decides to 
compete 
* price 
* quality 
* production lead times 
* distribution networks 
Source: Pettigrew and Whipp, 1991 
Finally, Pettigrew and Whipp are keen to stress their multi-
level concept of competitiveness as something new that had not been 
explored before them. They mention a common weakness of previous 
models (e.g. microeconomics models) that overlooked a holistic view 
of competition. These models fail to recognize the existence of multi-
aspects such as economic, social, political relationships, national 
cultures, institutional arrangements and so on (Chamberlain, 1933; 
Lenz, 1980; Barney, 1986; Bain, 1956; Caves, 1980; Porter, 1981; 
Schumpeter, 1950; Nelson and Winter, 1982; Francis, 1992). 
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Table 3.4 Competitiveness and the three dimensions of strategic 
change 
DIMENSIONS 
• PROCESS 
• CONIENT 
• CONI'EXT 
MAIN COMPONENTS 
* change managers 
* models of change 
* formulation/implementation 
* role of technology 
* language 
* time 
-------------------------------------
* assessment and choice of products 
and markets 
* key objectives 
* assumptions 
* targets and evaluation 
-------------------------------------
INTERNAL 
* resources 
* capabilities 
* culture 
* politics 
EXTERNAL 
*economic 
* business 
* culture 
* politics 
Source: Pettigrew and Whipp,1991 
3.3.4. Microeconomics 
Three microeconomic concepts of competition can be identified: 
Industrial Organization, Chamberlinian, and Schumpeterian. All three 
concepts do not address the level of competition as being something 
broad that embraces more than one or two level of analysis (Table 
3.5). 
The Chamberlinian Competition model emphasizes the 
remarkable capabilities of the firm. An important source of 
competitive advantage for firms is related to their ability to exploit a 
whole group of resources in such a way that allows them to overtake 
their competitors. 
Chamberlain lists some aspects that can bring about differences 
between firms in terms of performance and efficiency: talent of 
managers to work together, product reputation, technological 
know-how, patents, trademarks and so on. 
34 
Given the differences between firms related to skills, abilities, 
and experiences, Chamberlain suggests that firms should choose 
strategies that most stress their capability to exploit individuality 
and uniqueness. This will allow firms to improve their market 
position and increase the ability to compete. 
In its turn, the Industrial Organizational (IO) model, different 
from the Chamberlinian model perspective, has as central point the 
relationship between the firm and the industry. The structure of the 
industry defines the level of return that a firm will probably get. The 
main elements of that structure include number and relative size of 
firms, barriers to entry, product differentiation in the industry, and 
elasticity of demand. The core concepts of 10 are structure, conduct, 
and performance. Within this paradigm, firms should try to find 
means to modify the structure of their industry so that it can have 
high returns on investment. 
Contrary to the 10 and Chamberlinian models, the 
Schumpeterian model stresses the relevance of instability and 
uncertainty as main factors in his view of competition. The former 
two models consider the existence of a certain level of stability in 
the competitive dynamics under which firms are submitted. This can 
let firms, to a certain extent, take measures to avoid being surprised 
by unsuspected threats or, conversely, take advantage of the 
opportunities that appear. 
For Schumpeter ( 1950), the fundamental impulse of the 
capitalist engine is related to the creation of new methods of 
production, new markets, development of new forms of industrial 
organization and so forth. This process of 'Creative Destruction' brings 
uncertainty and insecurity to the environment of firms, in other 
words, firms are facing the existence of another more unpredictable 
variable: luck. As a result, the process of competition turns out to be 
even more complex. 
35 
Table 3.5 Characteristics of microeconomics models and level of analysis 
LEVEL 
CF 
ANALYSIS 
• ECONOMY 
MODELS 
--------------------------------------------------------
Chamberlinian I. Organizational Schumpeterian 
* process of creative· 
destruction 
* instability and 
uncertainty are 
fundamentals on 
competition 
*fundamental 
impulse of the 
capitalist engine is 
related to creation 
of new markets,new 
forms of industrial 
organization, etc. 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
• INDUSTRY 
* relationship between 
firm and industry is 
fundamental. 
* Structure of industry 
defines return of firm 
* core concepts: 
structure, conduct, 
performance 
--------------- -------------------------------------------------------
* a firm should exploit 
its uniqueness and 
individuality through 
• FIRM technological know-
how, product 
reputation, patents, 
trademarks, etc. 
Source: Adapted from Barney, 1986 
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3.4. Role of government and related issues 
'Business - not governments - create wealth. The primary 
responsibility for improving competitiveness must lie with 
firms. The Government's role is to create the conditions in 
which firms throughout the economy can improve 
competitiveness.' (HMSO, 1994). 
Understanding the role of government 1n the marketplace has 
been the focus of many studies looking for the reasons and 
justifications for direct intervention or absence of it that can bring 
about good results for different economies (HMSO, 1994,1995; 
Howard, 1990; Porter, 1990; Prowse, 1994: 15; Stephens and 
Goodhart, 1994; Thurow, 1990; US GPO, 1985). 
In 1994, the British Government issued a comprehensive white 
paper on competitiveness pointing out the performance of British 
Industry and its relationship with government since 1979 (HMSO, 
1994 ). The idea that only market forces are capable of defining 
better ways for increasing British competitiveness has been buried. 
The document is clear when it acknowledges the vital role of the 
government in supporting, creating a climate, and intervening, if 
necessary, to help businesses to succeed. 
The government's role is to build up an appropriate 
environment in which companies can increase their capacity to 
compete worldwide. Having taken that idea into consideration, the 
British Government seems determined to provide a stable 
macroeconomic environment, stimulate efficiency through adequate 
allocation of resources, support new businesses via realistic tax 
policies, and improve services offered by the public sector. 
As a sound attitude, a government should avoid over-regulation 
that obstructs business interests and innovation, limits consumer 
choice, and overburdens companies. It must be sure that competition 
prevails and is encouraged. Monopolies should not be allowed to 
expand their interests without complying with the public benefits. A 
government should have a proactive role in the marketplace, just 
intervening when goods and services are not properly delivered. In 
other terms, it must restrict itself in areas where the private sector is 
not able to develop the process of wealth creation better than the 
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public sector. Finally, it should ensure that education of good quality 
is available for the whole of society as a matter of crucial importance 
to the national competitive advantage. 
The Report of the President's Commission on Industrial 
Competitiveness (US GPO, 1985) recognizes the role that the 
government has to play to help business to succeed. First of all, it 
must lead the way to increase national competitiveness through 
adequate and responsible measures that are of its responsibility. 
According to this report, a government must select competitiveness 
as a main priority and, at ·the same time, point out to the whole of 
society its importance to the living standard of the population; take 
measures to guarantee a stable macroeconomic environment; 
stimulate the dialogue between leaders in industry, labour, 
government, and academia; lower the cost of capital for companies 
through a fiscal reform and monetary policy and tax laws; increase 
the potential of companies to compete via adequate domestic and 
trade laws; create an environment that improves the flow and 
fairness of word trade; take joint actions with educational institutions 
so that people can be better prepared and trained, and in so doing 
that, be able to respond to changing markets and technologies 
quickly. 
From these different perspectives, the role of government 
continues to be important. Governments cannot be omitted. 
Intervention should happen when markets fail to reach levels of 
efficiency or competition that will better serve the interests of the 
whole society. 
3.4.1. Management 
'Successful companies are led by people with a clear vtswn of 
the company's objectives and how to be achieved, who 
recognise the need to change and innovate. This is essential for 
large and small companies alike.' (HMSO, 1994). 
Another key element related to competitiveness is 
management. It plays a fundamental role into the success of any 
undertaking. Qualified and skillful managers are essential for the 
well-being of any company. For that reason, it is not uncommon to 
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see certain managers being offered huge sums of money to change 
from one place to another. Successful managers know quite well how 
important the involvement and commitment of people at all levels is 
to reach the company's objectives. Successful managers are well 
trained and competent. Management of people, processes, products 
and services require a great deal of knowledge, expertise, team-work, 
leadership, decision-making, trust, and so on. In fact, good 
management is the efficient way to provide customers with the 
products and services they want. 
Since available resources are limited, high quality management 
is needed to achieve the most from the least, in both public and 
private sectors. For the British Government, companies should be 
aware of their responsibility towards raising management 
performance and, as a consequence, undertake the right measures to 
bring this about. In addition, companies can expect some help from 
the Government, particularly, in terms of easier access to a range of 
available business services, as well as, identifying, spreading and 
stimulating the use of better management practices (HMSO, 1994). 
In a competitiveness survey (HBR, 1987) carried out by 
Harvard Business Review, one of the reasons why America's 
competitiveness is declining (as stated by the HBR readers), rests on 
the shoulders of the American managers. For the HBR survey the 
main cause of the weaker competitiveness is poor management. 
Almost 90% of the responses point out managers' attitudes and views 
to competitiveness as being unconcerned and unengaged. But, at the 
same time, 97% HBR readers see the solution to this problem in the 
hands of managers and their ability to improve management skills, to 
seek to change their concepts and reduce their resistance to new 
ideas . 
The competitiveness issue has been under discussion by the 
British Government since the relative decline of the economy began 
over the last decades. In conformity with a report produced by the 
Department of Trade and Industry (DTI), the British industry is weak 
and it is struggling to catch up with other industrialized economies. 
Besides factors such as low investment in technology and inferio~ 
products., one aspect that is striking is concerned with the low level of 
management displayed by the majority of companies (Lorentz and 
Smith, 1993). In fact, continues the report, the biggest weakness 
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found in British manufacturing is due to managers. They are blamed 
for the deplorable situation of the industry. Mainly because, when 
compared with overseas managers, they are less-educated and 
trained and have failed to manufacture winning products that can 
match similar foreign goods. As a result, the DTI points out that 
management is still a matter of concern and must be improved to 
help the British industry to compete on a worldwide basis. 
For Pettigrew and Whipp (1991), competitiveness has a multi-
dimensional perspective. Thus, management attitude will be quite 
important. Accepting this multi-level and dynamic view of 
competition, it will demand a great deal of effort and skill from 
managers. Indeed, to match this holistic approach, management 
should be able to undertake changes, evaluate the environment, 
choose adequate options, make flexible arrangements and decisions 
that can meet the requirements of each situation. The more 
successful the management in dealing with this dynamic approach 
the more visible will the difference between the performance of 
firms be. 
Scott (1985) and Rugman (1987), share with Pettigrew and 
Whipp, the view that management should be able to adapt and make 
decisions bearing in mind the existence of different environments 
and circumstances that will affect the level of competitiveness. 
3.4.2. Productivity 
'Productivity Movement was introduced as one of the principal 
strategies to achieve economic growth, international 
competitiveness and at the same time make social 
contributions, ultimately leading to a better quality of life. 
The need to increase the productivity level of the country 
requires organisations, especially business enterprises, to 
increase the productivity of their operations. Organisations 
need to assess their productivity levels using a reliable 
productivity system and methodology.' (Malaysian National 
Productivity Corporation, 1992). 
Competitiveness and productivity are intimately bonded. There 
is no way to separate one from the other. Greater competitiveness 
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usually means higher level of productivity. Paul Krugman (1994) 
states that for an economy, productivity is the key behind the notion 
of competitiveness. It means a better level of productivity should 
help the nation's growth and bring about a rise in living standards. 
Sharing the same viewpoint, Elstrodt and Lopetegui ( 1994) declare 
that "the higher a nation's productivity, the higher its population's 
standard of living. At the company level, productivity is one of the 
key factors that fuels competitiveness. Productivity growth is the 
driving force of economic growth and higher per ea pi ta incomes." 
Prowse ( 1994 ), Porter ( 1990), Scott (1989), Thurow (1990) and most 
economists regard productivity as being the primary determinant in 
the long-term of a country's living standards. It is the basic element 
of national per capita income. According to Porter, cheap labour and 
exchange rate are not so significant to competitiveness as grasping 
the determinants of productivity as well as the rate of productivity 
growth. 
Malaysian National Productivity Corporation (1992) defines 
productivity as being a ratio of output generated to inputs consumed. 
In other words, productivity is expressed as follows: 
Productivity = Output/Input 
Outputs are all goods and services produced by a company. Inputs 
are the resources utilized by it to get the outputs: labour, energy, 
capital, materials, and others. Thus, productivity means the ability to 
get the most from the least. It is a measure of efficiency, 
performance. 
Balls and Goodhart (1994), Buckey et al. (1988) all connect 
competitiveness and labour productivity. In terms of international 
competitiveness one fundamental measure has been the cost of 
labour, since it has grown over the last few decades in industrialized 
economies. Thus, there is evidence of a great interest to increase 
labour productivity so that the level of competitiveness can be 
raised and, as a consequence, maintain the living standards and be 
able to fight the cheap labour from the developing countries. For 
example, European labour productivity (output per person-hour) has 
been increasing at 2 percent a year since 1979, according to Balls and 
Goodhart. 
Lorenz and Smith (1993), set out that the fundamental output 
by a Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) report on Britain's 
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manufacturing industry is that the manufacturing productivity levels 
in Britain are at least 25% below those of France and Germany; 35% 
of Japan and 45% of the United States. In spite of the British 
productivity growth throughout the 80's this was not enough to 
catch up with the productivity of other European countries (Francis, 
1992). Meanwhile, in the USA manufacturing productivity grew at 
5.3 per cent in 1993 and 4.3 per cent in 1992. Productivity as whole 
augmented 1.6 per cent in 1993 and 3.1 per cent in 1992 (Prowse, 
1994 ). 
3.4.3. Innovation 
'Innovation - the successful exploitation of new ideas - is 
essential for sustained competitiveness and wealth creation. A 
country aiming to keep ahead of its competitors needs 
companies which innovate. Successful innovation requires good 
management, appropriate finance, skills and a supportive 
overall climate.' (HMSO, 1994). 
Innovation can be the difference between survival and death. 
Nowadays those companies unable to rediscover and reinvent 
themselves continually, in terms of new products and services will 
probably disappear. Since companies face one of the most 
competitive and hostile environments ever seen; attitudes, values, 
and perceptions should change to adapt to new realities. New 
competitors have been appearing throughout the world from the 
most distant places and countries. Thanks to free trade, new 
markets, and the spread of technology, information and knowledge 
have been reaching all corners. 
The British Government White Paper on Competitiveness, 
understands innovation as the successful exploitation of new ideas -
either major cultural, organisational or technological changes, or just 
incremental or minor achievements or modifications. Scientific and 
technological advances as well as developments in industrial and 
commercial activities are valuable parts of innovation. Thus, any 
change that can lead to an increase in competitiveness should be 
welcome. Unlike decades ago, when it was possible to carry on selling 
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products without any changes for a long time and keep the market-
share intact, today this approach would be suicidal. 
Companies must accept that they need to be prepared and take 
actions before an environment that is tough and will not allow the 
presence of weak firms. As a result, decisions should be made within 
the organisation to stimulate innovation; to acquire external skills 
and know-how; to train employees in new technologies; to be up-to-
date in terms of new equipment and processes; and increase the 
collaboration with universities and research institutes (HMSO,l994). 
All these measures and actions should allow companies to tackle the 
innovation issue with the proper means and weapons. 
According to Porter (1990), companies can only succeed in 
international markets and accomplish their targets through decisive 
actions of innovation. The approach must be the broadest possible, 
which means involving new technologies and different ways to do 
things. In reality, innovation, to be implemented, demands pressure, 
necessity, and sometimes failure . In spite of all the potential benefits 
that can be gained, successful companies, in general, are afraid to 
undertake innovations and changes. This is not a natural option. On 
the contrary, fear of losses has been a powerful element in imposing 
modification·s. Successful companies have a tendency to become 
attached to stability and predictability. They turn out to be 
unconcerned about new ideas and proposals. At this moment, they 
are at the beginning of their downfall. Business literature has plenty 
of examples of companies that failed to carry out changes when they 
were at the top. Unfortunately, success usually carries the virus of 
failure. 
Geroski and Machin (1992) set out that innovating companies 
are most often faster-growing than their competitors; more profitable 
and can maintain average sales and growth above non-innovators, 
mainly due to new products and innovations that will meet consumer 
demand. So they are open to suggestions from their employees, keep 
an eye on leading innovative companies, and are able to create a 
favourable climate for innovation. Often they have an internal culture 
that stimulates a relaxing and enjoyable working atmosphere. 
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3.5. Conclusions 
Competitiveness means different things to different authors. 
Scott and Lodge (1985), Porter (1990) and Krugman (1994) see 
improvement in competitiveness as the way forward to rising 
standard of living. For Buckley at al. (1988), competitiveness is an 
ongoing process, depending on comparison and its measures can be 
categorised into three groups: competitive performance, competitive 
potential and management process. Then, Pettigrew and Whipp 
(1991) relate competitiveness with a holistic perspective coupled 
with two dimensions: the level of analysis and the element of time. 
The concept of competitiveness is better understood when it 
takes into account different levels of analysis. Each level of analysis 
(country, it:Idustry, enterprise - and product) has a set of specific 
measures that allows an insight into the particularities of the concept. 
Also, the interrelationship between levels of analysis can contribute 
to success of each other. A company level success provides greater 
chances to country level success and vice versa. 
The role of government may or may not increase this level of 
competitiveness . When governments do intervene to increase 
savings, select niches to develop, keep a stable macroeconomic 
environment, encourage new enterprises to set up, maintain a strict 
control of public expenditure, increase public assets efficiency, reduce 
corruption and mismanagement, prioritize education, research and 
development, technology and innovation, and so forth, it may be that 
competitiveness is enhanced. 
However, management is another factor considered important 
to enhance competitiveness. When poor management is present it is 
very hard to overcome barriers and obstacles to achieve an increase 
in competitiveness or to implement the actions of government 
deregulation or privatisation. The burden of poor management of 
course will be on the managers' shoulders. So it is no surprise that 
companies want to contract the best managers because they know a 
good manager can be the difference between profit and loss. The 
trouble is how to find a good manager or to prepare him or her. 
Having a Master of Business Administration (MBA) alone is not 
necessarily a guarantee of competence. In the 1990s besides having a 
business diploma, a manager may require vision, equilibrium, 
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, 
I 
excellent ability to deal with people in different positions, flexibility, 
endurance, determination and clarity about goals and targets, and 
involvement in most matters related to competitiveness and 
commitment to long-term achievement. The question is whether 
competitiveness can be achieved by privatisation strategies alone, or 
to what extent competent management and management knowledge 
can facilitate and enhance competitiveness. 
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4. RESEARCH STRATEGY, METHODOLOGY AND DESIGN 
4.1. Introduction 
This research is a study of two steel companies located in the 
state of Minas Gerais . 
beginning of the 1990s. 
technology and corporate 
Both companies were privatised at the 
Workforce, finance and marketing issues, 
development are some of the main aspects 
that experienced modifications under private control. 
The general research question relates the effects of 
privatisation on competitiveness and performance of industrial 
enterprises. The research question clearly identifies the enterprise as 
the appropriate level of analysis. The two companies to be studied 
were chosen out of a group of eight privatised Brazilian steel 
companies. Alpha was chosen as the best Brazilian firm in 1995, after 
four years as a private company, by a Brazilian business magazine, 
Exam e. The second company, Beta, was the last steel enterprise to be 
privatised. The two companies were selected by the researcher due to 
their relevance to the research, size, accessibility, location, and cost 
considerations. The data collection was carried out over a three-
month period in 1994, from August until October. Further updated 
information has been gathered through the help of people within the 
companies, colleagues in Belo Horizonte, from company literature, and 
financial information. 
Throughout the field work the researcher sought information, 
both written and spoken, company documents, magazines, 
newspapers, etc . Without underestimating the context and the 
difference between what certain people say and what they would like 
to say. Access to quantitative and qualitative data is always a 
constraint in this type of research and its implications for the 
research is considered below. 
4.2. Research strategy and design 
The Brazilian Government initiated the privatisation 
programme at the beginning of the 1990s giving special attention to 
the steel industry. It was chosen as a showcase for the Brazilian 
public and external investors as the steel industry was the least 
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controversial industry to undergo a privatisation process at that time. 
It was the first industry to be totally privatised and it was quite 
convenient for the researcher as many of the newly privatised steel 
companies are located in the state of Minas Gerais, where the 
researcher has his residence and job. From that point onwards, the 
research strategy began to take shape to suit the reality already in 
place. 
In the first place the level of analysis had to be chosen. Country 
and industry levels were definitely out of question as they were not 
feasible due to the limitation of time, the size of the country and total 
costs involved. Also, competitiveness is gained at the enterprise level 
within the context of the industry, economic circumstances, 
government policy, and the broader context. Thus, the level of 
analysis had to be at company level. It was considered the most 
convenient and appropriate before the circumstances at that time: 
resources and time constraints. The analysis at firm level has its 
advantages as it allows a deeper knowledge and understanding of a 
few cases as the case study method was chosen to carry out this 
research. It opens the opportunity to build up a far-reaching 
relationship with some· of the people in the chosen companies. As a 
consequence, the researcher is able to get to know in detail the day-
to-day reality of the business. 
The next stage would entail the selection of an event that could 
become the turning-point for comparing the competitiveness and 
performance of companies. Privatisation arose as the main occurrence 
that could fulfill the watershed role as it was considered "the fact of 
the day" and probably the main contributor in changing the face of 
government involvement in business matters as an administrator and 
shareholder. 
Out of three potential firms to be analysed, two were selected at 
the end of the fieldwor~ one being rejected due to lack of available 
relevant information. All three were privatised between 1991 and 
1993 and were undergoing reorganization and restructuring 
programmes for about three years in preparation for possible 
privatisation. Prior privatisation, all three firms were part of 
SIDERBRAS which was the holding company for the state owned steel 
companies. 
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Table 4.1 sets out some of the main research design issues and 
a brief description of them. 
Table 4.1 Research design 
Issues 
• Level of analysis 
• Theoretical framework 
• Identity of empirical field 
• Research method 
• Data collection process 
• Research management 
process 
(1) See Yin, R. K. (1993) 
Description 
* Firm level 
* Modified Buckley, Pass and Prescott 
framework 
* Industrial sector: steel industry 
Country: Brazil 
Companies: Alpha and Beta 
* Case study: descriptive and 
explanatory 
* Sources of evidence: 
* 
academic literature, business 
journals and newspapers, company 
documents, archives, interviews, 
direct observation · 
Data analysis strategy: relying on 
explanatory and analytical 
frameworks. 
Reporting with linear-analytic 
structures (standard approach for 
research reports) ( 1) 
4.3. The company analysis framework 
The aim of the research framework is to provide an overview 
and description of the main aspects and components involved in the 
restructuring and privatisation of the two case studies. 
Figure 4.1 sets out the three phases of the changing of 
ownership. It shows the different stages of restructuring and related 
privatisation that took place in the two steel companies. Industrial 
restructuring happens when a company takes actions to bridge gaps 
between the current and intended situation. These gaps come out due 
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to changes in technology, organization, marketing, and factor prices. 
Experience has demonstrated that restructuring at the firm level does 
not happen automatically in consequence of macroeconomic policy 
shifts or rapid changes in overall conditions. So restructuring of 
macroeconomic policy changes (privatisation for example) needs 
government intervention to establish directions that facilitate the 
changes required at the firm level (Lieberman, 1990). 
Pre-privatisation and restructuring situation represents the 
stage when actions start to be taken to prepare a company to be 
privatised. Generally, it entails a great deal of restructuring that 
affects areas such as personnel and finance, for instance. It was the 
moment when the government took decisions in order to make the 
company most attractive for potential buyers. Next, it is the 
restructuring and privatisation stage after the decision to privatise 
has been made. Finally, comes Stage Ill when as a privatised entity, a 
company freed from government decrees and directives, starts taking 
actions to explore the opportunities available in the market place. 
Figure 4.2. displays the main constituents of a "Company 
Analysis Framework" used in this research. The framework is based 
on Buckley, Pass and Prescott (1988) study on measures of 
international competitiveness (see chapter 3 for more details) . It is a 
modified version of the framework in the study mentioned above and 
focuses on competitiveness at the firm level. The company analysis 
framework is an attempt to explain the process of change in 
ownership, mentioned previously, and its consequences on a 
company. It comprises three groups: 
• MANAGEMENT 
• COMPETITIVENESS AND PRODUCTIVITY 
• PERFORMANCE 
Each group embodies a number of measures, indicators and 
qualitative assessments intended to explain the dynamics behind the 
process undergone by the two case study companies. The items in the 
three groups help to assess the implications of privatisation for 
competitiveness and performance. 
As the focus is on the firm level, it is necessary to distinguish 
between changes internal to the firm and one in which the 
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management have control and the external changes such as shifts in 
government policies. The external environment of the firm comprises 
all those influences that intervene in the enterprise's performance 
and the way the top management take decisions. Among the external 
influences is the neo-liberal policy adopted by the Brazilian 
government, in the beginning of 1990's, intended to expand foreign 
trade, curb inflation, reduce import tariffs, reduce the public burden, 
increase competition, and deregulate the business activities. Other 
external influences are the creation of the Mercosul common market 
(Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay, and Paraguay) that opened new business 
opportunities for a great number of companies, recovery of the 
domestic economy in the outset of 1990's, the implementation of a 
economic stabilization programme, lifting of the domestic market 
steel price controls, car makers increasing demand, and recovery of 
the steel industry worldwide. 
Among the internal influences are the drastic reduction of the 
workforce, different goals and values of the two companies, different 
technological capabilities, excessive hierarchical levels, management 
affected by political interference, great uncertainty on the boardroom 
and among employees, relationships with competitors, suppliers and 
customers. 
Management components in the framework are those related to 
the way a company is constituted, organized, formulates and 
implements strategies and policies. These strategies and policies are 
the main internal influences on the competitiveness and performance 
of the companies. Broadly, management decision-making acts on the 
"Competitiveness/Productivity" components to improve them as well 
as the performance. Management is a critical aspect that plays an 
important role in any organization. Six components of management 
identified as having the most significant influence on competitiveness 
and performance are ownership, governance, autonomy, incentives, 
organizational structure, and strategy. 
Competitiveness/productivity group embodies those measures 
that help the management to achieve a better performance and 
makes performance sustainable. It is the link between management 
and performance. The success of a company is dependent on the way 
management deals with the competitiveness components. These 
measures influence productivity in quantity and value/unit terms. 
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They are mainly internal: workforce, R&D, technological capabilities, 
production capability and finance/investment; and external/internal: 
products, price/deregulation, market strategy and relationship with 
customers. 
Performance group is constituted of those measures that 
provides management the information needed to improve and assess 
the outcome of a company's operations. It helps the management to 
carry out changes according to the results achieved. Performance 
measures the success or failure of a management and bears a close 
link with the competitiveness/productivity group. Performance is 
dependent on management and competitiveness/productivity 
measures groups as well as influence them. 
Productivity is one of the most commonly used and accepted 
measures influencing cost competitiveness. Also, Profits and Earnings 
per share are the two most used measures of financial performance 
(Kay, 1993: 193). PBIT (profit before interest and taxation)/total 
assets and PBIT/sales are amongst the most popular profitability 
ratios (Samuels, Wilkes, and Brayshaw, 1995:52). Sales margin (net 
profit over sales) and return on equity (net profit over stockholders 
equity) are also very often used as a profitability ratios that take 
into account net profit. Sales/total assets or asset turnover is an 
important ratio that indicates how a company is capable to produce 
profits. Further measures used are costs, sales, market share, exports 
and value added. Most of the ratios and other measures listed are 
widely used by the main Brazilian business magazine to evaluate the 
largest 500 industrial, commercial and service companies in the 
private sector and the top market leaders in 23 main sectors of the 
Brazilian economy (Exame, 1995) and accepted by experts to be 
relevant to the Brazilian business environment. 
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Figure 4.1 Research Framework 
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Figure 4.2. Company Analysis Framework 
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COMPETITIVENESS AND PRODUCTIVITY 
Influences on productivity (quantity) 
(mainly internal) 
* Workforce 
* R&D/Technological capabilities 
* Production capacity 
* Finance/investment 
Influences on productivity (value/unit) 
(external and internal) 
*Products 
*Price/deregulation 
* Market strategy 
* Relationship with customers 
4.4. Research method adopted 
In devising the appropriate methodology for examining the 
effects of privatisation on an enterprise, the researcher faces 
problems which are common to most other areas of research in 
business and the social sciences. From the available information, it is 
often difficult to separate the effects of some changes from those of 
others. For example, while the Brazilian steel enterprises were being 
privatised, they were also being influenced by changes in variables 
such as the Brazilian inflation rate, growth in the demand of steel, 
trade liberalisation policies and growth in the world demand for 
steel. Faced with such a complex situation, one approach would be to 
base the investigation entirely on a limited number of easily 
quantifiable variables (e.g. productivity, exports, sales). Another 
would be to focus on the qualitative aspects (e.g. governance, 
strategy). The alternative approaches clearly have very different 
implications for data requirements, the forms of analysis and the 
nature and validity of the results. The methodology used in this 
thesis is a blend of the quantitative and qualitative approaches. 
Before it is considered in more detail, it is useful to examine the pros 
and cons of the alternative approaches and their underlying 
philosophical foundations. 
As Knights (1984) has stated, in general, quantitative 
methodologies (survey, statistical sampling, closed questionnaires, 
reports, records, files, etc.) aim to create generalisable statements 
conc,erning the object of the study through a representative survey 
and to validate it by standard statistical techniques. On the other 
hand, the approach of the qualitative methodologies (case study, 
open-ended questionnaires, formal interviews, participant-
observation, etc.) seek more detailed understanding of processes, 
causes and effects and aim to examine what happens behind the 
public facade of an institution, organisation or activity. 
The choice of the right approach to an investigation depends on 
the nature of knowledge being sought. According to Archer (1988), 
the three main epistemological standpoints are positivism, non-
positivism and normativism. These are directly related to · the basic 
premises on the nature of knowledge. Positivism embraces the idea 
that facts and value judgements can be and should be separated and 
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therefore the investigation of a certain reality can be carried out 
without being affected by a researcher's values. Positivism 
incorporates two main assumptions: (a) reality is external and 
objective, and (b) knowledge is based on the external reality (Smith, 
Thorpe, Lowe, 1992). Non-positivism accepts the idea that facts and 
values are intrinsically related and intertwined. Normativism is a 
more extreme view, where the fact-value distinction cannot be 
separate and value judgements are always involved in any process of 
research investigation. 
The understanding of the nature of reality has implications for 
the nature of knowledge and its viewpoints. Archer states that there 
are three main theories of reality (ontology): external realism or 
traditional 
External 
realism, internal realism, and subjective idealism. 
realism states that reality exists independently of the 
observer. It matches the positivistic viewpoint when the latter 
distinguishes facts and values. Subjective idealism has the opposite 
view when it sees reality as something to be constructed by the 
subject according to his/her specific ambience. Internal realism 
regards reality as being a commonly shared value system therefore 
independent of a person's own reality. The knowledge and reality 
combinations are summarised in Table 2.2. 
The various attitudes concerning research methodology, 
according to Archer, show a combination of theories of reality and 
theories of knowledge. Most of the time when researchers display 
quite different viewpoints, this is because they support a particular 
arrangement of epistemology and ontology positions. The two 
extreme combinations are positivism/external realism and 
normativism/subjective idealism. The former states that the object 
to be researched exists independently of the research community's 
beliefs and values. In other words it is independent of the observer, 
value-free, and reductionist. This approach stresses the benefit of 
potential generalisations of research findings as it is based on 
extensive statistical analyses of multiple observations. Nevertheless, 
it fails to realise the limitations (eg the richness of an in-depth 
analysis of the subject, the context and process). 
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Table 4.2 Theories of knowledge and reality matrix 
Options 
I 
(extreme) 
II 
Ill 
IV 
V 
VI 
VII 
VIII 
IX 
(extreme) 
Theories of know ledge 
(Epistemology) 
Positivism 
Positivism 
Positivism 
Non-positivism 
Non-positivism 
Non-positivism 
Normativism 
Normativism 
Normativism 
Theories of reality 
(Ontology) 
External realism or 
Traditional realism 
Internal realism 
Subjective idealism 
External realism 
Internal realism 
Subjective idealism 
External realism 
Internal realism 
Subjective idealism 
Source: Adapted from S. Archer (1988) "Qualitative re.search and the 
epistemological problems of the management disciplines" in 
Pettigrew, A. M. (ed) Competitiveness and the management 
process. Basil Blackwell 
The normativism/subjective idealism combination sets out that 
there is interdependence between researcher and the researched 
object and between fact and value. Reality is deemed to be a product 
of an individual researcher's observation and interpretation. As such, 
generalizations, value-free investigation, reductionism are not 
possible. 
4.5. Case study method 
The two extreme combinations outlined above do not fit in 
with the characteristics and realities of this research. Among the 
options displayed in Table 4.2. the non-positivist/internal realism 
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position, which states that facts and values are difficult to separate 
but not inseparable; is the most appropriate. Besides, reality is seen 
as a value system socially produced and commonly shared. 
Vaidya (1993) asserts that a relevant amount of value 
judgement is presented when one is "(a) making a statement of the 
issues to be investigated, (b) defining the boundaries and the context 
of the investigation, and (c) designing the research methodology." The 
Company Analysis Framework introduced in section 4.3, makes a 
statement of the issues to be investigated and defines the boundaries 
and the context of the investigation. 
The case study method was adopted in this research due to its 
strengths as a technique allowing an in-depth analysis of an event 
and the context within which it happens. Both qualitative and 
quantitative evidence have been used to develop an understanding of 
the effect of privatisation and related restructuring on the two 
enterprises. The situation being examined is complex with many 
changes taking place in the Brazilian economy, economic policies as 
well as the Brazilian and world steel markets and availability of 
quantitative data are limited. Under these circumstances a 
positivistic, external methodology attempting a rigorous quantitative 
test of possible cause and effect is neither possible nor desirable. It 
was thought to be more appropriate to combine quantitative data 
(e.g. changes tn productivity, employment, profitability) with 
qualitative information (e.g. changes in company culture and 
strategy). 
The context was unique as the companies being examined were 
going through a process almost totally new and unknown in Brazil. 
Government, state-owned companies, and the general public did not 
know the probable outcome of such a radical change of mentality, 
ownership and management involved in the privatisation of entire 
industries. 
The approach adopted in this thesis fits in well with Yin (1989), 
who describes the case study as a contemporary event with its own 
context, where the boundaries between the occurrence and context 
are not very distinct, and multiple sources of information can be 
used. Hartley (1994) similarly defines case study research as 
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'a detailed investigation, often with data collected over a period 
of time, of one or more organizations, or groups within 
organizations, with a view to providing an analysis of the 
context and processes involved in the phenomenon under 
study. The phenomenon is not isolated from its context (as in 
say, laboratory research) but is of interest precisely because it 
is in relation to its context'. 
The main criticisms of case study methodology are related to 
investigator's bias and difficulties of generalising results (Figure 4.3). 
Whatever the research strategy adopted by any researcher there will 
always be some bias influencing the findings. The investigator must 
remain aware of the possibility of such bias and attempt to reduce it 
by consulting a number of persons, some of them independent of the 
companies being investigated and by attempting to establish 
objective criteria for classifying and assessing the collected 
information. The second most common criticism of the case study 
methodology is to do with the validity of results. It is claimed that 
results from case studies cannot be readily generalised and applied 
elsewhere. 
Apart from improving understanding of the issues under 
investigation, the broader combination to knowledge of the case 
study approach is the addition to the case study clinical knowledge 
which could be specifically applicable in some other cases or simply 
of value as a general guide for other investigations. Case studies also 
generate hypotheses which can be tested more rigorously by other 
methods. 
Alpha and Beta were both restructured and privatised but are 
very different in terms of organizational culture, management, 
market niche, products exported, size, age of business, and so on. In 
these case studies , generalisations could be on the relative 
importance of privatisation and other factors on the performance and 
competitiveness of the companies. They would add to the case study 
clinical knowledge of all the privatisations that have been studied 
and identify specific issues (e.g. changes over longer periods of time) 
that should be studied. 
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Figure 4.3 CASE STUDY METHODOLOGY: STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES 
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researcher 
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4.6. The choice of industry and companies 
The steel industry was the first Brazilian business sector to be 
entirely privatised by the end of 1993. It is an important basic 
industry in an industrialising country such as Brazil. The majority of 
the industry was state-owned and managed under SIDERBRAS, a state 
holding company. The industry is one of the main sources of hard 
currency for the Brazilian Government and has some major Brazilian 
companies by any criteria. 
The three initially selected steel companies are located in the 
state of Minas Gerais, all with headquarters in Belo Horizonte and 
steelworks situated in neighbouring towns. The researcher chose the 
three companies as they match the main aspects mentioned before 
and because the researcher is located in Belo Horizonte and has 
contacts with many people in the steel industry. Knowing people from 
the industry can facilitate access and provide vital information, 
otherwise extremely difficult to get. Costs of travelling for the 
research were also minimized by choosing companies in Belo 
Horizonte. 
At the end of the data collection one of the companies was 
eliminated due to lack of commitment to participated in the research 
on the part of the company and the anticipated difficulty in obtaining 
relevant data for this company as a result. The two remaining 
companies were impeccably professional in their dealings with the 
researcher throughout the collection of data. From the start, they 
appointed a representative who would be in permanent contact with 
the researcher and would help him to arrange interviews with 
mangers and others within the company and gather relevant data. 
4. 7. Data collection 
The main data collection was held in Belo Horizonte (Minas 
Gerais state capital) and Ouro Branco over a period of three months. 
Later information was gathered through colleagues, from company 
literature and financial information. 
Right from the beginning. after being contacted from England, 
one of the companies showed great interest in the subject and 
demonstrated this by sending a letter indicating willingness to 
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participate straightaway. The second company sent plenty of 
leaflets, booklets and balance sheets, but did not indicate great 
enthusiasm in further involvement. Back in Brazil, personal contacts 
were made to try to elucidate any doubts concerning the subject, data 
and interviews. At the end of the first month there, the second 
company agreed to participate in the research. The third company 
also sent a letter agreeing to the research being undertaken, as long 
as further contacts were made when in Belo Horizonte. The person 
designated to be the middleman had a great deal of interest in the 
research, but he left the company. Unfortunately, the new person 
selected to be the middleman did not show great interest and almost 
all the time was busy and unavailable. After two months trying to get 
access, finally a letter allowing the research to be carried out was 
received . Then, further difficulties came up since most of the 
information asked for was not available, given that it was considered 
confidential. That being so, it was decided to scrap this company from 
the bulk of the research. 
In the two companies, sources of evidence utilized were direct 
observations (e.g. steel mill) , documentation (e.g. balance sheets), 
archival records and interviews (with open-ended questions). Written 
reports of events, articles from the mass media, newspapers, journals, 
were some of the additional documentation used. List of customers, 
suppliers, competitors, distribution of customers, range of products, 
number of employees over time, organizational charts, sources of 
funds, capital structure, dividend policy, were the main archival 
records consulted. Lastly, the other important source of evidence was 
in-depth interviews (Table 4.3). 
4.6. Research questionnaire 
The research questionnaire used in the in-depth interviews is 
made up of questions comprising four parts: summary information 
about the firm's history, products, employment, turnover and 
financial position; changes related to privatisation, competitiveness 
and general information on personnel. 
The questionnaire is composed of 44 questions, 16 being 
related to general company information, 15 to privatisation issues, 10 
to competitiveness issues and the last 3 to general data. Most of the 
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questions were open-ended, covering topics such as company history, 
ownership, distribution of customers and suppliers, main products, 
technology adopted, market, organisational structure, marketing 
strategies, circumstances of the privatisation process, company 
objectives before and after privatisation, competitiveness factors, 
impact of privatisation on competitiveness and so on. The 
questionnaire questions in English and Portuguese are set out in 
Appendix I. 
Table 4.3 Methods used to gather information 
Subjects of investigation 
• International competitiveness 
- definitions, level of analysis and 
measures, the government role, 
education and training, and so on. 
• Privatisation process 
- definitions and principles, 
objectives, benefits and 
disadvantages, ownership, natural 
monopolies, and so on 
• Iron and steel industry 
- World and Brazil 
• Case study companies 
- Alpha and Beta 
4.9. Interviews 
* 
* 
* 
* 
Primary method 
literature search, company 
documents 
literature search, company 
documents 
literature search, company 
documents 
interviews, company 
documents including 
archival records, direct 
observation 
Twenty-nine people were interviewed by the researcher, 
thirteen being from Alpha, thirteen from Beta and only three from 
the third company which was eliminated from the research at the 
early stage as indicated above. The interviewees were 
superintendents, managers, advisors and engineers (see Table 4.4 ). 
Those who had been chosen were informed beforehand so that 
they could prepare themselves for the interviews, make 
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ar.rangements for the meeting, gather informative material, and so on. 
A copy of the questionnaire was sent in advance so that the 
interviewee could think about the questions he/she would be faced 
with. During the interviews, most of the interviewees had minutes, 
memoranda, tables and other documents, that would enable them to 
answer the questions. The duration of the interviews varied between 
one hour and three hours, all depending on the relevance of the 
subject to the research and availability of the interviewee. Some of 
the interviewees were interviewed more than once. All interviews 
were conducted by the researcher, thus allowing a similar approach 
as well as an opportunity to explore the surroundings and observe 
aspects related to working conditions, facilities, tension between 
colleagues and superiors, and so forth. 
Table 4.4 Sample hierarchical 
Hierarchical 
position Alpha 
* Superintendent 
* Manager 6 
* Advisor 4 
* Engineer 3 
* Total 13 
Source: Interview data 
position breakdown 
Companies 
Beta Gamma 
2 
4 1 
4 1 
3 1 
13 3 
Total 
2 
1 1 
9 
7 
29 
4.10. Difficulties getting access to companies, people and data 
Getting access to companies is not an easy task. There is no 
tradition of opening doors to researchers in Brazil. Just a few 
companies take seriously the importance and value that research has 
both for the company and for the community. Generally speaking, 
research and researchers are viewd with a certain suspicion. Some 
companies think that it is waste of time and money allowing 
researchers onto their premises, looking around, talking to their 
employees, and disrupting their working day. 
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To overcome those misconceptions and prejudices, usually a 
great deal of persuasion is required. Beforehand, the researcher 
made an appointment with a key person in the company to explain to 
her/him what the research was all about: reasons, justifications, 
objectives, and potential gains for the company. The researcher 
reminded the company of its social responsibility regarding sharing 
its experience with others so that a greater number of people could 
get access to information and experience which otherwise would be 
restricted to just a few people. However, doing that, the company 
could gain rewards, given that someone from outside could raise 
issues and see aspects concealed to the majority of employees. 
Besides that, at the end of the research a copy of it would be handed 
in to the company that had let the research be carried out. 
To gain access to a company easier, personal contact with a 
person inside it is invaluable. Unfortunately, such access is not 
always possible and therefore "cold" contacts are necessary. These 
require going through formal channels, which are more time 
consuming and not always successful. 
The researcher found that in the two case study companies, 
people were usually quite helpful and willing to cooperate after 
learning the content and purpose of the research and why they were 
chosen to be interviewed. At the very beginning, some employees 
were a little bit cautious, given that their companies had undertaken 
major reorganization programmes resulting in thousands of people 
being out of work. They did not want to be the next ones to be fired 
just because of things they said during an interview. The key issue 
throughout the data collection time was trust. People must trust you 
and believe that you are serious and intend to do something that will 
be worthwhile. Interviewees who feel proud when selected to be part 
of research, in general, are more responsive and willing to cooperate 
fully. 
One the main difficulties during the data collection was to 
arrange a time when people could be interviewed. Most of interviews 
were carried out in the early morning or late afternoon, to suit the 
employees' interests and time availability. Giveu the level of demand 
upon employees, mainly after reorganisation and privatisation 
programmes, the number of tasks to be carried out by them had 
increased significantly, according to some. In general, most 
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interviewees were quite helpful and keen to give all the information 
they could on their subject. Just a few of them showed a certain lack 
of interest and motivation, by forgetting the appointments or arriving 
late. Usually, they did not give any explanation for their lapse. 
Access to data was also a great issue and a source of 
difficulties. The researcher tried from the very beginning to convince 
companies that data gathered would be used strictly within the 
research objectives and would not be released for other purposes. So 
a great deal of trust had to exist to allow companies to let their 
employees supply the information demanded by the research. Again, 
most of the interviewees showed great trust in the researcher, 
revealing all the information they were asked for. Of course, there 
were a few cases when the interviewees were so intimidated and 
insecure that the simplest information was considered vital and 
confidential. The main reason for this behaviour could be explained 
by the sweeping effects that reorganisation had left upon the 
employees, primarily in one the companies where the workforce had 
been almost halved. The fear of being fired was so great that they 
hardly mentioned anything that could be used as a motive for their 
bosses to get rid of them. 
4.11. Sorting out all the information gathered for analysis 
From the beginning of the research one of the areas that caused 
much concern was collection and sorting of the gathered data. 
Throughout the collection of data the researcher, after every 
interview, tried to write down notes and comments on interesting 
remarks made by the interviewee as well as organize all the leaflets, 
booklets, written reports, articles from the mass media, archival 
records, and so on that were handed in by a specific company. Each 
one had its own box where all relevant information was kept. 
The data collected should be arranged in a way that makes 
sense and can be found easily. Classification was made by company 
and notes, comments, copies of interviews, leaflets, and more filled 
according to different subject-matter such as company background, 
ownership, production, products, marketshare, technology, exports 
and imports, sales, productivity, workforce, and so forth. 
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Unfortunately, as almost always happens, not all the data 
needed for the research are obtained at once. There is not much 
problem when this takes place if the researcher is living near the 
source of data. Nevertheless, when the researcher is living some ten 
thousand kilometres away filling in gaps in the data is difficult. It 
was possible to fill in most of the gaps in the data even obtain 
updated information from the contacts established during the 
company visits. 
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5. BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT AND STEEL INDUSTRY CONTEXT 
5.1. Introduction 
The aim of this chapter is to give an overview of the Brazilian 
economic policies and the Brazilian and international steel industries. 
It provides the context for the examination of the two companies. 
This is necessary as during the period of examination the Brazilian 
steel industry and the case study companies have been influenced by 
a number of external forces as well as privatisation and the related 
restructuring. This is recognised in the framework and some of the 
external influences are explicitly examined in the case studies. An 
attempt has been made in analysing the companies to distinguish 
between the external influences and the effects of restructuring and 
privatisation. The chapter starts by presenting the Brazilian context, 
its main characteristics and peculiarities including some of the main 
economic changes that occurred over the last years in Brazil. Further, 
a section on the Brazilian steel industry sets out some of the main 
features of the industry. The International steel industry section 
portrays some of the main aspects of the industry worldwide which 
affect the Brazilian steel industry and enterprises. 
5.2. Brazilian economic context 
The years 1969 to 1973 are known as the "economic miracle" 
period when Brazil became one of the fastest growing economies in 
the world. Then came the years between 1974 and 1983, 
characterized by a fall in industrial growth and economic activity in 
general, coupled with the high inflation. The main external reason 
was the oil crisis but poor macroeconomic management, exchange 
rate and trade policies made the situation worse (Oliveira, 1989). The 
1980s are known by some economists as the "lost years", when 
inflation rose sharply reaching almost 1800 per cent per year in 1989 
and GDP decreased by -4.4 per cent in the following year, the worst 
macroeconomic performance in recent times. The policies known in 
Brazil as "neo-liberal" introduced since the late 1980s appear to have 
improved the macroeconomic situation and the performance of the 
industrial sector. At the macroeconomic level, these policies have 
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included tighter monetary and fiscal policies. In addition trade 
barriers have been lowered, price controls have been removed and 
government subsidies to industrial enterprises have either been 
completely removed or significantly reduced. The privatisation 
programme, which started with the sale of one of the companies 
studied in this thesis, is a consequence of the change in the policies. 
Another important development for the Brazilian economy and 
industry has been the creation of the Latin American Common 
Market, Mercosul (It was established in 1991 by Brazil, Argentina, 
Paraguay and Uruguay). The long term aim of the member countries 
is to create a trading block which includes all South American 
countries with a market of 300 million consumers. The elimination of 
trade barriers within Mercosul. (Note: But in this respect, the 
Brazilian steel industry is well placed as it has the largest home 
market base in Latin America and is the longest established in the 
region). 
In the 1990s the "REAL" stabilisation programme has kept 
inflation below 40 per cent per year while 40 per cent was the 
montly rate during some years. At the same time, GDP has been 
growing at about 5 per cent per year. Economic stabilization has 
played an important part in changing the attitudes and behaviour of 
individuals and businesses. Instead of taking a short-term approach 
to survive in the face of economic uncertainty (in the case of many 
companies through the use of instruments in the financial markets), 
many companies have started to take a long term view and expand 
productive capacity. Consumers have also increased their spending as 
a result of rising incomes and · less uncertainty. 
Brazil has an area of 8,547,403.5 square kilometres; it is the 
world's fifth largest country, after Russia, Canada, United States and 
China. It is located in South America, being 47% of the continental 
area. The national language is Portuguese. Brazil is the world's fifth 
most populated country, having a population of 160 million 
inhalbitants. Life expectancy is 66 years, adult illiteracy is 20 percent 
and infant mortality is 66 per 1000 live births (Financial 
Times/Brazil Survey 6 June 1996). Some of the key economic 
indicators are shown below (see Table 5.1). 
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The main trading partners are the European Union, the United 
States, Mercosul and Asia. They constitute 77 percent of all exports 
and imports. Figures 5.1 and 5.2 display the main figures. 
Table 5.1 Brazilian economy key indicators 
Indicators 
* Total GDP ($bn) 
* Real GDP growth (%) 
* Annual inflation 
* Income share of poorest 50% (%) 
* Tax burden as share of GDP(%) 
* Exports ($bn) 
* Imports ($bn) 
* Trade balance 
* International reserves (year end in $bn) 
1994 
624.2 
5.7 
912 
10.4 
28.3 
39.8 
28.6 
+11.3 
36.5 
Source: Financial Times/Brazil Survey 6 June 1996:ii 
Figure 5.1 Brazilian exports breakdown 
Others 
26% 
Asia 
17% 
Mercosul 
13% 
European Union 
26% 
United State~ 
18% 
Source: Financial Times/Brazil Survey 6 June 1996 
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1995 
644 
4.2 
18.8 
11.6 
30.1 
42.6 
45.7 
-3.1 
50.5 
Figure 5.2 Brazilian imports breakdown 
Others 
23% 
Asia 
17% 
Mercosul 
14% 
European Union 
25% 
United States 
21% 
Source: Financial Times/Brazil Survey 6 June 1996 
Since the 1960s, Brazil has had pursued an import substitution 
policy under which it sought to develop a number of major industries 
within a protected domestic market. In the late 1980s, the 
government realized that protection alone is not enough to develop 
efficient and competitive industries. The consequences of tight 
protection in many industries were disastrous since companies 
became relaxed regarding the quality of their products and started to 
charge domestic customers high prices as there were few foreign 
products . to compare or to buy. 'Brazil's private sector will remember 
the 199o"s as a time of strenuous and often painful readjustment' 
(Financial Times/Brazil Survey 6 June 1996:iv). 
The reduction of import tariffs, creation of the Mercosul market, 
privatisation of entire industries, and the reduction of inflation from 
four to two digits a year, put an end to easy profits derived from 
financial speculation. Companies had to improve their productivity 
and quality of their products to become competitive and improve 
their financial performance. Trade liberalization has faced Brazilian 
manufacturing companies with increased competition from foreign 
products which in many cases are much cheaper and of better 
quality. The effects of this policy have been stormy. The number of 
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complaints by those industries affected (eg, textiles, footwear) is 
enormous. In spite of that, the government seems to be inclined to 
carry on with this policy. The government's view the liberal trade 
policy will bring some casualties, but domestic firms will have to 
become more competitive. 
According to MA Economic Consultants, the Brazilian industrial 
sector has been under great pressure over the last three years (1992-
1995). In a study of 16 industrial sectors, figures show that industrial 
production has increased by 12%, productivity by 33% on average, 
meanwhile, the workforce has been reduced by 15%. However, in 
spite of the productivity growth, the prices of industrial goods 
increased by 45% since 1992. The best performers were transport, 
electrical, telecommunications products, automobile industries, which 
grew by around 36%. The worst performers were textiles and 
footwear industries, where production levels decreased by 7.1% and 
6 .5%, respectively. The steel industry net profit over sales increased 
8.8 per cent in 1995 (Exame magazine, 22 May 1996:60). 
As shown above, the Brazilian economy has been undergoing 
countless changes since the outset of the 90's decade. To give a much 
broader picture of what has happened over the last 10 years, a group 
of charts are displayed. The objective is to help the reader to better 
understand the Brazilian economy context within which this research 
was carried out. Figure 5.3 displays the inflation rates and their 
development since 1986. It shows that the Brazilian economy has 
been quite unstable over the last years, according to the chart. It was 
a period of great financial speculation and low investment in 
production. 
Figures 5.4 and 5.5 display the GDP and GDP per capita. Over 
the last years, the economic instability, high inflation, government 
maladministration, high public indebtedness, lack of investment, all 
these aspects took their toll on GDP growth. After a period of decline 
from 1989, the GDP per capita began to grow in 1993 onwards, 
reaching US$3545.00 by 1994. Manufacturing production of selected 
goods has been improving over the last five years, despite some 
setbacks, as shown by Figures 5.8, 5.10 and 5.11. As the economy 
gets better and stable, car production presents clear signs of 
recovery. In 1995, it attained 1543.3 thousand units. It expects to 
exceed the 2 million level by the year 2000 (Financial Times, 13 May 
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1996:30) with will be possible by probable expected of a number of 
foreign car producers including Hyundai, Mercedes-Benz, Asia Motors, 
Honda, Mitsubishi, Peugeot, Renault and Audi. The foreign car makers 
are planning to invest US$10.6 billion in Brazil by the end of the 
decade (Financial Times, 5 March 1996:iv). 
The purchasing power of the population has increased since 
1993 with GDP growth averaging 4. 7 per cent in the years 1993 to 
1995 (see Figure 5.4). The 1994 Economic Stabilisation Programme 
has also brought down inflation from more than 2700 per cent in 
1993 to 15 per cent in 1995 (Figure 5.3). Both these developments 
have contributed to steady growth in the demand for cars and 
household appliances such as television sets, refrigerators, video 
players, microwaves, dish washers and cookers (as shown by Figures 
5.8 and 5.10). As cars and some household appliances are steel · 
intensive products, growth in these sectors would be expected to 
increase domestic consumption of steel. 
Figure 5.6 sets out the Brazilian exports breakdown. The bulk of 
exports is made of manufactured goods, while raw materials stand for 
less than 25.0%. Cars and transport goods represent 9.0% of all 
exports. Figure 5.7 shows the Brazilian imports breakdown. The bulk 
of imports is constituted by raw material and semi-finished products 
(45.3%). Capital goods and consumer goods stand for over 40% of the 
total. Fuel and lubricants represent approximately 10.0%. Figure 5.12 
displays the share of three sectors of the economy. Over the last ten 
years (1985-1995), services (46.6% - 50.0%) and agriculture (11.1% -
13.0%) have seen their share increased. On the other hand, 
manufacturing reduced its share from 42.3% in 1985 to 37.0% in 
1995 (Brazil em Exame Magazine June/1996:15). 
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Figure 5.3 Brazilian inflation (%) 
1986 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 
Source: Exame Magazine, June/1996, FGV, IGP-01 
Figure 5.4 Brazilian GDP 
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Figure 5.5 GDP per capita - in US dollar of 1 994 
1986 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 
Source: Exame Magazine, June/1996 
Exhibit 5.6 Brazilian exports by product (%) 
Source: Exame Magazine, June/1996 
74 
Exhibit 5. 7 Brazilian imports by product (%) 
Raw material and semi-finished products 45.3 
. 
Capital good: 24.2 
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Source: Exame Magazine, June/1996 
Exhibit 5.8 Brazil's output of cars and light trucks 
(000) 
1499.8 1543.3 
1986 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 
Source: Exame Magazine, June/1996 
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Exhibit 5.9 Brazilian crude steel production (OOOt) 
(tons) 
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Source: Exame Magazine, June/1996 
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Exhibit 5.10 Household appliance sales (COOs) 
(Year) 3031 .2 
1995 1923.6 6066 
2400.6 
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Exhibit 5.11 Household appliance sales {OOOs) 
(Year) 
1995 na 
1994 
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Source: Exame Magazine, June/1996 
Figure 5.1 2 Economy sectors breakdown 
Manufacturing 
37% 
Agriculture 
13% 
Source: Exame Magazine, June/1996 
* Approximate figures 
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Services 
50% 
5.3. The National steel industry context 
The Brazilian steel industry was initially set up in the 1940s, 
when the Government created the Companhia Siderurgica Nacional 
(CSN). At that time, the Brazilian economy based on farming, mining 
and other primary activities. An important objective of the 
Government was to initiate a programme of industrialization. In 
establishing the steel industry, an important aim was to reduce the 
dependence on imported steel as the war could jeopardize the 
delivery. A deal was struck between the Brazilian and American 
Governments according to which the Brazilian Government would be 
helped by the American Government to build up its first steelmill 
plant as long as the Brazil took the side of the Allies in World War II. 
Brazilian soldiers were sent to Europe to fight for the Allies and in 
exchange the Brazilian Government had its first steel mill. After the 
war, other state-owned steel mills (for example, Usiminas, Cosipa, 
Acesita, Acominas) were established and stayed in public hands until 
the privatisation programme in the 1990s. 
The Brazilian steel industry is made up of 27 companies located 
in 11 states. Its annual production capacity was 28.5m tonnes of 
crude steel in 1995. In 1994, steel output reached a total of 25.8m 
tonnes, and Brazil became the eighth biggest steel producing country 
in the world, according to the Institute Brasileiro de Siderurgia (IBS). 
Domestic consumption of steel products reached 12.8 million tonnes 
in 1994, an increase of 15 per cent over the previous year. Iron and 
steel products accounted for 14.0 per cent of the Brazilian exports in 
1995 and earned almost US$6.0 billion of hard currency for the 
country. 
Exports in 1994 reached 11.08m tonnes of steel, accounting for 
48 percent of output, down from 12.24m tonnes in 1993. By1994, 
exports generated US$3.2 billion in revenue. As a whole the sector's 
turnover was US$12 billion. In January 1995, steel exports fell to 
625,900 tonnes, nearly 32.3 percent less than the same month in 
1994. Exports in January 1995 totalled US$201m. An explanation of 
the fall in Brazilian steel exports is the increase in local demand from 
sectors such as carmakers, auto-parts, steel welded tubes, industrial 
equipment and packaging. In addition there are other reasons such as 
the stronger Brazilian currency, high taxes and transport costs which 
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have made the Brazilian steel relatively uncompetitive In 
international markets. 
The steel companies are planning to invest US$7 .0 billion 
between 1994 and 2000 to raise annual production capacity to 32m 
tonnes from a current capacity of 28.5m tonnes, according to IBS. In 
1995, the total investment expected would reach US$1.3 billion 
mainly in training and environmental protection. In 1994, the 
industry invested US$700m , up from US$340m in 1993. 
Productivity has been steadily increasing over the last years. 
This is mainly due to the reduction of manpower, hardware 
improvement, reorganization and rationalization within companies. 
The Brazilian steelworker produced 186.5 tonnes in 1991, but in 
1994, production reached an average of 260 tonnes per worker. In 
terms of man/hour/ton it is expected that productivity levels will 
attain values between five and six, by 1997/98. 
Brazilian crude steel consumption per capita which was 120 kg 
in 1981, dropped to 65 kg due to the deep recession that hit the 
country's economy during the 80's and at the beginning of the 90's. 
However, in 1995, the forecast is that the per capita consumption will 
reach 100 kg/inhab. 
Finally, there seems to have been the beginning of a new cycle 
of development happening in the Brazilian economy from 1993 
onwards. The steel industry is very much part of this ongoing 
process with its 98 thousand employees and a turnover of US$12 
billion in 1994. There is a renewed confidence in the sector after the 
privatisation period (1991-1993) which brought about great changes 
in terms of reorganization and mentality. According to experts in the 
steel sector, after privatisation companies are more prepared, both 
qualitatively and quantitatively, to fight their way through the 
international arena, where competition is fierce. The Brazilian 
steelmills are going through a period of optimism and facing a 
scenario of growth and development, investing in improvement of 
quality and productivity as well as modernising their management. 
Crude steel production 
Brazilian crude steel production increased steadily from 1983 
untH 1990. From a total production of 14.7 million tonnes in 1983, 
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reaching 25.1 million tonnes at the end of the 1980s. By 1983, Brazil 
accounted for 2.2 percent of world crude steel production of 663.4m 
tonnes, reaching 3.2 percent by 1988. Unfortunately, due to recession 
and other economic problems production dropped by about 20 
percent in 1990, in comparison with 1989. 
Meanwhile, the world steel production fell by just less than 5 
per cent in 1992. Recently, Brazilian production has started to 
increase again, mainly because of improvement in the economy 
(increased demand from the car industry, for example) and exports to 
Asia and Mercosul (especially to Argentina) . In 1992, production 
reached 23.9m tonnes, 3.3 percent of world production of 722.7m 
tonnes (see Table 5.2). 
Table 5.2 Brazilian crude steel production (OOOt) 
Year 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1991 
1992 
World 
(A) 
663,398 
710,137 
718,941 
713,587 
736,530 
780,178 
785,838 
770,220 
737,075 
722,663 
Source: IISI 1993, IBS 1993 
Brazil 
(B) 
14,671 
18,386 
20,456 
21,233 
22,228 
24,657 
25,055 
20,600 
22,617 
23,898 
B/A 
(%) 
2.2 
2.6 
2.8 
3.0 
3.0 
3.2 
3.2 
2.7 
3.1 
3.3 
Table 5.3 shows the Brazilian crude steel production in relation 
to that in Latin America. Brazil is by far the biggest producer in the 
region. From 1983 to 1992 it increased its share by almost 8 per cent. 
In 1983 Latin American production reached 29.1 million tonnes as 
Brazilian production achieved 14.7 million tonnes, 50.4 per cent of 
the total. In 1987, the Latin American production reached a level 
above 40 million tonnes of which Brazil' proportion was 55.4 per 
cent. Considering a period of 10 years (1983-1992), 1989 was the 
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year when the total production attained its maximum result. More 
than 42.7m tonnes were produced in that year, Brazilian production 
representing 58.6 percent of the total. The year of 1990 shows the 
worst figures for the period in consideration. Production dropped to 
38.5m tonnes, 10 percent fewer than the previous year. This 
reduction happened mainly due to a decrease in production in Brazil. 
Table 5.3 Brazil's crude steel production relative position in Latin 
America (OOOt) 
Year 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1991 
1992 
Latin America 
(A) 
29,105 
33,579 
36,200 
37,848 
40,101 
42,710 
42,759 
38,511 
39,549 
41,368 
Source: IISI 1983, IBS 1993 
Brazil B/A 
(B) (%) 
14,671 50.4 
18,386 54.8 
20,456 56.5 
21,233 56.1 
22,228 55.4 
24,657 57.7 
25,055 58.6 
20,600 53.5 
22,617 57.2 
23,898 57.8 
In spite of that, the Brazilian share continued to be more than 
50 percent, smaller, however, than in 1989. In 1992, recovery was 
underway with steel production reaching 41.4m tonnes in the whole 
region. Brazilian production was 23.9m tonnes, 57.8 percent of the 
total. 
Table 5.4 sets out the regional distribution of crude steel 
production in Brazil. The Brazilian South Eastern accountS for 94.5 
per cent of the total production. In second place, far below the first in 
production, comes the Southern region with 2.8 per cent of 
production. The North East stood for 2.6 per cent and the North 
represented 0.1 percent. The state of Minas Gerais in the South East 
produced more than 10m tonnes in 1993, accounting for 39.9 per 
cent of the total Brazilian production. It is the home of most of the 
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maJor Brazilian steelworks (Usiminas, Acominas, Acesita) and it is 
currently the biggest iron ore producer. Rio de Janeiro was the second 
in terms of production, representing 23.3 percent of the total. The 
biggest' Brazilian steelproducer, CSN, is based in Rio de Janeiro. Sao 
Paulo and Espirito Santo were the third and fourth states in steel 
production, respectively, in 1993. Rio Grande do Su1 is the biggest 
steel producer in the South, and Bahia in the Northeast region. In the 
North region, Para is the only producer. However, due to a huge iron 
ore reserve in the Amazon region, its potential to become a bigger 
producer should not be underestimated. 
Table 5.4 
Region 
* Southeast 
(94.5%) 
* South 
(2.8%) 
* Northeast 
(2.6%) 
* North 
(0.1%) 
* Total 
Source: IBS 
Regional distribution of crude steel production (1993) 
State Tonnage Share 
(000) (%) 
- Minas Gerais 10.055 39.9 
- Rio de Janeiro 5.867 23.3 
- Sao Paulo 4 .106 16.3 
_ Espirito Santo 3.792 15.0 
- Rio Grande do Sui 450 1.8 
- Parana 266 1.0 
- Bahia 378 1.5 
- Pernambuco 171 0.7 
- Ceara 62 0 .2 
Alagoas 43 0.2 
- Para 17 0 .1 
25.207 100.0 
Brazilian steel products range from commodities (slabs, ingots, 
blooms and billets) to more value-added ones such as galvanized 
plates and stainless steel. 
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Slabs are made by five companies: Companhia Siderurgica 
Tubarao (CST), Acominas, Usiminas, Companhia Siderurgica Nacional 
(CSN) and Cosipa. CST is by far the largest slabs producer, accounting 
for around 75 percent of slabs available for sale in 1993. 
In 1989 CST had produced 2.9m tonnes of semi-finished 
products for sale, corresponding to 45.0 percent of output, 2.7m 
tonnes being slabs. Four years later its semi-finished product market 
share rose to 47.4 per cent. In 1990, CST saw its market share come 
down to 36.4 percent mainly due to a recession in the Brazilian 
economy and reduced demand and low prices abroad. The other two 
main producers of slabs are Acominas and Usiminas, representing 
22.2 percent of the total slabs output in 1993. 
Blooms and billets are produced by about 20 steel producers, 
Acominas being the most important. In 1989 its production had 
reached 1.4m tonnes, more than half of the bloom and billet output. 
Its market share has been growing since then. In 1993 it managed 
73.6 percent of the total. The other main producers at that time were 
Vibasa, Guaira and Cosigua. Blooms and billets are considered 
commodities, as such they do not get good international prices, when 
compared with, for example, cold rolled coils and galvanized plates. 
For that reason, some producers are considering upgrading their mix 
of products, since the lion's share goes to the end-producer. 
Domestic sales 
The Brazilian steel industry has been able to produce and 
market a wide variety of steel products ranging from semi-finished, 
long and flat products. They are designed to serve different uses and 
users. Flat products are plates and coiled plates, hot-rolled sheets and 
coils, cold-rolled sheets and coils, coated sheets, special steel sheets. 
Uses of heavy plates are concentrated in civil construction, industrial 
equipment and autoparts. Hot-rolled sheets and coils have their main 
users in civil engineering, agricultural equipment, and welded tubes. 
On the other hand, cold-rolled sheets have their principal customers 
in autoparts, automobiles and household appliances. 
Table 5.5 shows the Brazilian steel market sales by type of 
product. By 1993, sales of flat products reached 5.9m tonnes, up from 
4.8m tonnes in 1990, when the Brazilian economy was in recession. 
Cold-rolled sheets accounted for 34.1 per cent, down from 35.2 per 
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cent in 1990; hot-rolled sheets 29.8 per cent, up from 24.1 per cent in 
1990; plates 17.0 per cent of domestic sales, down from 21.6 per cent 
in 1990 and so on. The volume of sales reached more than 3.0 million 
tonnes by 1993, better than the 1990 figures, however worse than 
1989, when total sales came to 3.6m tonnes. As a whole, total rolled 
products sales reached 8.9m tonnes in 1993, up 17.4 percent from 
1990. 
Semi-finished products domestic sales decreased over the 
period from 1988 until 1993. The main reasons are economic 
recession and bigger volume of exports. In 1993, a total of 1.2m 
tonnes of semi-finished were sold, blooms and billets accounting for 
91.5 percent, up from 72.7 percent 1n 1990; slabs stood for 8.4 
percent, down from 26.3 percent in 1990; and ingots represented 0.1 
percent in 1993, down from 1.0 percent in 1990. 
Table 5.5 Domestic steel sales by product (OOOt) 
Products 
* Flat products 
- plate 
- hot-hailed 
sheet 
- cold-boiled 
sheet 
- coated sheet 
- special sheet 
- total 
* Long products 
* Total rolled 
products 
* Semi-finished 
products 
- ingots 
- slabs 
- blooms and 
billets 
- total 
1988 
1.496 
1.713 
2.260 
786 
214 
6.469 
3.278 
9 .747 
24 
401 
1.047 
1.472 
1989 
1.537 
1.943 
2.305 
905 
292 
6.982 
3.576 
10.558 
17 
155 
1.047 
1.219 
1990 
1.036 
1.155 
1.686 
735 
184 
4.796 
2.801 
7.597 
1 1 
315 
870 
1.196 
1991 
975 
1.476 
1.574 
900 
211 
5.136 
2.589 
7.725 
8 
406 
886 
1.300 
Source: Instituto Brasileiro de Siderurgia (1994) 
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1992 
978 
1.348 
1.597 
819 
195 
4.937 
2.195 
7.132 
9 
246 
988 
1.243 
1993 
1.005 
1.764 
2.016 
907 
222 
5.914 
3.003 
8.917 
2 
100 
1.091 
1.193 
5.4. The International steel industry context 
The international steel industry has not escaped the 
globalisation of economic activities and increased international 
competition. Ease of communication, better transport systems, greater 
freedom of international capital flows and technology and a growing 
skilled labour force are some of the factors that have contributed to 
the increase in international integration atld competitive rivalry in 
many major industries. 
According to the ILO (International Labour Organisation) 
(1992), the recent developments in the international steel industry 
show clear differences between types of economies. According to 
Dicken (1990), steel demand in the industrialised economies of 
Europe and the United States have been hit by three factors . First, as 
these economies are becoming more and more 'service oriented', 
economic growth is becoming less steel intensive and therefore the 
consumption of steel is stabilizing or declining. The second reason 
for the reduction of steel demand is related to increasing imports of 
ships, automobiles and othermanufactured goods with high steel 
contents. Third reason is that steel users are reducing the amount of 
steel needed to produce the same goods as before, mainly due to 
design and technological changes or, in some cases, the substitution of 
steel by other materials. 
During the 1980s, the performance of the Eastern European 
economies deteriorated. The demand for steel in this region fell, there 
were inadequate resources and also a lack of incentives to improve 
performance under the central planning systems. The steel industry 
therefore became progressively outdated in its manufacturing, 
management and performance. 
The strongest growth in production and consumption of steel 
are in the newly industrialised and industrialising countries. Many of 
them are in South East Asia. The "Asian Tigers" (Korea, Taiwan, Hong-
Kong and Singapore) are now generally recognised as industrialised 
but there are a number of other countries in the region (e.g. Malaysia, 
Thailand, Indonesia and mainland China) which have a rapidly 
growing industrial base. While policies and circumstances in Brazil 
are different from those in the South East Asian countries, it is a 
middle income industrialising country with a large steel industry. 
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Over the next few years, the greatest growths on steel production and 
consumption are expected to be in these and similar economies which 
are referred to as industrialising countries in the following discussion. 
Technological changes in the iron and steel industry have 
affected most stages of production. The main changes are 
computerisation of production, increasing use of continuous casting 
processes, energy conservation and environmental protection. These 
changes have had a great impact on the number of steelworkers 
which has declined in most nations. The main reasons according to 
ILO ( 1992) are modernisation, restructuring and the related 
productivity improvements. Technological innovations have been 
responsible for the decrease in unskilled jobs and increase in some 
skilled ones. Privatisation and restructuring have also increased the 
pace of theses changes. 
Crude steel production 
Table 5.6 shows the world steel production since the end of the 
Second World War. The growth in steel production continued until 
1974, when a production of 703.5m tonnes was attained. This long 
phase was interrupted by the first oil crisis, which caused a drop in 
production of 60.0m tonnes in 1975, primarily in the industrialised 
countries (International Labour Organisation, 1992). The recession of 
the 1970s brought about a new scenario. Instability and fluctuations 
became characteristics of the whole industry. In 1987, the industry 
began a recovery, when the steel production reached 736.5m tonnes. 
That level of production represented an increase of 651.2 percent in 
comparison with 1945 and just 4.7 percent in relation to 1974. It 
lasted until the first half of 1990. From 1990 until 1992, the world 
steel production again entered another period of lower production 
and demand. In 1992, steel production achieved 722.7m tonnes, 
down 8.0 percent from 1989. The main consumers of steel are capital 
goods, the car industry, construction and consumer durables. 
Growth rates in production and consumption also differ 
significantly between countries at different levels of development. 
Steel production in industrialised countries fell more than 6.0 per 
cent in absolute terms between 1980 and 1990, while industrialising 
countries increased their share by 5.0 per cent over the same period. 
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Former USSR and East European countries had their output decreased 
by 2.5 percent. 
Table 5.7 sets out the trends in world crude steel production by 
region between 1983 and 1992. The major trends over this period 
have been the fast growth of steel production in Asia, cyclical changes 
in steel production in the industrialised countries of the European 
Union and North America and relative growth in Latin America. In 
1983~ world steel output reached 663,398 thousand tonnes, Asia 
accounting for 26.1 percent, the European Union standing for 18.6 per 
cent, North America 13.5 per cent, Latin America 4.4 per cent, and 
rest of the world 37.4 per cent. In 1987, when the recovery 
happened, production achieved 736,530 thousand tonnes of steel, up 
11 per cent from 1983. Asia stood for 27.5 per cent of world 
production, the European Union produced 17.2 per cent, North 
America accounted for 13.0 per cent and the Latin American output 
was 5.4 per cent. 
Table 5.6 World crude steel production (million tonnes) 
Year Total Cumalative Growth (%) 
1945 113.1 100.0 
1950 189.8 167.8 
1955 270.5 239.2 
1960 347.1 306.9 
1965 452.4 400.0 
1970 595.3 526.3 
1975 643.5 569.0 
1980 716.3 633.3 
1985 718.9 635.6 
1986 713.6 630.9 
1987 736.5 651.2 
1988 780.2 689.8 
1989 785.8 694.8 
1990 770.2 681.0 
1991 737.1 651.7 
1992 722.7 639.0 
Source: International Iron and Steel Institute (IISI) 1993 
Five years later, in 1992, total output had attained 722,663 
thousand tonnes of steel. Asia production reached 250,897 thousand 
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tonnes, 31.1 percent higher than in 1983, due to its overwhelming 
economic success and staggering growth. The European Union 
produced 132,356 thousand tonnes, an increase of 7.4 percent in 
comparison with 1983, although far less than the growth rate of Asia. 
North America produced 98,162 thousand tonnes of steel, an 
augmentation of 9.6 percent to that of 1983. Finally, Latin America, in 
1992, produced 41,368 thousand tonnes of steel, 42.1 percent higher 
than in 1983. Clearly, developed economies have not been able to 
follow the growing rates shown by developing countries over the last 
decade. 
Table 5.7 Crude steel production by region (lOOOt) 
Year 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1991 
1992 
European 
Union 
123,223 
134,434 
135,644 
125,740 
126,537 
137,829 
140,142 
136,758 
137,448 
132,356 
North 
America 
89,594 
98,640 
94,705 
88,113 
95,614 
105,516 
104,292 
102,004 
92,726 
98,162 
Latin Asia 
America 
29,105 172,964 
33,579 187,210 
36,200 193,232 
37,848 194,073 
40,101 202,730 
42,710 219,703 
42,759 228,609 
38,511 238,895 
39,549 249,491 
41,368 250,897 
Source: International Iron and Steel Institute (IISI) 1993 
5.5. Conclusions 
World 
663,398 
710,137 
718,941 
713,587 
736,530 
780,178 
785,838 
770,220 
737,075 
722,663 
The Brazilian economic and political context has been anything 
but stable over the last three decades. It has affected profoundly the 
way enterprises behave. Expansion and recession intervals have 
been happening since the "economic miracle" of 1968/1973. High 
levels of inflation coupled with economic and political instability have 
affected deeply the business environment. However, the 1990's 
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brought hope of a much more stable conditions, after the success of 
the "Real" plan, that brought inflation to less than 2 percent a month. 
The Brazilian steel industry is currently the world's eighth 
biggest producer. It is constituted by 27 companies. In 1995, its 
production capacity reached 28.5m tonnes of crude steel per year. 
Domestic steel consumption achieved 12.8m tonnes in 1994. Exports 
in the same year attained 11 .08m tonnes of steel. After a period of 
great instability on sales and profitability at the end of 1980's and 
the beginning of 1990's, the domestic steel industry seems to have 
found its route to recovery over the last years. It has witnessed a 
great number of changes over the last years. Among them is 
privatisation considered a very important one as since the end of 
1993 all state-owned steel companies has changed ownership to 
private hands. Privatisation has allowed companies a greater freedom 
to establish new business, partnerships and alliances. There have 
been some drastic actions related to reduction of personnel and 
organization restructuring (see next two chapters) . 
The international steel industry has shown an unstable profile 
over the last decades. In the 1970's, recession, instability and 
fluctuations were common ground. In 1987, the industry started 
recovering when production reached 736.5m tonnes. Then, in 1990, 
another fall in production happened. However, by 1993, world steel 
prices have started to increase again. Two years later, steel prices 
increased by 30 percent in relation to 1993, mainly due to a rise in 
demand and cut in production and capacity. 
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6. COMPANY ALPHA · 
6.1. Introduction 
The main objective of this chapter is to examine Alpha within 
the company analysis framework developed in Chapter 4 (Figure 4.2). 
Alpha has been a leading steel producer in Brazil over decades. It is 
considered to be a model Brazilian company with profitable 
operation, high technical capability and a well disciplined and 
qualified workforce. Alpha is the second largest steelmaker in Brazil, 
operating automated integrated hot and cold rolling mills. It produces 
common flat steel and higher-value-added galvanized products, 
mainly for the car . industry. In 1994 Alpha reported profits of 
US$344.5m. The return on assets was 14 per cent compared with the 
year before. 
One of the most important issues that this case study will examine is 
the contribution, if any, of privatisation to the renewed success 
achieved by the company after 1991, the year of privatisation, or if 
other reasons explain the increase in productivity, efficiency and 
competitiveness. The case study presents the historical development 
of the company and more recent quantitative and qualitative 
evidence on changes in the company's strategy, internal culture, 
external relationships, competitiveness and performance. Based on 
this, a judgement is formed on the changes that can attributed to the 
privatisation and related restructuring. 
6.2. Company background 
Alpha is a Brazilian steelmill created in the 1950s in the state 
of Minas Gerais. In 1956 a joint-venture was established between the 
Brazilian Government and a consortium of 30 Japanese steel makers 
and steel-equipment suppliers dominated by Nippon Steel. In 1958, 
the foundation of the construction was laid, and the company was 
inaugurated on October 1962 with the starting up of the number 1 
blast furnace . Between 1962 and 1965, the company's employees 
worked closely with the Japanese partners. Many locals went to 
Japan for training and learn from hands-on operational experience in 
the partner's production plants. In the early years, the company 
manufactured rolled products and sold them in the domestic market 
90 
only. The initial investment was 270 million dollars at the time, with 
an initial steel production capacity of 500000 tonnes per year (Table 
6.1 ). 
In 1965, the first stage towards vertical integration was 
inaugurated with the hot-strip mill. The year 1966 was a major 
turning-point for the company. From that time onwards the 
company's employees took over management and operational control 
of the firm. Its personnel have since continued to go abroad for 
courses and practical experience. They have carried on training, 
working very closely with foreign technical advisers . In 1970, the 
company was producing one million tons of steel per year. 
As table 6.1 shows, the company continued to builld on its initial 
technological capability, acquired from the collaboration with Nippon 
Steel, over time. The year 1972 marks the creation, within Alpha, of 
the Technical Assistance Management Department (T AMD) which 
took over the coordination of activities related to technology transfer, 
development of technology related to new business opportunities, 
acquisition of technology through licensing and other forms of 
collaboration, and sale of technology and related services. In 1974 
the company was authorized by the Brazilian Government to 
undertake an investment programme to increase its production 
capacity to 3.5 million tonnes (mt) of steel, which was concluded in 
1979. Also in 1974 the company managed to start-up the cold strip 
mill and inaugurate the number 3 blast furnace. The year after, the 
number 2 steelmaking plant was inaugurated. 
In 1980, Alpha became the first Latin American company to be 
granted the American Bureau of Shipping (ABS) granted the company 
the Quality Assurance Certificate. At the end of Phase II, in 1984, 
production of hot steel reached 3.5mt a year. The steelworks covers 
an area of 7.0 by 1.5 km. It is situated near the ferrous quadrilateral 
of the State of Minas Gerais. Alpha has four coke-oven batteries of 
which two are four meters high with 100 ovens, and two are six 
meters high with 110 ovens. The total output was 4600 tons of 
coke/day. 
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Table 6.1 
Phase 
I 
11 
Ill 
Main Phases and Description of a Brazilian Steel Company Background 
Date 
1956 - 1961 
1962 - 1965 
1966 -1971 
Description 
* 1956: a joint-venture was established between the 
Brazilian Government and a consortium of 30 Japanese 
steel makers and steel-equipment suppliers dominated by 
Nippon Steel 
* 1957: Japanese technology transfer details and the 
specification of the steelworks plant were agreed 
* 1958: the foundation of the steelworks was laid 
* 1961: third year of the plant construction 
* 1962: on October 26, the steelmill was inaugurated with 
the starting up of the No. 1 blast furnace 
* 1963: the steel-making plant, stabbing mill and plate 
mill were inaugurated 
* 1965: in May, the first stage towards the vertical 
integration was inaugurated with the hot-strip mill 
* 1966: the company's employees took over 
administrative and operational control of the firm 
* 1970; the Board of Directors delivered a ten year 
expansion plan to the Government 
* 1971: stretching the capacity of the original plant and 
equipment 
Comment 
* period of intense negotiations 
between Brazilian and Japanese 
authorities 
* plant construction period 
* steel production capacity was 500,000 
ton/year 
* investment was US$270m 
* technology chosen: coke-based, 
basic-oxygen, blast-furnace process 
-------------------------------------------
* the rolled products started to be sold 
on the domestic market 
* period when the company's 
employees worked closely with the 
Japanese. Many locals went to Japan to 
get trained and hands-on operational 
experience 
* inauguration of No. 2 blast furnace 
and cold strip mill 
* the company raised production to 
l .Om tonnes of steel per annum 
* its personnel continue to go abroad 
for courses and practical experience. 
They carry on training working very 
closely with foreign technical advisers 
IV 1972 - 1985 
V 1986 - 1990 
* 1972: the Technical Assistance Management Department 
(TAMD) was created to coordinate the activities related to 
technology transfer, new business opportunities, 
coordinate the activities of patents and increase the 
number of customers of technology and services 
* 1974: the company was authorized to undertake an 
investment programme to increase its capacity to 3.5 m 
tonnes of steel per annum. Start-up of cold strip mill and 
inauguration of No. 3 blast furnace · 
* 1975: inauguration of No. 2 steelmaking plant 
* 1976: inauguration of the new plate mill 
* 1977: the company becomes a member of the 
International Iron and Steel Institute (IISI) 
* 1979: the company concluded its five-year investment 
programme 
* 1980: the American Bureau of Shipping (ABS) granted 
the company its Quality Assurance Certificate. Start-up of 
HC mill 
* 1981: the production reached 3.5 mi. tons of hot steel 
per annum 
* 1986: the company started its technological updating 
program estimated at US$760mi 
* 1989: the company began a US$600mi five-year 
modernization programme 
* 1989: the company reached a record production of 4.5 
mi. tons of hot steel 
* the main shareholders were: 
Brazilian Government: 82,322%, 
BNDES:l2,471%, Nippon: 4,648%, minor 
shareholders: 0,559% 
* the company was the first Latin 
American producer to get a quality 
award from the ABS 
* it has a great number of quality 
guarantee systems implanted over the 
years, based on ISO norms, series 9001 
* the company gives technical 
assistance to the most varied industrial 
sectors 
* it has a great number of patents 
registered at home and abroad 
* the technological program is 
distributed as follows: quality 
improvement/product upgrading: 
US$262mi, cost reduction/increase of 
productivity: US$182m, environmental 
protection: US$163m, increase of 
production capacity of cold strip mill: 
US$41m, maintenance of production 
capacity: US$112m 
VI 1991 - onwards * 1991: the company was privatized · * the main shareholders are: 
Source: Company data 
* 1992: the company started a programme which includes foundations: 28%, financial 
constant technological updating, seeking profitability organizations: 23%, Vale do Rio do Doce: 
via the upgrading of its products and diversification of 15%, Nippon: 14%, Employees: 10%, 
business Steel distributors: 4%, Others: 6% 
* 1992: the company sold about 1.8 million tons of * the company produces carbon and 
materials on the international market, with exports to 27 low alloy-carbon steels. Its product 
countries: Argentina, China, Japan, Malaysia, Singapore, lines consist of hot rolled products 
Taiwan, Thailand, the USA and so on (plates, hot rolled sheets and coils), cold 
* 1992: the main consuming sectors: auto, auto parts, rolled products (cold rolled sheets and 
packing, large pipes, electric equip. /machinery, coils, black plates) and 
shipbuilding, distributors electrogalvanized coated products 
* 1993: start-up of electrolytic galvanization line 
In 1986 the company started its technological updating 
program estimated to cost US$ 760m. Then, over a five-year period 
(1989-1993), Alpha spent on average US$135m per year, about 
US$34/ton of produced steel (Soares, 7 Dec 1993). The target areas 
were quality improvement, product upgrading, equipment and 
process modernization, cost reduction and productivity improvement 
and environmental protection. In 1989 the company reached a record 
production of over 4.5 mt of hot steel, 20 per cent higher than 
estimated capacity. 
On 24 October 1991, the company was privatized by auctioning 
75 per cent of voting capital. In November, preferred shares were 
sold (see ownership section for more details). In 1992, the company 
started a programme aimed at technological updating, increasing 
value added of its products and diversification of business 
(engineering, data processing, equipment, service centres, consulting, 
industrial maintenance, subsidiaries partnerships). In 1993 the 
electrolytic galvanization line began production of electrogalvanized 
coated products to meet the demand by carmakers, for steel body 
panels . 
6.3. Privatisation 
The process of sale of shares that Alpha went through was 
anything but smooth. Both before and during the auction a great deal 
of skirmishing between different groups (e.g. trade unions, students) 
did occur due to misunderstandings, novelty, and distrust. The 
Government failed to explain to the general public the reasons 
underlying the choice of Alpha as the first company to be privatised. 
The . decision to start the privatisation process through one of the best 
managed, most profitable and healthiest companies was unreasonable 
for many people. It seemed that the Government was giving the 
"family silver" away to private owners. Nevertheless, as at that time 
the Government had stressed, the reason behind Alpha's choice was 
to give a push to the privatisation process. It was used as a show-
case. 
Only after three attempts was Alpha finally sold off. The first 
attempt to sell it failed amid lawsuits and scenes of violence outside 
the Rio Stock Exchange. A second attempt again was cancelled due to 
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legal problems and misunderstandings. Finally, on the 24 October 
1991, the company was successfully privatised. The 75 per cent of 
voting capital on offer was sold by auction for a total of US$1.15 
billion dollars. 10 per cent of the voting stock was reserved for an 
employee share offer. Payment was accepted in a variety of 
government debt instruments, with investors preferring to use 
domestic debt paper. 
Most of the voting shares went to industrial companies, banks 
and pension funds. Foreign buyers took only 6 percent of the voting 
capital, perhaps nervous of the public opposition as evidenced by the 
demonstrations outside the Rio de Janeiro Stock Exchange. 
6.3.1Alpha's privatisation: model, process and consequences 
According to Soares (1993), the main problems of the steel 
industry under public ownerhsip were the instability of the 
Government to provide resources for adequate levels of investment, 
increasing obsolescence, loss of competitiveness as a result of 
technological advance and improving productivity in industrialised 
countries. 
Alpha was chosen by the Brazilian Government to be 
privatised in the first place due to its reputation for good 
management, a trained workforce, relatively high level of 
technological expertise, and a record of profit. Besides, the company 
was attractive to potential investors taking into account the quality 
of its products, low- operating costs, and a high level of productivity 
in comparison with national and international competitors. 
The main characteristics of the Company Privatisation Model as 
stated by the company should be related to the preservation of 
intangible assets (human resources and technological know-how), 
transparency, capital democratization, and preservation of strategic 
potentials. Before the privatisation, the company put forward its 
views on the privatisation model it preferred. It favoured ownership 
to shared among employees and retired personnel, Japanese partners, 
customers, suppliers and financial organizations, Brazilian and foreign 
entrepreneurial groups and the public interested in the undertaking. 
In terms of strategic potentials, basically, after the privatisation the 
management wished to have more autonomy in its strategic decisions 
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and more active participation of the employees. With greater 
autonomy, the company intended to increase investments, improve 
its technology, diversity, integrate vertically, and form partnerships 
with other businesses (see Table 6.2). 
6 .4. Applying the company analysis framework 
The aim of this section is to examine Alpha within three main 
components specified in the company analysis framework (Figure 
4.2). The three components, management, 
competitiveness/productivity, and performance are interrelated. 
Management enables the elements of the company to improve 
productivity and to enhance performance. Productivity makes 
performance sustainable and foster it. Performance helps the 
company to achieve its goals. 
6.5. Management 
In the company analysis framework, the management organises 
the company, sets objectives and makes decisions within the context 
of external influences. The main external factors are the broad social, 
cultural and political contexts, the international and domestic 
economic contexts and the company ownership. It is reasonable to 
argue that in the short run, the social and cultural contexts, their 
influences on the management style and organizational structure and 
culture will not change. The previous chapter shows that there have 
significant changes in the economic context. These could have a direct 
, 
effect on the management (e.g. making the management realise that 
their organisations need to be more responsive in a more competitive 
environment). However, one the most significant effects are likely to 
be because of the change of ownership. As the following discussion 
shows, the problem is the difficulty of separating the effects of the 
change of the broader economic context from those resulting from 
change of ownership. 
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Table 6.2 Main impacts of privatisation on Alpha, according to its Chief Executive Officer 
Aspects Characteristics 
* strategic planning 
• Strategic 
* corporate development 
* selling effectiveness 
• Commercial 
* serving the customer 
Key Indicators 
- autonomy to develop its own entrepreneurial, 
technological, marketing, human resources, and product 
goals without government interference 
- freedom to work within a long-term perspective 
- autonomy for establishing strategic alliances, setting 
up new subsidiaries, new businesses, diversification, 
verticalization 
- synergic gains from the shared management model 
- more flexibility, speed, greater freedom in decision-
making during the sales negotiation process 
- more flexibility in price negotiation 
- more speed in dealing with foreign customers 
- special attention to clients' needs, deliveries within l 0 
days, quicker response to complaints 
Comments 
- the company has already 
established partnerships 
with Brazilian and foreign 
firms: British Steel, Hitachi, 
Chugai-ro, Nippon Steel, 
Ahlstrom Equipment, 
Magnesita, Fiat, etc (some of 
these were establised before 
privatisation). 
- greater customer 
orientation and more 
emphasis on search for new 
markets 
------------------ --------------------------- -------------------------------------------------------------- ------------------------------
• Procurement 
* purchasing process 
rationalization 
* flexibility in 
purchasing process 
- more speed, simplification, rationalization, freedom for 
price negotiation 
- reduction in time required for negotiating supply 
contracts 
- closer association with suppliers of raw materials and 
other inputs, consignment contracts, use of just-in-time, 
minimized inventory levels and lower costs of materials 
_ greater flexibility and 
freedom in procurement 
• Financial 
* autonomy in financial 
transactions 
* business 
rationalization 
- freedom to develop relationships with as many banks 
as the company wants, access to credit from Brazilian 
and foreign organizations, increasing participation in 
operations in the financial market 
- speed in the negotiation process and decision making 
when closing businesses 
- reduction of obstacles imposed by government 
agencies 
- the firm is taking 
advantage of its well-
established position in the 
market to engage in 
financial operations 
(financing, loans, leasing, 
etc.) 
------------------ --------------------------- ----------------------------- --------------------------------- ------------------------------
• Human 
resources 
* employees 
* company 
* potential for 
improving productivity 
- participation in shareholding, salary levels according 
to performance, better opportunities for professional 
development 
- flexibility in negotiations with unions. freedom to 
contract/dismiss and set the company's policy on wages 
and salaries 
- investment in training, salary levels based on 
efficiency and productivity, retirement incentive plans, 
planned and negotiated decrease of personnel 
Source: Adapted from Soares, R. C. (1993) 
- in general, the workforce 
is well-trained, motivated, 
and keen to upgrade skills 
- some employees complain 
that company does not 
accept new ideas from them 
6.5.1. Ownership 
Alpha's main shareholders before privatisation were 
SIDERBRAS (state holding company) with 82.32 per cent of shares, 
BNDES (Brazilian Development Bank) with 12.47 per cent, Nippon 
with 4.65 per cent and others 0.56 per cent of shares. As a result, the 
Brazilian Government had a 94.79 per cent stake in Alpha (Table 6.3). 
After privatisation the shareholding picture is quite different. 
Most of the voting shares went to Brazilian groups, with the largest 
stakes going to CVRD (Companhia Vale do Rio Doce) and Previ (Banco 
do Brasil's pension fund). 
Table 6.3 Major shareholders before privatisation 
Shareholders 
* SIDERBRAS (State 
holding company) 
* BNDES (Brazilian 
Development Bank) 
* Nippon company 
* Others 
* Total 
% of common 
87.11 
7.58 
4.99 
0.32 
100.00 
Source: BNDES/PND (1991) 
% of preferred 
77.53 
17.36 
4.30 
0.81 
100.00 
%of total 
82.32 
12.47 
4.65 
0.56 
100.00 
Currently, the major voting shareholders are CVRD, PREVI, 
Nippon company, Company's employees, CVRD pension fund (VALIA), 
Grupo Bozano Simonsen, Grupo Economico, Privatinvest - DS Mutual 
Privatization Fund, Grupo Bamerindus, Libero Badaro Administracao 
e Participacoes, Grupo Banco de Credito Nacional - BCN, Fasal S.A., 
Grupo America do Sui, Confab, Benafer, Grupo Multiplic, and other 
smaller shareholders. In fact, Foundations (pension funds) have 28% 
at stake, Financial organizations: 23%, Companhia Vale do Rio Doce: 
15%, Nippon company: 14%, Company's employees: 10%, Steel 
distributors: 4% and others: 6% (Tables 6.4 and 6.5). 
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Table 6.4 Major voting shareholders after privatisation 
Shareholders 
* Foundations 
* Financial organizations 
* Vale do Rio Doce 
* Nippon company 
* Company's employees (CIU) 
* Steel distributors 
* Others 
* Total 
Source: Company data 
6.5.2. Governance 
%of shares 
28 
23 
15 
14 
10 
4 
6 
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The change in ownership has a direct effect on company 
governance under Siderbras (the holding company of Brazilian state-
owned steel companies), all publicly owned steel companies were 
ruled by the same decrees and directives with no allowance made for 
differences between them in terms of performance, culture, and 
efficiency. This approach has proved very damaging for those 
companies with a higher performance as there were no incentives to 
increase their results. The idea was to achieve an average 
performance that would suit the majority of the publicly owned steel 
companies. 
After privatisation, without the constraints imposed by 
government decrees and directives, and the standardization of 
procedures and regulations; companies with better management, 
skilled workforce and higher competitive strengths were freed to 
become more entrepreneurial and had the incentives to do so. The 
liberalization of the economy, the lifting of restrictions to operate 
fully, the foundation of the Mercosul, were just some the facts that 
have allowed Alpha to grow and thrive quickly over the last years. 
For more details see external and internal factors affecting the 
performance of companies (Chapter 4) and Figure 6.2. 
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Table 6.5 Major shareholders after privatisation 
Shareholders 
* BNDES(Brazilian 
Development Bank) 
* PREVI(Banco do 
Brazil's pension fund) 
* Vale do Rio Doce 
* Nippon Company 
* Usiminas employees 
* V ALIA(Vale do Rio 
Doce's pension fund) 
* Grupo Bozano 
Simonsen 
* Others 
%of common % of preferred 
31.9 
15.0 
15 .0 
13.8 6.7 
10.0 
7.7 
5 .3 
32.7 61.4 
Source: Company data, Baring Securities (1993) 
6.5.3. Autonomy and incentives 
%of total 
16.0 
7.5 
7.7 
10.3 
5.0 
3.8 
2 .7 
47.0 
Privatisation has allowed a profound change in autonomy 
within the company. From a situation of passivity and dependency of 
decisions taken by Siderbras to a much more dynamic and 
entrepreneurial attitude. After privatisation, a culture of dependence 
has been changed deeply towards one that praises initiative and 
courage to undertake actions that can bring new business 
opportunities for the company. Managements attitudes are more 
proactive, seeking new business opportunities and a better approach 
towards consumers . 
According to Soares (1993), after privatisation Alpha enjoys 
greater autonomy to devise its "own technological, entrepreneurial, 
marketing, human resources and production goals." Besides, 
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establishing new investments, alliances, partnerships and 
associations. 
For the employees, the change in ownership brought about 
participation in shareholding, performance-related pay, increasing 
opportunities for professional development as the company began to 
explore business areas both domestic and international. Greater 
possibilities to travel abroad, retirement incentive plans. 
6.5.4. Organizational structure 
Alpha has been undertaking a restructuring process either 
before and after privatisation. Before it, main decisions were related 
to building up a suitable environment that should enable the 
company to go to private hands. After privatisation, the restructuring 
is related to increasing the company's efficiency, performance and 
competitiveness. 
Despite its history of good management, efficiency, well-
qualified workforce and, being almost free of political intervention in 
spite of being a public company, Alpha underwent profound 
restructuring programme which resulted in reducing the number of 
functional units (directorates, departments and divisions) by half. 
The number of staff, while substantial was not as high as in the other 
steel companies. 
The immediate post-privatisation period brought about changes 
in organizational structure, under the guidance of the Booz, Alien & 
Hamilton Co. consultancy. The main changes were related to 
rationalization of administrative processes, management information 
system, personnel restructuring, and business process reengineering. 
Hence, organisational efficiency is sought by increasing the range of 
supervision, simplification of processes, ratstng delegation of 
responsibility and authority, rationalization of personnel 
management, and higher efficacy of management information 
Organizational structure changes, in terms of functional unit 
figures, that took place at Alpha from May/88 until May/94 are set 
out in Figure 6.1. The reduction of functional units was overwhelming 
(191 in total). In May/91, Alpha had 324 functional units as against 
198 in May/94, resulting in a decrease of 126 units (39%). Levels of 
organizational structure were reduced and several superintendences, 
divisions, departments, sections were eliminated. The company 
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undertook an impressive restructuring programme after 
privatisation looking for a leaner, more flexible and swifter 
structure. Throughout the restructuring process, Alpha management 
kept in mind the preservation of production areas, since they are 
considered the heart and soul of the company. Even more now, as 
inflation rates are low, stimulating production instead of speculation 
in the financial market. 
Figure 6.1 Organizational structure changes by functional 
units 
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6.5.5. Strategy 
May/94 
The . senior management of the company in pronouncements 
and publications (Soares, 1993) claim that privatisation has given the 
company greater freedom to develop and pursue strategies to 
improve the capabilities, competitiveness and performance of the 
company. Table 6.2 shows a systematic structure for relating the 
overall strategy to the main activities of the business. Interviews 
within the company confirm that there has been a clear change in the 
strategic direction taken by the management. 
The generic strategic framework (Porter, 1985) outlines the 
main forms of competitive strategies a company could pursue. Within 
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this framework the company's strategy is shifting towards a broad 
differentiation (e.g. galvanized steel plates). However, it is not 
possible to attribute all this strategic change to the privatisation. The 
capability to produce the range of products which has enabled the 
company to supply higher value added differentiated products was 
developed before the privatisation and related technological 
capabilities developed over a long period of time. Capabilities of the 
management and the skilled workforce were also legacies from the 
pre-privatisation period. 
However, after the privatisation, the company has greater 
freedom to pursue business opportunities, and take advantage of its 
competitive strengths . Before the privatisation, competition in the 
domestic market between the state-owned steel companies was 
limited. Since the privatisation, the company has formed closer 
partnerships and strategic alliances with some major companies (see 
Table 6.2 for more details). 
6.6. Competitiveness and productivity 
In the company analysis framework, competi tiveness and 
productivity are closely related. Productivity has two aspects. The 
quantity of steel produced per unit of input and the value of 
production per unit of input. The quantity is mainly determined by 
aspects internal to the company (e.g. management, technological 
capability, capital equipment and workforce). The value of production 
is also influenced by external factors such as market conditions. Each 
aspect is examined below. 
6.6.1. VVorkforce 
If the workforce is underemployed or poorly employed, 
reduction in the size of the workforce would be expected to have a 
significant effect on the physical productivity. So, the company's 
workforce has been reduced gradually during the last few years. In 
1989, the company had 13,838 employees. There was a reduction of 
2,894 employees from 1989 till 1993. At the end of the 1994 the 
number of employees was 10,488. All in all, 3350 employees lost 
their jobs over a six-year period, accounting for 24 per cent of the 
original workforce (Figure 6.2). The company management has stated 
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that the decrease in number of employees after privatisation was 
mainly through incentives for retirement and not redundancies. 
However, the programme of reducing the workforce, including 
redundancies, which started by 1989, was part of the preparatory 
restructuring of the company before privatisation. 
The major reductions in the number of managers took place 
after 1991, the year of privatisation. The number of managers was 
reduced from 487 in 1991 to 217 in 1993, a reduction of 270 people. 
This was associated with changes in the management structure under 
which Alpha reduced the levels of hierarchy and the number of 
departments, divisions, and sections. The restructuring process has 
been quite profound in almost all areas of the company. Downsizing 
has mainly affected middle management and administrative areas. 
Operational areas have seen one of the lowest percentage reduction 
(Figure 6.3). 
The number of graduates increased by 5% (53 people) from 
1991 (969 people) till 1993 (1022). After privatisation the company 
has been trying to improve the quality of the workforce even more. 
The blue-collar workers suffered a reduction of 526 (8% of the total 
in 1991) people from 1991 until 1993, basically due to retirement 
and improvement of productivity. However, the category that 
suffered the major impact is that of clerks. They have been reduced 
by almost 30 per cent (301), from 1006 in 1991 to 705 in 1993. 
6.6.2. R&D and Technological capabilities 
Alpha is considered to have the highest level of technological 
capabilities in the Brazilian steel sector an research and development. 
The company's long-term relationship with Nippon Steel, which is 
discussed further below, has been a major factor in developing 
technological capability. More recently, the company has established 
links with other companies in collaborative research and training (e.g. 
with British Steel). 
R&D expenses have been around 0.6% of total sales. This figure 
is not high in comparison with that of Japanese steelmakers. It means 
there is room to increase expending on R&D. This will depend on the 
company's strategy in the near future. 
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Figure 6.2 The company's workforce by year 
(employees) 
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R&D is important since it enables Alpha to produce, to 
assimilate and to adapt different products to different consumer 
demands. When a production problem arises a R&D team is called in 
to try to sort it out. According to one of the interviewees, with the 
help of R&D the company is able to 'consolidate its reputation as a 
technology generator, to develop the potential for rendering technical 
assistance, and adapting the production to the world patterns of 
security, quality, costs and productivity'. 
Most of the R&D team have been abroad in countries such as 
Japan, UK, Germany, and the USA. They attend doctorate 
programmes, technical training and conferences. 
The major functions of R&D are to enable the company to 
absorb more advanced technology, adapt it and even sell it to others 
in Brazil and abroad, often in collaboration with the original 
technology providers. 
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6.6.2.1. Technological capability 
Alpha's technological capability is a distinct competitive 
advantage and has therefore been examined here at some length. A 
number of strands in the strategy and economics literature 
emphasise the importance of capabilities and strategies at the 
enterprise level, including technological aspects, in explaining their 
own performance as well as the performance of the economies in 
which they ·operate (Rumelt,1984; Teece,1986 and Porter,1990). Lall 
(1992), in particular, considers technology transfer issues for firms in 
industrialising countries . 
Technological knowledge is not shared equally among firms. 
Nor is it easily imitated by, or transferred across firms. Transfer 
requires learning as technologies are tacit and their underlying 
principles are not always clearly understood. Acquiring a new 
technology and gaining mastery of it requires appropriate cultural, 
institutional and market contexts, strategies, skills, effort and 
investment by the receiving firm. The extent of competence achieved 
is uncertain and necessarily varies between firms according to the 
existing capabilities, objectives and strategies and the external 
context. These features of the process of technology transfer are 
recognized by a number of authors (Pavitt, 1985 and Afriyie, 1988). 
Dahman et al · (1987) provides a useful account of the early 
development of technological capability in Alpha. According to these 
authors, from the beginning, the locals and foreigners worked closely. 
This was made possible because of collaboration with Nippon Steel an 
other Japanese companies when the company was founded. The 
Brazilian employees has excellent opportunities to learn about many 
aspects of the design, equipment, selection, installation, construction, 
start-up, and operation of the plant. In addition there was an 
extensive training programme in Japan under which the company's 
employees acquired the basics of how to deal with an integrated steel 
plant. A more detailed picture of the company's development of 
technological capability is presented here. Table A1 shows the 
Framework adapted from Lall (1992), which has been used to 
examine the company's technological capability. 
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Figure 6.3 Workforce breakdown by cate~ory 
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The main phases of the company's technological development 
can be identified from Table 6.1. Having technology providers as part 
owners was clearly a strong advantage for the company. During 
phases 1 and 2 (in Table 6.1 ), installation and expansion of 
production capacity were major activities. Nippon Steel was 
responsible for overseeing these activities. Phase 2 in Table 6.1 
corresponds with the "basic stage" in Table Al during which 
administrative and operational control were largely in the hands of 
Nippon Steel. Training programmes in Brazil and Japan for company 
technicians at all levels continued throughout this stage. 
Phases 3 and 4 in Table 6.1 broadly correspond with the 
intermediate stage in Table Al. In 1966, company managers and 
employees took over administrative and operational control including 
technical responsibilities. However the emphasis on tratntng 
continued. During phase 3, capacity stretching was necessary as the 
firm could not obtain funds for expansion because of the national 
financial crisis (see Dahman et al (1987) for more detailed 
discussion). Value added was also increased by improving the quality 
of the steel and making special steels such as thick ship plate through 
licensing and technical assistance contracts. 
Along with improving technical capability during phases 3 and 
4 between 1966 and 1985, the company had a substantial 
investment programme as indicated in Table 6.1. During phase 4 a 
shift was in progress from the "intermediate stage" to the "advanced 
research-based stage" (as described in Table Al). Creation of the 
Technical Assistance Management Department (T AMD) to acquire and 
assimilate technology and develop new technologies (discussed in 
the next section) was a clear indication of the shift from the 
"intermediate" to the "advanced" stage. 
Since 1986 the company could be regarded as being in the 
advanced innovative stage as it has demonstrated the capability to 
(a) recognize technology requirements, (b) assess alternative 
technologies and suppliers, (c) assimilate technologies purchased 
from outside and (d) develop technologies for internal use and for 
sale . Development of special relationships with other steel producers 
and major customers has also been a significant aspect during this 
stage. The management culture within the company has also been 
strongly influenced by its long association with Nippon Steel. An 
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important aspect of this culture is the strong emphasis on training 
and maintaining and enhancing technical competencies demonstrated 
by the continuing programme of technological improvement (Table 
6.1). 
Nippon Steel has given technical assistance to Alpha since 
1966. The company has renewed the technology transfer contract 
with the Japanese group recently. This will be the fourth technology 
agreement between the two companies. Nippon Steel, the world's 
largest steelmaker, will extend the scale of cooperation to the full 
production process, including productivity, total quality management 
and cost reductions. A more detailed discussion of Alpha's acquisition 
of t~echnological capability and its implications for strategy and 
competitiveness is provided in Barbosa and Vaidya (1995). 
6.6.2.2. The role of T AMD and other parts of the company 
T AMD is one of the most important departments under the 
Development Directorate. Other departments under it are 
Engineering, New Business, the Technical Information Department 
(TID) and a company manufacturing large metal presses. The 
Development Directorate is one of the five directly under the 
company president (the other are Finance, Commercial, Industrial 
which includes operations and maintenance, Development and 
'Special'). 
TAMD was set up in 1972 to co-ordinate technology transfer 
activities which include: (a) marketing of the technology and services; 
(b) development of new business opportunities in selling technology 
and services through the search for potential clients and matching 
customer needs with the technology and expertise available within 
the company; (c) co-ordination of the technology transfer process 
which involves purchasing and selling of technology and services, and 
(d) responsibility for registering and protecting patents. 
The firm sells technological expertise in areas of steel plant 
operation and maintenance, engineering, equipment upgrading, 
transport, production planning and control, purchase, process 
automation, industrial security, environmental and managerial 
activities (Table 6.6). 
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In purchasing and selling transactions, TAMD is responsible for 
matching technology needs and suppliers, negotiation of legal 
registration of the contracts and execution, control and follow-up of 
the technology transfer process. 
T AMD works within a clear policy on technology development, 
acquisition and selling. Formally, the introduction of a new 
technology follows a sequence of stages which are selection, 
acquisition, absorption and adaptation, mastering and upgrading and 
commercialisation. When the need for a process or product 
technology is recognized, an assessment is made to determine 
whether it can be developed internally or bought from an outside 
supplier. Company interviews indicated that some employees within 
T AMD and elsewhere in the company are unhappy about how 
decisions are made and feel that insufficient attention is paid to the 
flow of communications within the company and suggestions on 
technology and related matters have not been accepted as frequently 
as they should be. This leads to a slowing down process of the change 
and adoption of innovations. 
The company has established principles for technology 
acquisition. The firm avoids turn-key projects where the opportunity 
to learn about technology is limited. It also prefers to acquire 
technology from suppliers who are willing to supply all the stages of 
the technology required (see Table Al). A realistic assessment of the 
company's capability to assimilate the technology and the probable 
success of the technology transfer process is also carried out 
(Nogueira et al, 1993). Advanced technologies which are beyond the 
reach of the company are avoided (Table 6.7). 
The Research Centre is in charge of the internal technology 
development. The Technical Information Department (TID) keeps the 
company abreast of technical and commercial developments in the 
international iron and steel industry. In addition to maintaining a 
library and a database, the department produces reports, abstracts 
and technical analyses to meet specific demands for information, is 
considered to be the best source of information on the steel industry 
in Brazil and is also used by other Brazilian companies. 
T AMD works closely with the Research Centre and other parts 
of the company at different stages of the technology transfer process. 
In introducing new products, at the selection stage9 the Commercial 
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Development Department which is responsible for marketing and 
selling plays an important part. Where the technology to be bought or 
sold is concerned with production processes the Maintenance and 
Operations Departments become involved. Following the Japanese 
model, decisions are taken by consensus involving people from 
different departments. When selling technology, the company 
attempts to protect the most advanced research and technologies 
developed internally for its customers and partners. 
6.6.2.3. Implications for competitiveness and productivity 
The company has been improving its level of technological 
capability and commercial success over time. One of the most 
important external contributing factors in this company's success has 
been the long-term, and continuing, role played by Nippon Steel as a 
part owner and technology supplier. However, this by itself would 
not have been sufficient without the continuing emphasis on 
developing technological capability and becoming a technology 
exporter and the clear and well-executed strategy on technology 
acquisition. For example, as noted above, the company does not 
acquire any technology without full knowledge of its specifications 
and operations and has a policy of acquiring only those technologies 
that it is capable of absorbing, even if they are not the most 
advanced. 
Table 6.8 summarizes the technological capabilities and 
advantages of the company as well as the obstacles to enhancing 
them. The capabilities have arisen from the acquisition and use of 
technical knowledge and experience of technology transfer over a 
number of years. The company has recognized technical capabilities 
as important 'specialized factors' (see Porter, 1990) which have been 
developed and internalized. 
113 
Table 6.6 Some of technologies sold to Brazilian and foreign companies 
AREAS 
• Research 
• Training 
• Industrial 
technology 
• Industrial 
safety 
• Maintenance 
TECHNOLOGY 
* technical assistance general agreement in the research field 
* research to determine the transformation curve of steel 
COUNTRY 
continuous cooling * Brazil, Venezuela 
* advisory services on the utilization of super fines 
* vacuum degassing operational training 
* operational training for a steel plant static control 
* operational training of sliding valve system in steel ladle 
* training in techniques of iron ore utilization in the iron and 
steel industry 
* training in operational techniques of metallurgical and * Brazil 
production control, mechanical/electrical maintenance, plate 
rolling and hot scarfing 
* operational training on steel plant commissioning 
* operational training for start-up plate heat treatment line 
* training in steel manufacture techniques and heat treatment 
* supply of industrial technology in the continuous casting * Brazil , Argentina 
* supply of industrial technology in the blast furnace area 
* technical assistance in the industrial safety area * Argentina 
* services/specialized advisory in maintenance techniques * Portugal 
Table 6.7 Some of the technologies that have been bought 
AREA 
* Technical 
assistance 
TECHNOLOGY 
* general technological 
assessment of the steelworks 
* Training * research and development 
* Technical * electrolytic galvanization line 
assistance and technology 
training * company and university 
cooperation 
* advanced industrial technology 
* annealing furnaces industrial 
technology 
* tampering mill technical 
assistance 
Source: Company data 
COUNTRY 
* Japan 
* Britain 
* Japan, 
Germany, Brazil 
The continuing ties with Nippon Steel and other foreign 
enterprises make it easier to access new technological developments 
and form alliances for marketing and selling products and 
technologies especially in Latin America. The company's cultural 
affinity to customers in Brazil and the rest of Latin America makes it 
an attractive partner for Japanese and other foreign firms in 
accessing markets in this region. From 1972 to 1993 it had a net 
surplus in its technology and services trade, purchasing US$44.7 
million worth of technology and selling US$83 million worth. It is one 
of Brazil's largest and most profitable steel producers and exports 
about 50 per cent of its production. 
The firm recognizes that internationally it cannot compete with 
the technologically most advanced comp·anies because of the high cost 
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of developing some technologies and the reluctance of foreign 
companies to sell the most advanced technologies. 
Until recently the company's ability to exploit its technical and 
related competitive advantages were restricted by government 
market controls and the company's status as a state enterprise. Funds 
for investment were also restricted (especially in the 1980s) and the 
company could not make important decisions on investment and 
commercial initiatives without government approval. There has been 
a strong improvement in the financial performance since the 
privatisation and restructuring, and there is a substantial investment 
programme to modernise parts of production capacity and to reduce 
environmental pollution. Arguably the company is now in a better 
position to use and further develop its technological advantages. 
6.6.3. Production capacity 
The company's nominal production capacity is 3.5m tonnes a 
year. However, Alpha has been able to reach well above this mark 
through improvements and adaptations of machines and equipments. 
The company's crude steel production in 1993 was nearly 4.2 million 
tonnes a year, 20 per cent higher than its nominal installed capacity 
(Table 6.9). It represented 16.5 per cent of the Brazilian crude steel 
production (25.2 million tonnes a year). In 1980, the company's 
production reached 3.2mt pa, about 21.1 per cent of the Brazilian 
production. Ten years later, production achieved 3 .5mt pa - almost 
10 per cent higher than in 1980 - despite all the problems of the 
Brazilian economy during the eighties - the "lost decade" due to bad 
economic and social achievements, and despite the increase in 
national production capacity because of the starting up of new steel 
plants. In 1991, the year of the privatisation, production of crude 
steel reached 4.1mt a year, representing 18.3 per cent of the total 
Brazilian production. After privatisation, production has been stable 
around 4.2mt pa. There is a project going on to increase production of 
liquid steel by over lmt a year. The total production capacity should 
reach more than 5.0mt pa from 1996/1997 onwards, according to 
some analysts. 
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Table 6.8 Technological capabilities and obstacles to further 
improvement 
Aspects Characteristics 
• Capabilities 
* advanced process capability in Brazilian context 
* capability to produce higher value added 
products 
* long tradition and experience in technology 
transfer 
* high level of technical education and training and 
ability to assimilate foreign technology 
* policy to prepare personnel before acquiring 
technology and other changes 
* good internal infrastructure: Research Center and 
Technical Information Department 
* internal culture that considers technological 
capability a fundamental tool to improve 
competitiveness 
* technology improvements and partnerships 
identified as driving forces for competitiveness 
* cultural and language affinity in Latin American 
markets 
------------------ ------------------------------------------------------
• Obstacles 
* high cost of some technologies 
* reluctance of foreign suppliers to sell new 
technologies to a capable competitor 
* 
* 
internal resistance to new technologies and R&D 
expenditure 
cultural obstacles and language differences 
Although Alpha has been one of the most profitable steel 
companies in Brazil, its production has not grown significantly in the 
last 5 years. It appears that the improvements in its profits are built 
on the value of its products rather than the quantity of production 
(see later sections for further discussions). 
117 
Table 6.9 Crude Steel Production (OOOt) 
YEAR Alpha Brazil Alpha/Brazil(%) 
1980 3240 15337 21.1 
1981 2274 13226 17 .2 
1982 2880 12995 22.2 
1983 2690 14671 18.3 
1984 3162 18386 17.2 
1985 3328 20456 16.3 
1986 3073 21233 14.5 
1987 2874 22228 12 .9 
1988 4120 24657 16.7 
1989 4395 25055 17.5 
1990 3464 20600 16.8 
1991 4135 22617 18 .3 
1992 4033 23898 16.9 
1993 4140 25149 16.5 
Source: IBS (1994), Company data 
6.6.4. Finance/investment 
The main purposes of the investment programme are related 
to increasing the range of products with higher added value, 
augmenting productivity and improving the environment. During the 
last decade, the most important part of Alpha's investment 
programme has been the installation of a new electrolytic galvanizing 
line. A quarter of the total investment funds in 1990 and 1991 were 
spent on this line. In 1993, investment in the electrolytic galvanizing 
line accounted for 51% of the total investment (Table 6.10). The total 
cost of the line is estimated at US$200m and the production capacity 
is expected to be 360,000 tonnes of zinc-galvanized steel which has 
higher corrosion resistance and is suitable for shaping an painting. 
Galvanized sheets production started in 1993. 
Galvanized sheet steel is a high value added product with 
strong growth in demand because of its use in the car industry. With 
the electrolytic galvanizing line, Alpha aims to enter a niche from 
which it has been excluded so far and one which it considers 
strategic. 
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Other main areas of investment are environmental protection 
(15 per cent of total investment in 1993), production capacity 
maintenance (14 per cent of total investment in 1993) and 
technological modernization ( 11 per cent of total investment in 
1993). 
However, these investments were planned before privatisation 
and it is not possible to determine whether privatisation has had any 
impact on the availability of funds for them and their 
implementation. The company has also a combining programme of 
expansion and acquisition of companies. 
Table 6.10 Investment programme (%) 
Investment 1989 1990 1991 
* Technological 47 48 23 
modernization 
* Production 32 20 20 
capacity 
maintenance 
* Electrolytic 7 24 25 
galvanizing line 
* 
Environmental 14 8 4 
protection 
* Production 
expanston 
* Others 28 
* Total 100 100 100 
Source: Company data 
Influences on productivity (value/unit) 
internal 
1992 1993 
28 1 1 
14 
63 51 
9 15 
9 
100 100 
external and 
Details about external and internal influences are dealt with 1n 
Chapter 4, section related to the company analysis framework. 
6.6.5. Finished products 
Alpha is not a producer of commodity products. Its range of 
products mainly includes higher value-added finished steel products 
which are more profitable. Alpha produces a wide variety of finished 
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steel products, including hot-rolled steel, cold-rolled steel, heavy 
plate, slabs, uncoated rolled steel and, recently, it started the 
manufacturing of galvanized plate demanded by carmakers. 
Production of hot-rolled steel - most used in autoparts, containers, 
compressors and structures in general, steel welded tubes (small 
diameter), civil engineering (bridges, viaducts, pedestrian bridges, 
commercial and residential buildings. industrial sheds and so on), 
agricultural equipment industries - in 1989, stood for 33.0 per cent 
of the total volume of 3.9 mt pa. In 1991, production rose 8.2 per 
cent by comparison with 1989 (1.3 mt pa). That year hot-rolled steel 
production represented 37.1 per cent of the total volume. It was a 
year when the Brazilian economy began to show the first signs of 
recovery. 
In 1993, production decreased 12 per cent in comparison with 
1989. In terms of total volume, hot-rolled steel represented 29.9 per 
cent. Problems related to political instability and higher output from 
competitors are the main reasons for decrease (Table 6.11). 
On the other hand, using the first half of the year as a measure 
of comparison, in 1992, hot-rolled steel stood for 37 per cent of total 
volume. In 1993, there was a reduction of 8 per cent. However, in 
1994, a recovery of 6 per cent, taking it to 35 per cent of the finished 
products total occurred (Table 6.12). 
Cold-rolled steel products are most used in household 
appliances, steel furniture, electric motors, food containers, autoparts 
and car bodies. In 1989, the company produced 1.1 mt of cold-rolled 
steel (27 .9% of total volume). In 1991, production reduced by 18.5% 
in comparison with 1989. It stood for 23.7% of the total volume 
(3.4mt a year). In 1993, production again reached the total of 1989 
(l.lmt a year). In terms of total volume, cold-rolled steel represented 
28.8%. If the first half of the year is used as a measure of comparison, 
in 1992, cold-rolled steel stood for 27.0% of the total volume. In 
1993, the volume increased by 4.0%, reaching 31%. Yet, in 1994, 
production in the first semester dropped to 29.0%. 
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Table 6.11 Comparative production of finished products (OOOt) 
Finished 
Products 
1989 
(OOOt) (%va) 
1990 
(OOOt) (%va) 
* Hot-rolled steel 1,271.7 33.0 1,155.9 34.2 
* Cold-rolled steel 1,077.8 27.9 946.0 28.0 
* Heavy plate 983 .9 25.5 915.6 27 .1 
*Slabs 412.8 10.7 258.3 7.7 
* Uncoated rolled steel 110.3 2.9 99.4 2.9 
* Galvanized plate 
* Total 3,856.5 100 3,375.3 I 00 
Source: Company data 
va: vertical analysis 
1991 
(OOOt) (%va) 
1992 
(OOOt) (%va) 
1,376.6 37.1 1,304.6 34.8 
878.9 23.7 1,028.8 27.5 
896.2 24.2 878.4 23.5 
444.9 12.0 436.4 11.7 
110.8 3.0 94.6 2.5 
3, 707.4 100 3,744.9 100 
1993 
(OOOt) (%va) 
1,118.7 29.9 
1,077.8 28.8 
901.6 24.1 
570.4 15.2 
74.6 2.0 
4.7 0.13 
3,747.7 100 
Heavy plates are used in a wide range of products. Beginning 
with shipbuilding, civil construction, steel welded tubes (large 
diameter), through to manufacturing autoparts and industrial 
equipment. Production of heavy plates, in 1989, stood for 25.5% of 
total volume of 3.9mt a year. In 1991, production fell by 8.9% in 
comparison with 1989 (0.98mt a year). In terms of total volume, 
heavy plates represented 24.2%. In 1993, production fell by 8.4% in 
comparison with the year of 1989. In total volume it stood for 24.1 %. 
Using the first semester as a measure of comparison, in 1992, 
heavy plates represented 25.0% of the total volume. In the first half 
of 1993 there was a decline of 3%, down to 22%. In 1994 there was 
yet another reduction of 4.0% in comparison with 1992 production. 
Table 6.12 Finished products by total volume 
(lst half of the year) 
Product 
* Hot-rolled steel 
* Cold-rolled steel 
* Heavy plate 
* Slabs 
* U ncoated rolled steel 
* Galvanized plate 
* Total 
Source: Company data 
1992 
(%) 
37 
27 
25 
8 
3 
100 
1993 
(%) 
29 
3 1 
22 
16 
2 
100 
1994 
(%) 
35 
29 
21 
12 
2 
1 
100 
Slabs are mainly exported to other steel companies for further 
rolling. In 1989, Alpha's production reached 0.41mt pa, nearly 11.0% 
of total volume. However, in 1991, there was an increase of 7.8% in 
output in comparison with 1989. In terms of the total volume it 
represented 12.0%. Exports had an impressive increase at that time. 
Then, in 1993, production reached 0.57mt pa. It had an expansion of 
38.2% in relation to 1989 and of 28.2% in comparison with 1991. In 
terms of total, volume slabs stood for 15.2%. It means that the 
domestic market was not able at that time to absorb the production. 
For that reason the company was looking for consumers abroad. The 
problem with exports is that prices are not as good as in the 
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domestic market. When the domestic economy is booming, the 
company prefers to sell its products internally, since it can get bigger 
profits . 
In 1993, the company started its production of electrolytic 
galvanized products in order to upgrade its product mix with higher 
value added products and increase, mainly, its share of the 
automobile industry. Galvanized sheets, coated with pure zinc or zinc 
and nickel alloy, are corrosion resistant. Uses range from carmaking 
to household appliances and building. At the end of 1993, production 
of galvanized plates reached 4700 tonnes. In the first half of 1994, it 
represented 1.0 per cent of the total volume. Overall, Alpha improved 
its productivity by maintaining the volume of production with a 
substantial reduction in the labour force. 
6. 6.6. Price/deregulation 
Alpha, when it was state owned, could not be accused of being 
a drain on the public purse or the private sector. On the contrary, 
government price controls over decades benefited private sector 
users of steel (for example, automobile industry, industrial 
equipment, and home appliances). The company succeeded in 
showing a healthy balance sheet almost throughout its period as a 
state-owned company (1956-1991), in spite of the low prices. 
In July 1991, the government control over domestic steel prices 
was removed, allowing an average price increase of 30 per cent in 
1992. 
The removal of price controls was accompanied by deregulation 
of the market which permitted the domestic steel companies to 
compete with each other. Tariffs on imports were also lowered at the 
same base. The deregulation also provided an opportunity to Alpha to 
acquire or to have stakes in many dealers which sold its products. 
Before privatisation, most of Alpha's production was sold via dealers. 
This way of distribution reduced Alpha's profitability as the dealers 
made a significant profit in the transactions. The price increase made 
a large contribution to the increase in the revenue and contributed to 
the increase in profits. 
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6.6. 7. Market strategy 
Before 1991, the Brazilian market was protected from foreign 
competition mainly due to the high tariffs imposed by the 
government. At the beginning of the 1990s, the government started a 
programme of gradual liberalization, reducing tariffs and taxes, and 
allowing the entrance of foreign products to compete with the local 
goods. The aims were to improve the quality of products available, 
reduce domestic prices and help to decrease the high levels of 
inflation. 
After the removal of price controls and market liberalisation all 
steel companies needed to pay much greater attention to their 
competitive positions in the market and be responsive to their 
customer's requirements. For example, commodity steel producers 
selling their products based on a price advantage had to ensure that 
their costs were sufficiently low for them to be able to operate 
profitably at competitive prices. Alpha's productivity performance 
enabled it to improve its competitiveness. In addition, Alpha's 
technological capability and continuing links with technology 
suppliers enabled it to develop a market strategy which focused on 
higher value added market segments. 
6.6.8. Relationship with customers 
An important aspect of the market strategy is the development 
of close relationships with large customers. This enables coordination 
of production plans and therefore better matching between 
production and demand. Some major customers such as car 
manufacturers may require close integration between steel 
production and manufacture of car components with the final 
finished steel production located close to the customer. Alpha has 
such an arrangement with Fiat. Other forms of collaboration are joint 
export programmes and development of products and businesses in 
partnership. Privatisation has helped the company to free itself from 
legal constraints that were imposed by government regulations that 
prevented a closer relationship with private customers. 
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6. 7. Performance 
Performance is the third component of the company analysis 
framework. It measures the outcome of the whole process in which 
changes in management and the policies and actions of management 
influence productivity and competitiveness as well as performance. 
The performance measures used here were discussed in Chapter 4. 
6. 7 .1. Labour productivity 
Overall, the labour productivity of the Brazilian steel 
companies' is worse than that of companies in the industrialized 
countries. Figures from World Steel Dynamics (WSD) report (1993) 
show that on average Brazilian productivity is 40% below that of 
companies from the USA (5.1 m/h/t), Japan (5.1 m/h/t), Germany 
(5.3m/h/t), Korea (7 .5 m/h/t), UK (5.4 m/h/t) and France (5.2 
m/h/t). 
Figure 6.4 compares Alpha's labour productivity with the 
average for all Brazilian steel companies. The measure used is the 
number of man-hours required to produce one tonne of steel 
(m/h/t). Therefore, higher numbers represent lower productivity. It 
is clear that Alpha's productivity is much better than the Brazilian 
average throughout the period. Brazilian productivity has improved 
every year with 40 per cent improvement between 1989 and 1993. 
Alpha's productivity has also improved each year with the exception 
of 1990. In this year, there was a fall in demand and therefore the 
company decided to do essential maintenance during that year. 
Figure 6.5 shows another measure of Alpha's labour 
productivity, tonnes of steel produced per man/year employed. 
Between 1989 and 1994, productivity increased by 17 per cent. Both 
the measures show improvements in productivity especially since 
1991. According to Alpha, these improvements have resulted from 
the adoption of a profit-seeking approach, restructuring and 
rationalization, improvements in technological and managerial 
effectiveness, and reduction of employment. Privatisation played its 
part in these changes since it gave Alpha the freedom to take 
measures that were not possible under strict public control, notably 
the reduction of the workforce and restructuring and rationalisation. 
125 
Figure 6.4 Steel productivity in Brazil and Alpha 
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A side-effect of the increase in productivity through 
restructuring and rationalisation is that employees feel they are 
und,er greater pressure. One of the interviewees stated: 
"Before we used to do things much more at ease. Now, 
everything must be done quickly. The work environment is 
becoming demanding and stressful. It is not unusual to stay on 
at work till late evening. There are more things to do and fewer 
and fewer people to share the burden" 
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Figure 6.5 Alpha•s labour productivity 
(m.ton/manlyear) 446 
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 
Source: Company data 
6. 7 .2. Costs 
The company is a low-cost, modern producer. It has low labour 
costs by international standards and its location close to one of the 
largest Brazilian deposits of high-grade iron ore enhances its cost 
competitiveness. As Figure 6.6 and Table 6.13 show, raw materials 
are the largest component of the cost structure. Due to its strategic 
position, costs of raw materials for the company are lower than for 
European and Asian competitors (Amsden, 1989:298). They account 
for 38 per cent of total costs and 29 per cent of net sales. The main 
components of material costs (38 per cent) are coal (18 per cent), iron 
ore (5 per cent) and others (15 per cent). Coal and iron ore are the 
basic elements of steel. They account for 20 per cent and 10 per cent 
respectively of total manufacturing costs. 
The main suppliers of coal in 1993 were the USA (40.6%), 
Australia (31.8% ), Canada (14,0% ), Poland (11.5% ), South Africa 
(2.1 %) . From coal, Alpha produces chemical products such as 
ammonia, naphthalene, pitch, creosote oil, anthracene, disinfectant oil 
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and light oil (BTX) for use in refrigeration, fertilizers, plastic, 
aluminum, wood preservation, and so on. 
Figure 6.6 The company's cost structure in 1993 
Miscellaneous 
Electricity 
Depreciation 
Source: Company dat. 
coal 
iron ore 5% 
others ~ 
38% 
Labour costs 
Material costs 
Table 6.13 The company's cost structure as % of net revenues 
Items 
* Material 
* Labour 
* Other production 
* Manufacturing costs 
before depreciation 
* Depreciation 
* Total manufacturing costs 
* Selling, general and administrative expenses 
* Total 
Source: Company data 
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1992 
(% of net revenues) 
29 
18 
.L4 
6 1 
R. 
69 
u 
84 
The main suppliers of iron ore are Companhia Vale do Rio Doce 
(CVRD) and Mineracao Trindade (Samitri). Brazilian steel producers 
have benefited from having a low cost iron ore supply mainly due to 
their location. Also worthy of note is that the Brazilian iron ore is of 
good quality. In 1993, the iron ore domestic price was around US$8.4 
per tonne (FOB-mine) while on the international market the price 
was US$17 .3 per tonne (FOB-port). The difference was mainly due to 
railway freight. The company used to pay in 1993, US$11.5-12.0 per 
tonne including freight. Asian producers pay around US$30.0 per 
tonne and Europeans US$26.0 including shipping costs (Baring 
Securities, 1993). 
Alpha's labour costs account for 22% of total costs or 18% of net 
sales. Labour costs are low in comparison with other producers from 
Europe, America and Asia. The average wage cost in Germany is 
US$33.00 an hour, in Japan and in the USA it is US$30.00 an hour, 
France is US$27.00, the United Kingdom is US$18.0, Korea is US$12.00 
and in Brazil it is US$8.00 an hour. At Alpha the average wage cost is 
US$9.00 an hour, over US$1.00 more than the Brazilian average. 
Although wages paid by Brazilian steel makers are relatively low, 
their employees' productivity is about 40% below that of other 
producers from the countries mentioned above because of excess of 
man-hours employed and relatively outdated plant and equipment. 
Cost structure is also compounded by depreciation (9% ), 
electricity (6% ), and other costs (25% ) . The company uses the straight 
line as method of depreciation. Mill equipment has a 5% 
depreciation rate while other fixed assets have 4%. Manufacturing 
costs before depreciation stand at 61% of total net sales. Total 
manufacturing costs represent 69% of total net sales after 
depreciation. 
Selling, general and administrative expenses (SG&A) have 
increased in recent years caused by higher port charges, sale fees and 
distribution costs. As exports rise, SG&A tend to rise as well. They 
account for 15% of total net sales. Total costs accounted for 84% of 
the total net sales in 1992. 
In summary, the strengths of the Brazilian steelmakers are 
based on low labour costs, iron ore, and electricity power. 
Limitations such as products with low value added, low industrial 
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automation rate, long distance from the major international 
consumers, and low productivity are disadvantages. Alpha has the 
benefits of the low costs but not the . disadvantages faced by many 
other Brazilian steel producers. 
6. 7 .3. Sales and markets hare 
The level of sales in the domestic market are very sensitive to 
macroeconomic policies and the level of economic activity. In 1989 
due to a "summer shock" plan of economic stabilization with a price 
freeze, a new currency called "new cruzado", further measures of 
indexation and a rise in interest rates, this gave companies and 
consumers the confidence to start increasing production and 
expenditure. As a result, in 1989, demand for steel products soared. 
Brazil's crude steel production reached 25.3 million tonnes, one of 
the highest levels over many years. Alpha's sales in the domestic 
market reached 2.58 million tonnes representing 69 per cent of the 
entire sales (3.75mt). 
In 1991 after two new emergency plans of economic 
stabilization (Coil or I in March 1990 and Coli or II in January 1991 ), 
the Brazilian economy was again in recession. In spite of this, Alpha 
was able to raise domestic sales by 9 per cent in comparison with 
1990, mainly due to, lower production by its main competitors. 
Domestic prices in 1991 fell 16 per cent as a direct consequence of 
government price controls. As a result, Alpha reduced its domestic 
sales to 55 per cent with the remainder going to international 
consumers. As the Brazilian industrial production fell 4 per cent in 
1992, steel domestic sales volume dropped 11 per cent. However, in 
1993 domestic sales rose by 8 per cent, from 1.78mt to 1.93mt 
(Figure 6.7). 
In general, when the domestic prices are higher than 
international ones, either because of removal of price controls or 
stronger demand, the company gives priority to domestic consumers 
instead of external ones. But, when demand is low in the domestic 
market and prices are low, the company turns its efforts towards 
exports. The international sales volume increased 26% in 1991, 
reaching 45% of the total sales. In 1992, sales rose 5% in comparison 
with 1991, and exports made up 50% of the total sales (Table 6.14). 
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Table 6.14 Sales breakdown by destination 11 
[tonnage(%) - revenue(%)] 
Region 1989 1990 1991 1992 
* Domestic 69 74 58 69 55 61 50 65 
sales 
* Exports 31 26 42 3 1 45 39 50 35 
* Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Source: Company data 
Figure 6.7 Sales breakdown by destination 
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Source: Company data (OOOt) 
Domestic marketshare by sector 
The company's overall domestic marketshare has remained 
about the same over the last five years. It has no difficulty in 
maintaining its share while remaining profitable because of the cost 
and technological capability advantages discussed earlier. 
Fluctuations in the domestic market share from one year to the next 
are mainly due to the shifts in the company's marketing efforts in 
response to changes in the relative attractiveness of domestic and 
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export markets. The total domestic market share increased from 46 
per cent in 1990 to 48 per cent in 1991 (Table 6.15). In 1992 its 
market share fell to 45 per cent caused by an increase in output 
from its competitors. However, its share in the car industry rose 
substantially. It is worth remembering that car production demands 
cold-rolled steel, which is not only one of the highest value added 
products together with galvanized sheets but one of the most 
profitable. 
Alpha has seen its share of the car manufacturing sector 
increasing year by year. In 1990, it had 51 per cent of this segment. 
The 1991 marketshare did not change. However, in 1993, there was 
an increase of 8 per cent, reaching 59 per cent. In 1994. its 
participation rose to 60 per cent. Improvement in the Brazilian 
economy, the related higher demand for new cars, and the 
establishment of a number of foreign car producers as manufacturers 
in Brazil means that there is strong growth of steel demand by the 
automotive sector. The growth in Alpha's share could be attributed to 
the technological capability developed before the privatisation and 
the change in strategic direction made possible by the privatisation 
and economic liberalisation. 
Table 6.15 Alpha's domestic market share by market segments and 
types of products 
Sectors 
* Carmakers 
* Auto-parts 
* Steel welded tubes 
(small diameter) 
* Steel welded tubes 
(large diameter) 
* Industrial equipment 
* Packaging 
* Civil construction 
* Distributors 
* Re-rolling 
* Shipbuiding 
* Marketshare average 
1990 1991 
(%) (%) 
51 51 
59 55 
24 28 
70 80 
57 43 
32 64 
60 69 
45 44 
32 50 
33 40 
46 48 
Source: Company data, Baring Securities (1993) 
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1992 1993 
(%) (%) 
60 59 
54 48 
23 19 
82 75 
64 63 
64 41 
48 52 
3 1 31 
38 
60 47 
45 
There are sectors where the company has an overwhelming 
share. It is worth mentioning segments such as tractors and highway 
machines (94 per cent of the market in 1993), industrial equipment 
(63 per cent in 1993), steel welded tubes - large diameter (75 per 
cent in 1993), electrical equipment (57 per cent in 1991 to 63 per 
cent in 1993), and shipbuilding (40 per cent in 1991 to 47 per cent in 
1993). 
In terms of growth, industrial equipment increased 20 per cent 
from 1991 to 1993 ( 43 per cent to 63 per cent of the domestic 
market). Home appliances, in turn, grew 8 per cent from 1991 to 
1993. Agricultural implements and civil construction are also sectors 
where the company has been able to raise its participation (Figure 
6.8). 
Figure 6.8 Domestic market share by selected sectors 
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Sales to the domestic market in 1992 reached 1.8 million 
tonnes. Distributors represented 21% (0.38mt), carmakers 16% 
(0.28mt), auto-parts 10% (0.17mt), packaging 10% (0.17mt), steel 
welded tubes 8% (0.15mt) and so on. The five sectors mentioned 
above were responsible for nearly two thirds of the sales in that 
year. In 1993, some variations occured, but the main buyers 
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continued the same (carmakers, auto-parts, packaging, distributors) 
(Figure 6.9 and Table 6.16). 
Figure 6.9 Sales to domestic market by selected sectors 
(1993) 
Distributors 
Others 
Packaging 
Auto-parts 
Source: Company dat. 
Table 6.16 Sales by sector in the domestic market 
Sectors 1992 1993 
(OOOt) (%) (OOOt) 
* Carmakers 282 16 400 
* Auto-parts 171 10 212 
* Naval 45 3 34 
* Steel welded tubes 151 8 66 
(large diameter) 
* Steel welded tubes 85 5 79 
(small diameter) 
* Packaging 172 10 138 
* Home appliances 81 5 102 
* Civil construction 78 4 83 
* Electrical machinery 102 5 121 
and equipment 
* Distributors 375 21 456 
* Others 236 13 235 
* Total 1778 100 1926 
Source: Company data 
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4 
6 
24 
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The car manufacturing sector is by far the most important one 
for Alpha. It accounted for 21 per cent of the whole domestic sales in 
1993 (1.9mt) . In terms of tonnage, the company sold 0.29mt to 
carmakers in 1992. Yet, in 1993, this value reached 0.40mt. At the 
end of the first half of 1994, sales reached 0.20mt (Table 6.17). 
According to Alpha's Chief Executive, the good financial results 
of 1994 were due to an increase in domestic demand, and especially 
car industry demand for steel. Other, main reasons were price 
increases, rising exports to Mercosul, and continue cost-cutting. 
Another way to evaluate sales to the domestic market is 
comparing the first half of each year. The first half of 1992 shows 
that the main consumers were carmakers (13%), followed by 
distributors (18%), steel welded tube - large diameter (11 %), auto-
parts (9%), and others (Table 6.18). 
Table 6.17 Domestic marketshare by sectors (1st half of 1994) 
Sectors 1994 
(%) 
* Carmakers 6 0 
* Auto-parts 5 1 
* Naval 7 0 
* Electrical machinery and 
equipment 
* Home appliances 
* Steel welded tubes 
(large diameter) 
* Steel welded tubes 
(small diameter) 
* Packaging 
* Civil construction 
* Distributors 
Source: Company data 
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64 
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45 
68 
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It is interesting to observe that during the first half of the 
following years of 1993 and 1994, the situation stayed the same. The 
main variation was in terms of volume. The car industry stood for 
21% of the company's sales in 1993 (0.20mt) first half; the same 
figure when taking into account the whole year. The participation of 
the car industry, in the first half of 1994, was down to 18% in 
relative terms not in tonnage (0.20mt). This happened due to an 
increase in domestic sales (1.1mt) and an augmentation in sales to 
other sectors. Figures from 1993 and 1994 suggest that sales to 
distributors represented almost 25% of the whole domestic market, 
an increase of almost 7% in relation to 1992. It can possibly be 
explained by the economic conditions at that time. 1994 was a very 
good year for the Brazilian economy. The GDP rose nearly 5%. Sales to 
auto-parts increased from 9% in 1992 to 12% in 1994 during the first 
semester. Sales for the others sectors did not have impressive 
changes in terms of tonnage. It is worth remembering that in volume 
terms around 75% of domestic sales are made directly to end-users 
and the rest go to low-volume customers through local steel 
s toe kho lders. 
Table 6.18 Sales by sector to the domestic market (1st half) 
Sector 1992 1993 1994 (OOOt) (%) (OOOt) (%) (OOOt) (%) 
* Carmakers 115 13 201 21 203 18 
* Auto-parts 77 9 97 10 135 12 
* Naval 20 2 21 2 13 1 
* Electrical machinery 79 9 27 3 70 6 
and equipment 
* Home appliances 50 6 41 4 44 4 
* Steel welded tube 96 1 1 73 8 70 6 
(large diameter) 
* Steel welded tubes 39 5 50 5 60 5 
(small diameter) 
* Packaging 39 5 39 4 52 5 
* Civil construction 59 7 59 6 64 6 
* Distributors 157 1 8 222 23 263 24 
* Others 122 14 116 12 137 12 
* Total 853 100 946 100 1 1 1 1 100 
Source: Company data 
136 
6. 7 .4. Exports 
6.7 .4.1. Exports by country 
As noted above, the level of Alpha's exports is determined by 
the demand conditions and product prices in Brazil and foreign 
markets. Overall, profits margins on exports are not as high as in the 
domestic market. The reasons for that are: 
(a) the more intense competition in foreign markets from 
domestic and other foreign producers; 
(b) the higher costs of transporting steel, especially to the 
European and Far Eastern markets, and 
(c) the relatively low value added products exported (for 
example, the high value added cold-rolled and galvanised sheets are 
sold almost entirely in the domestic market). 
The USA was the main external consumer throughout the 
1980s. Sales rose from 80,596 tonnes in 1980 to 256,907 tonnes in 
1983. After that there was a decline until 1988, when sales started to 
increase again. On average, during the last decade US sales 
repr~esented 25 per cent of total exports. This figure was 16 per cent 
in 1989. There was an increase of 4 per cent in 1990, followed by 
two years of decline in 1991 and 1992 ( 16 per cent and 13 per cent 
respectively). Exports to the USA were reduced mainly due to import 
tariffs (30 per cent on average) imposed by the American Congress 
(Table 6.19 and Figure 6.10). 
Table 6.19 The company's exports by country 
------------------------------------------------------Country 
(%) 
1989 
(%) 
1990 
(%) 
1991 
(%) 
1992 
------------------------------------------------------
*US 
* Japan 
* Taiwan 
* Thailand 
* Argentina 
* Malaysia 
* Others 
* Total 
Source: Company data 
16 
14 
4 
1 
3 
1 
61 
100 
137 
20 
12 
1 1 
1 1 
1 
4 
41 
100 
16 
15 
20 
6 
6 
5 
32 
100 
13 
5 
16 
18 
13 
5 
30 
100 
In order to compensate for the fall in exports to the USA, the 
company increased efforts to find new markets in South East Asia 
and South America. Sales to Taiwan, Thailand, Malaysia and more 
recently China have been growing steadily. The Taiwan marketshare 
was just 4 per cent in 1989. Yet in 1991 it stood for 20 per cent. The 
tonnage sold to Taiwan in 1992 was 0.28 million tonnes, only 
Thailand bought more than that. 
In spite of all the obstacles, exports to the US had an impressive 
recovery in 1993; over 0.37mt were sold. An increase of 69% by 
comparison with 1992 (0.22mt). China's performance in 1993 was 
breathtaking. It bought almost 5.5 times more in 1993 than in 1992. 
Other countries had their share reduced due to much stiffer 
competition. 
Argentina has become an increasingly important customer since 
the formation of Mercosul in 1991. Sales in 1992 accounted for 13 
per cent of total exports, about 0.22mt. This figure dropped sharply 
to 0.13mt in 1993 due to internal economic difficulties in Argentina 
(Figure 6.11 ). 
Figure 6.1 0 The Company's exports by country of destination 
(1993) 
Thailand 
Others 
Taiwan 
Malaysia 
Japan 
USA Argentina 
Source: Company dat 
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In order to increase its services, operations and sales in the 
USA as well as in other areas of the world, the company has 
established subsidiaries and set up offices. This has allowed a better 
interrelationship with customers and improvement of prices and 
terms. 
Figure 6.11 Exports by selected countries of destination 
Malaysia 
Singapore 
Japan 
Thailand 308.2 
Argentina 
Taiwan 
China 
Source: Company data 
6.7 .4.2. Exports by continent 
D 1993 
• 1992 
(OOOt) 
Exports to Asia accounted for 59% of the total in 1992. Coming 
in second place is South America with 21%, in third place North 
America with 15% and, finally, Europe with only 5%. However, North 
America raised its participation in 1993, reaching 23% of total sales. 
Europe again was a dull figure in 1993, reducing its participation 
from 5% to 2% (Figure 6.12) . Main points about the relative 
importance of countries or in this case continents recognising that 
there are fluctuations from one year to the next - reasons have been 
discussed above. 
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Figure 6.12 Company's exports by continent of destination 
Europe 
South America 
North America 
Asia 
Source: Company data 
6. 7 .5. Profitability' and asset turnover ratios 
D 1993 
• 1992 
(OOOt) 
Profitability is among the most important indicators of the 
"performance" of an enterprise. It represents generation of value for 
the owners of the enterprise and makes it possible for it to survive 
and grow. Following the company analysis framework, section 6. 7 
examines the implications for company profitability of the 
management and competitiveness and productivity components and 
the output and sales aspects of the performance component. Figure 
6.13 sets out some of Alpha's main profitability and asset utilisation 
ratios. PBIT/total assets ratio reflects the profits generated before tax 
on all the assets used (fixed assets and current assets). Alpha's 
PBIT/total assets ratio has been uneven over the last five years 
mainly due to changes in profits before interest and taxation. Despite 
this the average ratio has been over 10 per cent, one of the best in 
the Brazilian steel industry. PBIT/sales ratio shows the gross profit 
margin on sales. The figures are quite impressive. The average ratio 
has been about 25 per cent. Again, one of the best results in the steel 
industry. 
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Figure 6.13 Profitability and asset turnover ratios 
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The sales margin (net profit over sales) has increased steadily 
since 1991. In 1995, it reached 15.5 per cent down from 20.3 per 
cent in 1994 due to a fall in net profits. Despite the fluctuations, these 
figures represent an impressive performance. The company has been 
one of the most profitable in the steel industry over the last five 
years. The primary reasons should be found in the restructuring 
programme, entrepreneurial strategy, a better mix of higher value 
added products, and improvement of the economy after the deep 
1990-92 recession. Return on equity (net profit over stockholders 
equity) presents a similar patterns to sales margin. It has been 
growing constantly over the years, except in 1995 when it dropped to 
11.9 per cent. Asset turnover (sales/total assets) shows how many 
times in a year a company's assets have been turned over. Alpha's 
asset turnover has decreased since 1991. Over time the company will 
need to take actions to stop the trend as this activity ratio is one of 
the most important ratios that shows whether a company has been 
able to generate profits or not. 
6.7 .6. Profits and Earnings per share (EPS) 
Figure 6.14 sets out the profit performance over a six years 
period. The last three years results have been encouraging when 
compared with the year of 1990. From losses in 1990, a year of low 
demand and maintenance work, the company managed to increase 
profits steadily since then. In 1995, the company's profit reached 
US$336mi, representing almost 20% of net revenues. It appears that 
privatisation, deregulation, increasing demand, better relationship 
with customers, price liberalization policy, all of them, have played a 
part to improve profits. 
Figure 6.15 displays Alpha's earnings per share. The chart 
shows that the company has been increasing the EPS since the 
beginning of 1990's. It seems there is a clear policy to favour the 
company's shareholders. For example, EPS grew more than fivefold 
during the 1991-1994 period. 
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Figure 6.14 Alpha's net profit (o/o) 
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Source: Company data 
Figure 6.15 Earnings per share (0/o) 
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6.7.7. Value added 
Value added is defined as being the difference between the 
selling price and the cost of bought-in materials, components and 
services. In other words, as put by Krugman (1994:37), "value added 
of a firm is the dollar value of its sales, minus the dollar value of the 
inputs it purchases from other firms." Porter (1985:39) points out 
some of the flaws associated with the value added concept, such as 
the improper distinction between raw material and the rest of inputs 
used by a company and the lack of emphasis on the relationship of a 
company and its suppliers which can diminish cost or increase 
differentiation. As far as this research is concerned, the value added 
concept is defined as being the difference between gross revenues 
and cost of products and services. 
Figure 6.16 presents Alpha's value added over a six-year period 
(data available for the researcher). The cost of products and services 
has varied between fifty three and sixty five percent of gross 
revenues figures over time. In its turn, the value added results have 
shown a small variation between forty three and forty seven percent 
of gross revenues, except in 1991, when it dropped to thirty five 
percent of gross revenues due to an increase in cost of products. To a 
certain extent, value added reflects what it is happening with profits 
over the same period. However, one cannot argue that privatisation 
has been the main factor affecting value added as this is not clear 
enough to be positive about. 
6.8. Conclusions 
Privatisation played an important · role in disentangling the 
company from government constraints . Many aspects such as 
strategic planning, corporate development, procurement, finance, 
human resources, decision-making process, have been affected by the 
company's new approach. 
However, it is important not to be impressed and blinded by 
the results after 1991, when privatisation happened. The issue of 
state versus private ownership should not obscure some fundamental 
facts. First of all, Alpha has been able to display quite a successful 
performance throughout most of its entire existence. With the 
continuing assistance of its Japanese partner, the company managed 
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to create technological capability and an internal culture that stresses 
the values of technical competence, teamwork, qualification and 
training, responsibility and autonomy, and managerial expertise. Most 
employees are proud to working for Alpha. They feel that the 
company cares for them, in a broad sense. 
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As a matter of fact, Brazilian public companies on the whole 
have been subject to considerable political interference since the 
outset of the dictatorship in 1964 until the resurgence of democracy 
in 1985. Prominent politicians appointed their followers as key 
members of t~e boards of major state-owned enterprises. 
Regrettably, in general, politicians and their appointees were not very 
much concerned about company well-being, but about how they use 
their positions to keep themselves in power, boost their profile 
within their constituencies, and even make personal financial gains. 
The available evidence suggests that before privatisation the 
company was able to limit undesirable political interference and keep 
a highly professional management team in charge of the entire 
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business. One possible reason for this is the continuing involvement 
of Nippon Steel. 
The case study demonstrates that privatisation is not by any 
means the only or even the most important explanation of Alpha's 
performance and efficiency. Alpha had a good record of management, 
technological capability and productivity before 1991. It was 
considered one of the best Brazilian public companies with a high 
reputation.' After 1991, results have been consistent and well 
received by the business community. However, besides privatisation 
there are other reasons that might justify the company's improved 
results . Among them are the recovery of the Brazilian economy from 
1993 onwards, increasing car production in Brazil~ the lifting of 
internal price controls by the government, increase in price of steel 
in international markets in 1994, stable prices of raw material, 
creation of the South American common market (Mercosul) that has 
allowed a steep increase in sales to Argentina. 
Labour productivity has been increasing steadily since 1990, 
when productivity reached 300 m.ton/man-year. In 1994, 
productivity rose to 446 m.ton/man/year, a significant increase by 
any standard. The main reason for this improvement is the 
restructuring programme, bringing about a leaner and sharper 
organisation, with a smaller number of employees, reduced layers of 
hierarchy, and reorganization of work processes. 
Profitability, while fluctuating from one year to the next, 
remained at a relatively high level since 1991. 
Growth in market share, sales, and exports are some of the 
indicators that one can consider to evaluate the health of a company. 
For example, Alpha gradually increased its participation in the car 
industry from 51% in 1991 to 59% in 1993. The most significant 
aspect of this lies in the fact that the car manufacturing sector 
demands higher value added products which are the most profitable. 
The carmakers' purchases stand for almost half of Alpha's income. 
Net income rose from US$58.9 million in 1991 to US$239.4 million in 
1993, amid 1994 values. 
Technology has played a very important role in Alpha since its 
foundation . A healthy relationship between a Japanese steelmaker 
and Alpha was established in the SO's. Japanese technology transfer 
started in 1957. Management as well as technology is regarded by 
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most specialists as an important component of competitiveness. 
Alpha has recently attempted to enhance its managerial capabilities 
through hiring the services of major international consultancy 
companies, a much closer link with Nippon Steel and increasing the 
training of its employees. It seems that, at the company level, 
managerial agency has the greater influence over an improved 
performance and competitiveness. 
Alpha is deemed to have one of the best workforces in the 
Brazilian steel industry. It is considered well-trained and qualified by 
its competitors and other companies in general, according to 
interviews conducted by this researcher. For 96% of Alpha's 
employees, it is the only company they have ever worked for (Exame, 
30 August 1995). One of the reasons put forward by the company's 
management to explain this loyalty lies in its 'Japanese culture' 
inherited by its close connections with Nippon Steel throughout its 
existence. Discipline, loyalty, teamwork, respect for hierarchy are 
some of the characteristics that the company's employees assimilated 
as a result of its partnership with the Japanese. 
The role of government is in general regarded as an important 
factor that affects competitiveness. It is accepted that the 
government's role should be mainly restricted to creating an 
environment which enables companies to thrive and prosper in order 
to compete at home and abroad. After privatisation, Alpha was freed 
of government constraints that hampered the undertaking of proper 
actions related to strategy, decision-making, personnel, finance, 
procurement, sales, and so on. For example, as a state-owned 
enterprise Alpha had to follow through a group of about 100 
government decrees and directives merely to sell/buy goods and 
services. After 1991, as a private enterprise, it was able to establ~sh 
major technological partnerships and alliances, to create subsidiaries, 
and to undertake a programme of diversification towards new 
business opportunities. 
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7. COMPANY BETA 
7 .1. Introduction 
This chapter examines Beta within the company analysis 
framework developed in Chapter 4 (Figure 4.2). Howevert the very 
substantial differences in the origin and characteristics of the 
company and data availability imply that this case study cannot be 
precisely evaluated in the same lines as the examination of Alpha in 
the chapter 6. 
Beta was the last Brazilian steel maker to be privatised. Since 
its foundation in 1978 the company has been through some 
difficulties. To begin with, due to the impact of the oil crisis on the 
Brazilian economy t public financial resources were scarce and the 
steelmill construction schedule was delayed by about five years. Beta 
began its production in February 1985 with completion of the second 
stage in July 1986. The last stage was suspended in July 1990 
because of higher financial costs, growing operational costs, fall of 
steel prices in international markets, unfavourable exchange rates 
and government domestic price controls. Beta made a loss in 1990 of 
more than US$230m. After 1990, the company has returned to 
modest profitability. 
Beta as a private company 
opportunities in the domestic and 
without government protection 
government controls. 
7 .2. Company background 
is facing new challenges and 
international markets but now 
or restrictions imposed by 
Beta is a Brazilian steel mill created by the Government in the 
1970s in the state of Minas Gerais. The company is located in the Alto 
Paraopeba, embodying the areas of the Ouro Branco and Congonhas 
city councils. Beta is strategically situated in terms of access to main 
Brazilian industrial and consumer centres and exporting ports. It is 
located close to one of the richest iron ore mines as well as to areas of 
limestonet dolomite and dunite. 
Construction was started in November 1976. Due to the oil 
crisis that hit the Brazilian economy at that time, financial resources 
allocated to the project by the government began to become scarce 
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and then became erratic. This had a major impact on the construction 
schedule. Between 1978 and 1985, construction work was delayed 
six times. After that, the project was divided into three phases: 
• Phase I: finished in February 1985, when coking plant 
and semi-finished products rolling mills were ready to 
produce billets and blooms, through the acquisition of 
steel ingots from other Brazilian steelmills; 
• Phase 11: finished in July 1986, when raw material yards, 
sinter plant, calcination plant, blast furnace, and steel-
making plant were ready, allowing the integration of the 
whole production up to the rolling mills stage, and 
• Phase Ill: comprising of rolling mill units for medium 
shapes and bars for heavy shapes and rail. Phase Ill was 
suspended indefinitely in July 1990, in spite of 75% of the 
construction work of the whole phase having been 
completed. 
The layout of the steelmill allows an expansion of production 
capacity to up to 10 million tonnes a year, without disrupting 
production. By 1993, the company's production had reached 2.4m 
tonnes of molten steel, with a nominal capacity of 2m tonnes, because 
of improvements and adaptations in machines and equipments. 
The main production units are: 
(a) Coal storage made up of two yards of 96,000 square meter area; 
(b) Primary yards chosen to store iron ores and miscellaneous 
materials; 
(c) Blending yards fitted with two stackers; 
(d) Coking plant with two 53-oven batteries, having an inside 
volume of 39.6 cubic meters; 
(e) Coke yard to meet the requirements of emergency storage; 
(f) Sinter plant of Dwight Lloyd type; 
(g) 2 Sinter yards operate with a single stacker-reclaimcr unit; 
(h) By-products plant for recovery of chemical by-products and 
pollution control; 
(i) Blast furnace plant with a production capacity of 2m 
tonnes/year; 
(j) Steel-making plant with two LD-type oxygen converters; 
(k) Calcination plant; 
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(1) Semi-products rolling mills; 
(m) Energy system. 
Beta has been in the forefront of preservation of the 
environment since its implementation in Ouro Branco. It was built up 
with installed pollution control equipment and systems. According to 
the company, among the environmental control actions developed so 
far are: 
• identification of pollution sources and relevant effluents; 
• continuous monitoring of water, air and soil throughout 
the area of the steelworks; 
• optimization of pollution control systems; 
• installation of a programme for management of wastes 
and by-products; 
• technical and scientific agreements with the Federal 
University of Minas Gerais (UFMG) and the Federal 
University of Vicosa (UFV); . 
• in 1992, the "Environment as your Client" programme was 
set up in the company and the community. 
7 .3. Privatisation 
Beta was the last Brazilian state steelmaker to be privatised. On 
September 10, 1993, through an auction held at Belo Horizonte Stock 
Exchange, the company was privatised. The consortium led by GMJ 
(Grupo Mendes Junior) with the Clube de Participacao Acionaria dos 
Empregados (Employees' association), Acos Villares, Banco de Credito 
Real de Minas Gerais, Vale do Rio Doce Navegacao, Grupo Economico 
and Banco de Credito Nacional became the main shareholders with 
the right to have their representatives in the boardroom. The 
consortium, till the end of 1994, held nearly 90 per cent of the total 
capital of the company. 
Alpha and Beta had similar problems during their auctions, the 
difference being scale. To begin with, both companies had their 
auction dates postponed. Beta's auction was planned, initially, to take 
place on August 25, but the Federal Government Controller's Office 
(TCU) required more time to look through the technical aspects of the 
privatisation process. Originally, the TCU auditors thought the 
minimum price of US$364.4m too low for a company with recently 
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installed capacity and a promtsmg future. Eventually, the auction took 
place in September. The auction lasted almost five hours and 38 
brokerage houses bid at the auction, representing 101 private 
investors, six foreign players and six public investors. 
When GMJ decided to bid for Beta it had the support of the 
company's Employees' Association, who until 1995, held 20 per cent 
of the Beta's capital. Thus, the support of the Employees Association 
was fundamental for GMJ. The latter had guaranteed the job security 
of as many employees as possible with their deal with GMJ. The 
employees who are now involved in the management of the company 
wanted to be sure that they would be consulted on a day-to-day 
basis on management decisions, including decisions about dismissals. 
The acquisition of Beta by GMJ would allow it to become an 
integrated company and be much more able to compete against its 
rivals, Companhia Belgo Mineira and Grupo Gerdau, in the production 
of quality long steel. GMJ (a private enterprise) and Beta were 
established in the 1980s with the idea that they should complement 
each other. Before the privatisation, more than 40 per cent of Beta's 
billets production was bought by GMJ, to compensate for its unequal 
product-mix. 
Before privatisation, Beta's gross debt was estimated to be 
US$380m, US$170m being owed to Cia Siderurgica de Tubarao, 
Usiminas and Doce Nave, for the sale of part of the port at Praia Mole. 
Of the US$210m of net debt, US$50m is short-term. Beta produced 
2.4m tonnes of steel in 1993, more than 10 per cent above its 
nominal capacity. In September 1993, 4,658 persons were employed 
. by Beta and its organisational structure had 149 functional units. 
7 .4. Applying the company analysis framework 
The aim of this section is to examine Beta within the company 
analysis framework (Figure 4.2) taking into account its three main 
components: Management, Competiti veness/Producti vi ty and 
Performance. The three components depict distinct stages in a 
company process. Management enables the elements of a company to 
improve productivity and to enhance performance. Productivity 
makes performance sustainable and foster it. Performance helps a 
company to achieve its goals. 
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7 .S. Management 
Management is deemed to be a key element of any successful 
undertaking. Having the right people, provided with vtston, 
determination, knowing why, where, when, and how to go, being able 
to change and innovate as circumstances require is an invaluable 
asset (HMSO, 1994). Successful companies are not run by weak and 
sloppy management. Conversely, successful companies are a mirror of 
a strong and competent management. In other words, it means a 
management able to act promptly, responding to different demands 
and needs. Being pro-active and innovative as much as possible. ie. 
acting and changing in a manner so that available options are not 
dictated entirely by chance or facts outside the control of the 
company. It is wise to act before things get worse or rather take 
action even if the company seems to be in a good shape as change is 
not always easy and welcome when things seem to be running well. 
To achieve that, a management is required to show leadership and 
ability to work as a team, drawing commitment from all those 
involved. So managerial agency is very important to any successful 
enterprise. 
There must be commitment to continuous learning through 
courses, seminars, conferences and all kinds of contacts with 
individuals both within and outside the company. In addition to that, 
entrepreneurship has been another demanded ability from 
employees. Then, there is a growing awareness and change of 
attitudes from most of the stakeholders: customers, suppliers, 
shareholders, government, green movement, animal protection 
movement, and so forth. The environment in which a company of the 
1990s develops its business is turning out to be less amicable 
towards those companies that have failed to comply with minimum 
standards set by its main stakeholders. So a flexible and conscious 
management is required to cope with all that. 
Management can be crucial to the success or failure of any 
undertaking. As mentioned in Chapter 3, 'successful companies are 
led by people with a clear vision ... objcctives ... rccognition of changes 
and innovation' (HMSO, 1994). As a state-owned enterprise, Beta did 
not have an outstanding record in management due to too much 
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political interference in its business. It had politicians appointed by 
the Government such as, for instance, a president and directors who 
did not have the relevant experience and capabilities to run a 
manufacturing enterprise, let alone a steel company. Further, their 
major motivations and objectives were not focused on improving 
Beta's performance and profitability. After privatisation, the need for 
a much more professional team to steer the company's business was 
very high on the shareholders' agenda. 
7 .5.1. Ownership 
Beta's main shareholders before privatisation were SIDERBRAS 
(the state holding company) with 60 per cent of shares, Minas Gerais 
State Government with 20 per cent, and others with 20 per cent 
(Figure 7.1) 
Figure 7.1 Major Shareholders before privatisation 
Minas Gerais State 
Government 
Others 
Source: Company dat. 
153 
Siderbras (State 
holding company) 
After privatisation, as stated above, most of the voting shares 
went to Brazilian groups, the biggest shareholder until the end of 
1994 being GMJ with 31.50 per cent of the common shares and 30.65 
per cent of the preferred shares (Table 7.1). Other big shareholders 
are the Employees' Association with 20 per cent of common shares, 
Banco Economico (10 per cent of common shares)7 Banco Credito 
Nacional (10 per cent of common shares}, Acos Villares SA (6.24 per 
cent of common shares), and Vale do Rio Doce Navegacao - Docenave 
(4.97 per cent of common shares). After the change in ownership, a 
great number of financial institutions became shareholders. 
7 .S.l. Governance 
Under state ownership, all steel enterprises were obliged to 
comply with a series of decrees and directives, without taking into 
account different realities, cultures, performance, and efficiency. This 
approach has proved damaging for a number of companies since their 
distinguishing characteristics were not always considered by 
SIDERBRAS. The main objective was to reach an average result that 
would suit the majority of public steel companies. 
After privatisation, Beta has gained greater freedom, flexibility 
and has been able to carry out a number of actions such as 
downsizing, reduction of red tape, changes in procurement and 
marketing areas. The liberalization of the economy, the lifting of 
restrictions to operate fully, the growing demand for its products, are 
some of the facts that have allowed the company to achieve some of 
its objectives. 
7 .5.3. Autonomy and incentives 
Privatisation has freed the company to es.tablish its aims 
without government interference. Greater autonomy has affected 
planning, corporate development, procurement, customer services, 
product development, financial transactions, commercial and 
marketing, and human resources areas. 
The decision·making process is quicker and much simpler. 
There is greater customer care and more emphasis on search for new 
markets. There is greater freedom to develop a much deeper 
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relationship with banks and foreign organizations. More flexibility to 
contract/dismiss people as well as to define policies on wages and 
salaries. 
For the employees who continued to be employed, the change in 
ownership brought, mainly, participation in shareholding and 
incentives in the form of performance-related pay. The reduction in 
the workforce has clearly had negative effects for former employees. 
The Employees' Association and the company management have 
collaborated to help former employees to establish their own firms to 
supply Beta (e.g. catering, cleaning). 
Table 7.1 Major shareholders after privatisation 
Shareholders %of common % of preferred % of total 
* Cia Mineira de 31.50 30.63 31.50 
Partici pacoes 
(Grupo Mendes Junior) 
* Acominas's Employees 20.00 
-----
20.00 
Invest. Club-CEA 
* Banco Economico 10.00 9.73 10.00 
* Banco Credito Nacional 10.00 9.72 10.00 
* Acos Villares SA 6.24 6 .07 6.24 
* Vale Rio Doce Navegacao 4.97 4 .83 4.97 
Docenave 
* Banco Real 3 .80 3.69 3.80 
* Bemge 4.27 4.15 4.27 
* Credireal 3.62 3.52 3.62 
* Grupo Bradesco 2.57 2 .50 2.57 
* Others 3.05 25.16 3.05 
* Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 
Source: Company data on 30 June 1994 
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7 .5.5. Organizational structure 
Beta carried out major changes both before and after 
privatisation. Actions have been taken to rescue the company from 
problems inherited since its beginning: oversized projects, lack of 
public money to undertake the timetable previously agreed, political 
interference, overmanning, mismanagement, low productivity and 
efficiency. 
A great number of measures were taken to improve the 
company's profile. As a result, action programmes were set up, such 
as cost reduction, rationalization of services, renegotiation of 
contracts, reduction of stocks, rationalization of port services, and 
better deals were made for the purchase of raw materials. The 
concept of Total Quality Management became embedded within the 
company, through a series of seminars and courses and active 
involvement of the workforce. 
Figure 7.2 shows the organizational structure changes that took 
place from the beginning of 1990 because of postponement of Phase 
Ill and the need to prepare the company for privatisation. Over a 
four-year period, more than 60 per cent of functional units were 
eliminated, including directorates, superintendences, departments, 
divisions and sections. The downsizing scale was quite significant. In 
April 1990, the company had 278 functional units (6 directorates, 15 
superintendences, 48 departments, 107 divisions and 102 sections). 
By the middle of 1992, a major downsizing was implemented, 
affecting many different units. Superintendence of Engineering was 
left without 14 functional units. Data Processing was reduced by 6 
units while Human Resources Management had 5 units scrapped. 
Administrative units were reduced by 5 and the Commercial 
Directorate had 2 units eliminated. Several of the Industrial 
Directorate's units disappeared. 
In October 1993, one month after privatisation, Beta had its 
structural organization reduced to 117 units, 58 per cent smaller than 
in April 1990. In April 1994, the number of units had fallen to 107, 
62 per cent less than four years before. The organizational structure 
was constituted of 6 directorates, 21 superintendences, 46 
departments, 34 divisions and no sections. After privatisation, the 
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company had its operational area reduced to four hierarchical levels 
and the administrative area was decreased to 3 hierarchical levels. 
7 .5.6. Strategy 
As the company has been affected by matters related to its 
control (shareholding dispute with GMJ). The senior management of 
the company was replaced at the end of 1994 which affected the 
corporate strategy. After that the new senior management is 
redefining the company businesses, the positioning in the market 
before customers, suppliers, and financial organizations. There is a 
commitment to lower costs, improve productivity and quality. 
Lack of investment has been affecting the company strategy 
since late 1980s. By 1990, it was clear that funds to undertake Stage 
Ill (upgrade the production line to manufacture products with higher 
value added) would not be released by the Brazilian Government. 
Then, a decision to suspend the construction of the rolling mill units 
for medium shapes and bars and for heavy shapes and rail was made. 
That decision unleashed major changes throughout the company. 
Future expansion was cancelled at least for a while. The Operational 
area in charge of the expansion plan was profoundly affected, having 
to reduce its organizational structure by almost 30 per cent. 
Also, by 1990, it was clear that the company would not be able 
to expand its range of products towards a more value-added product-
mix because of lack of funds. It would continue to produce, for the 
time being, steel commodities which offered low or no profitability. 
After privatisation, the company's strategic objectives appear to 
be as to develop a closer relationship with customers and suppliers 
through the establishment of strategic alliances and agreements of 
mutual interest and as to increase production and the range of 
products, giving priority to higher value-added products. 
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Figure 7.2 Changes in organizational structure 
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7 .6. Competitiveness and productivity 
Productivity is regarded by many as a very important factor 
contributing decisively to increase a firm's competitiveness. For the 
Malaysian National Productivity Corporation (1992), productivity is ·a 
means to attain economic growth, to raise international 
competitiveness and improve people's quality of life. Elstrodt and 
Lopetegui (1994). Prowse (1994). Porter (1990). Scott (1989). Thurow 
(1990) are among those experts that support the idea of productivity 
being the driving force that upholds the long-term living standards of 
people. Krugman (1994) goes further when he says that productivity 
is the key to any notion of competitiveness. 
Productivity is another component of the company analysis 
framework (Figure 4.2) . It can be influenced by quantity and value, 
external and internal factors . It plays a major role bridging 
management and performance groups. 
Influences on productivity (quantity) mainly internal 
7.6.1. VVorkforce 
Quality of workforce is hailed by almost everyone as a key 
factor to improve a firm's competitiveness. Any modern, 
international economy requires highly skilful and knowledgeable 
people. They are its lifeblood (HMSO, 1994). 
These characteristics are meant to be used as a means to 
evaluate how committed and involved a company is to the quality of 
its workforce. The two companies in this project seem to have a clear 
concern on the subject. However, some employees have complained 
that there are not enough resources allocated to education and 
training. Usually, some companies are not willing to expend a great 
deal of money on training as they are afraid of losing their better 
prepared employees to competitors. A survey carried out by the 
"Harvard Business Review" in 1990, states that just 18% of Brazilian 
as against 62% of German and 49% of French business people deemed 
the workforce training as being a decisive factor for business success 
(Exame, 1991). 
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Beta's workforce has undergone major changes over the past six 
years. The restructuring started about three years before 
privatisation. Workforce number has shrunk drastically since then. 
Its reduction of the has been profound. By December 1989, the 
company had 6,703 employees. In December 1993, the number of 
employees had dropped to 4,555, representing a reduction of more 
than 30 percent. Between privatisation and the end of 1994, the 
number of employees had declined further to 3,933. All in all, 2,770 
employees lost their jobs over this period, accounting for 41 percent 
of the original workforce (Figure 7 .3). 
Figure 7.3 Company's workforce by year 
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The main reasons for these redundancies can be related to a 
wide ranging cost reduction programme, rationalisation and 
down sizing of services, improved managerial effecti vencss related to 
organizational restructuring, contracting out, postponement of 
construction of the rolling mill units for medium shapes and bars and 
for heavy shapes and rails, and due to the need to get the company in 
better shape for privatisation. As a result, it seems reasonable not to 
blame privatisation as the only factor responsible for the decrease in 
160 
the number of employees. Restructuring and downsizing were also 
factors that affected the decrease of the workforce. 
Figures 7.4 shows the workforce breakdown by category over a 
six-year period. A great number of changes have happened over 
time. For instance, the number of managers has dropped 63 per cent, 
as a result of restructuring and downsizing. The number of graduates 
and technicians decreased by more than 50 per cent, mainly due to 
the delaying of expansion plans. Clerks (administrative staff) have 
also been badly affected by the changes. Their number was reduced 
by almost 80 per cent since 1989. Bluecollar workers were the least 
affe,cted during this period, having a reduction of 23 per cent. 
Significant, but far less than the other categories. The lower reduction 
in production-related employees suggests that the management and 
administration structure was too large before the privatisation and 
the restructuring. The changes were intended to reduce costs and 
improve production efficiency and lower costs. 
7 .6.2. R&D and Technological capabilities 
Beta is not known for having a R&D Department. It does not 
have units such as the Research Centre and the Technical Information 
Department in Alpha that could support research and development-
related activities. Unfortunately, R&D for many Brazilian companies 
and managers (unlike Alpha and its managers) is not a priority. 
According to one interviewee at Beta, 
"R&D is for rich companies and rich countries. The company 
cannot afford such a luxury. There are other areas and 
priorities where the money should go, instead of being poured 
into R&D where the results are certainly not guaranteed. In 
future, maybe, we can think about that". 
The company's R&D activities are by no means systematic and 
methodical. They are isolated cases that look at very specific 
problems. Most of the time they are related to upgrading operations 
such as the injection of coal fines into the furnace and improvements 
in the billet finishing area. 
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Figure 7.4 Workforce breakdown by category 
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Without firm commitment from the top management, certainly 
the R&D activity is not going to play a bigger role in the future of the 
company. For the time being, that commitment seems very unlikely 
as the company is struggling to cope with other more fundamental 
problems such as survival. 
It is possible to say that the company is technologically 
competent in the processes and products it engages .in. Its processes 
and products are basic. The problem is that its capability is focused 
on producing commodity products. Development of higher value 
added products and more advanced processes would require further 
technology transfer, experience and investment. 
7 .6.2.1. Technological capabilities 
Beta was the ·first steelmill project to be devised, designed, 
developed, implemented and managed almost entirely by Brazilians. 
The project was overseen by a team from Alpha. Most of the 
technological capabilities absorbed by Beta during the first stages of 
production were supplied by Alpha. About 60 per cent of the 
equipment was produced by domestic suppliers. Beta is currently one 
of the most up-to-date Brazilian steelworks. 
Beta has established technology transfer contracts with several 
suppliers for non-stop updating in the steel industry. Among the 
main suppliers are Alpha, Tyazhpromexport, Nippon Steel, and Davy. 
Alpha has provided industrial technology, in-house training, 
operational and technical assistance in the blast furnace area; 
implementation of a station for the pig iron desulfurization; 
implementation and operational training for a steel plant static 
control; technical services for Beta's no.l blast furnace's first 
revamping; supervision and instructions for start-up of the coke 
plant, sintering, blast furnace, steel plant, rolling mill: engineering 
teams training empowering them to develop operation research 
services. 
Nippon Steel has provided technical assistance and training in 
maintenance and improvement of operational conditions of all 
equipment, Davy has supplied technical assistance on blast furnace 
maintenance, engineering and operations. Finally, Tyazhpromexport 
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has transferred technology on steel fusion to the converter and blast 
furnace revamping. 
Despite lacking a organized Research Centre, Beta has been able 
to provide technical assistance and technology transfer to some large 
Brazilian companies. Among these are Acesita (steel company), RFF -
The Federal Railroad Network, Belgo-Mineira, Cosipa, Kevia and 
Cosigua. It has submitted over 20 patent requests with the INPI (the 
Brazilian National Institute for Industrial Property - Patent Office). 
Beta owns a patent for the on-line system for inspection, grinding and 
banding of blooms and billets. 
Areas where Beta has been able to improve operations are 
"injection of coal fines into the furnace (PCI); turbine for the blast 
furnace top gas; technological updating of electric/mechanical controls 
of equipment items; improvements on the billet finishing area; 
energy consumption/balance control center" (Damasio, 1994). 
7 .6.3. Production capacity 
The company's nominal annual production capacity is 2m 
tonnes. However, Beta has been able to reach production above this 
mark in recent years. The company's crude steel production in 1990 
was 1.95m tonnes, representing 10.6 per cent of the Brazilian crude 
steel production (20.6m tonnes). In 1991, the company's production 
reached 2.1m tonnes, an increase of 8.0 per cent in relation to 1990 
(Figure 7.5 and Table 7 .2). After a period of low demand and low 
prices both internally and abroad, and losses, 1991 came as a 
pleasant surprise to the company and to the steel industry as a 
whole. In spite of the recession in the Brazilian economy, the growing 
demand from the automobile industry and exports helped to increase 
steel industry production and steel prices. With the recovery on its 
way, crude steel production was 2.15m tonnes in 1992, an increase of 
2 per cent in comparison with 1991, representing 11.1 per cent of 
Brazilian production of steel. In 1993, the company achieved a record 
production of crude steel. The production of 2.4m tonnes from an 
installed capacity of 2m tonnes, 20 per cent higher than its nominally 
installed capacity, was important for its financial performance as it 
enabled the company to sell 2.1m tonnes of semi-finished. 
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Figure 7.5 Beta•s crude steel production 
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7 .6.4. Finance/Investment 
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2400 
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Over the last four years, the company has had to take measures 
such as cost reduction, rationalization of services, restructuring of the 
main activities of the business, contract renegotiation, reduction of 
the stock levels, maximization of the economic-financial results, 
searching for new markets and so on. In 1993, these measures began 
to bring results. Net profits reached US$53m. The operational profit 
tripled in 1993 in comparison with 1992, from US$30m to US$99m. 
However, in 1994, Beta had net profit of just US$9.7m, far lower than 
the previous year's figure. One of the reasons was due to the 74-day 
closure of its blast furnace for modernization which represented an 
investment of US$67m. 
Before privatisation, finance was restricted and ambitious 
investment plans had to be shelved. During privatisation and 
restructuring, the company has been struggling to improve financial 
performance by cost-cutting and productivity improvements. 
Prospects have looked too uncertain to engage in investment. 
It is too early to evaluate the effects of restructuring and 
privatisation on the company investment. The last five years have 
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brought a great number of changes in shareholding and top 
management which has affected almost all plans of investment. 
In the longer term, investment will be based on commercial 
considerations rather than government budgetary constraints. 
Table 7.2 Crude Steel Production (Unit: lOOOt) 
Year Beta Brazil 
1990 1951 20600 
1991 2109 . 22617 
1992 2149 23898 
1993 2400 25149 
Source: Company data 
Influences on productivity (value/unit) 
internal 
7 .6.5. Products 
Beta/Brazil (%) 
10.6 
10.7 
11.1 
10.5 
external and 
Currently the company's production mainly consists of 
commodity: billets, blooms and slabs. These are lower value-added 
products which can be purchased from a number of producers and 
typically no producer can offer an advantage over others. As a result, 
the seller cannot set the price but has to accept the going price and 
ensure profitability by controlling costs. Slabs are used to produce 
flat-rolled products. Billets and blooms are used as raw materials to 
manufacture rolled shaped products. As a big producer of 
commodities, Beta needs high volume and low cost production to be 
competitive and profitable. Commodities typically yield a low profit 
margin. 
Figure 7.6 displays the breakdown of production by type of 
product from 1989 to 1993. In 1989, the production of billets was 
1.25m tonnes or 73.3 per cent of the total production. The production 
of slabs and blooms accounted for 26.7 per cent of the 1989 
production. 
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Production of billets, in 1991, was 53.2 per cent of total volume 
of the company's products. By 1992, the production had reached 
approximately 1.46 million tonnes, roughly SS % of total volume and 
an increase of 8.5 per cent in comparison with 1991 figure. 
However, 1993 represented a big increase of 24.4 per cent in 
relation to 1991 as a result of growing demand in home and foreign 
markets. Eventually, the Brazilian economy started its recovery from 
the recession of preceding years. 
On the other hand, using the first and second quarters of 1994 
as measures of comparison, billets stood for 54.8% of total volume in 
the first quarter and increased to 57.3% in the second quarter (Table 
7 .3). These figures show no relevant changes in terms of past billet 
share of annual total volume or in relation to other products. 
Privatisation, at least at that moment, seems not to have had any 
influence on the overall production figures. 
Table 7.3 Products by total volume 
Products First quarter/1994 Second quarter/1994 
(OOOt) % (OOOt) % 
* Billets 362.3 54.8 438.3 57 .3 
* Blooms 5.6 0.8 20.9 2.7 
* Slabs 81.8 12.4 16.9 2.2 
* Chemical 11.3 1.7 12.8 1.7 
Products 
* Others 200.7 30.3 275.5 36.1 
* Total 661.7 100.0 764.4 100.0 
Source: Company data 
Table 7.4 compares Beta's production of steel commodities 
(biUets, blooms and slabs) with that of its main competitors (CST, 
Cosigua, Usiminas, and Cosipa). CST and Beta are the main producers 
of commodities in Brazil. The former is the main producer of slabs. 
The latter is the main manufacturer of billets and blooms. In 1987, 
Beta's production was 30.4 per cent of the Brazilian total production 
of steel commodities of about 5.7m tonnes while CST's production was 
53.4 per cent of the total. The following year, Beta increased its 
marketshare to 33.0 per cent, almost 1.9m tonnes out of 5.7m tonnes. 
CST's fell to 42.4 ·per cent. At that time, CST was going through a very 
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difficult situation. Strikes, high costs, corruption, and 
maladministration and so on, had brought about a challenging 
moment to the company. 
In 1989, Beta's marketshare dropped from 33.0 per cent to 
27.2 per cent due to a decrease 1n demand and an increase in 
production from competitors Its production worsened, just 1.7m 
tonnes. Unfortunately, 1990 was not much better than the previous 
year. Production stayed the same, but with the aggravation that 
domestic prices were under tight government control, along with high 
costs of debt and administrative problems. The end of the last decade 
was very difficult for Brazilian steel companies . That period was 
marked by strikes, dismissals, low morale, low productivity, and 
financial crises. 
Table 7.4 Billets, blooms, slabs production breakdown by enterprise 
Year Volume Beta CST Cosigua Usiminas Cosipa Others Total 
- (OOOt) 1724 3023 185 34 10 688 5664 
* 1987 
- % 30.4 53.4 3.3 0.6 0.2 12.1 100.0 
- (OOOt) 1 8 7 7 2 4 1 7 1 50 285 65 900 5694 
* 1988 
-% 33.0 42.4 2.6 5.0 1.1 15.8 100.0 
- (OOOt) 1702 2713 324 413 138 971 6261 
* 1989 
-% 27.2 43.3 5.2 6.6 2.2 15.5 100.0 
- (OOOt) 1 7 2 3 1 7 7 7 2 1 6 258 134 766 4874 
* 1990 
-% 35.3 36.5 4.4 5.3 2.7 15.7 100.0 
- (OOOt) 1 8 4 3 2 9 0 6 1 3 5 445 26 539 5894 
* 1991 
-% 31.3 49.3 2.3 7.6 0.4 9.1 100.0 
Source: Company data, IBS, BNDES 
169 
7 .6.6. Price/deregulation 
Until 1991, domestic steel prices had been under tight control 
by the Government which used the control as an instrument of 
industrial policy to favour steel using industries and to control 
inflation. Under price controls most Brazilian steel companies were 
trapped by persistently low revenues and profits. After the 
liberalization of the market, companies were able to increase their 
product prices by an average of 30% in 1992. 
Table 7.5 shows product prices between 1987 and 1992. By 
comparing domestic and export product prices over six years, a 
number of inferences can be made. Domestic prices of blooms and 
slabs have throughout the period under examination been higher 
than export price. However, the same does not apply to billets which 
accounts for about 60 per cent of production. Four out of six years 
display export prices higher than domestic ones. This was in spite of 
depressed international prices from 1989 until 1994, when world 
steel prices rose steeply for some flat products. 
Given that domestic billet prices were lower than export prices, 
the result was a transference of revenue from Beta, a state-owned 
company at the time, to customers mainly in the sector. This caused 
great damage to the financial health of the company, increasing its 
debt. As billet production was (and continues to be) Beta's main 
product, it accounted for a substantial part of Beta's revenue and 
therefore, price controls had a severe effect on Beta's profitability. 
Table 7.5 Product price breakdown (US$/tonne) (a) 
Market/Year 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 
* Billets 166.00 180.00 224.00 211.00 208.00 193.00 
* Domestic * Blooms 159.00 218.00 259.00 268.00 270.00 260.00 
* Slabs 172.00 249.00 261.00 205.00 205.00 164.00 
* Billets 148.00 196.00 231.00 208.00 217.00 210.00 
* Export * Blooms 155.00 181.00 222.00 19 5.00 219.00 205.00 
* Slabs 152.00 227.00 226.00 187.00 201.00 154.00 
Source: Company data 
(a) FOB at steelmills before tax 
170 
Table 7.6 sets out the average price of the company's products 
since 1986. It has been moving backwards and forwards, according to 
market prices and government interference. After the lifting of price 
controls in 1992, domestic prices were higher than international ones. 
Anyway, the current price policy is to allow the m.arket mechanism 
to determine both domestic and export prices. 
Table 7.6 Average pnce of company's products (US$/tonne) (a) 
Year/Market Domestic (D) Export (E) %EID 
* 1986 173.00 168.00 97 
* 1987 167.00 149.00 89 
* 1988 194.00 208.00 107 
* 1989 233.00 227.00 97 
* 1990 212.00 203.00 96 
* 1991 209.00 213.00 102 
* 1992 203.00 198.00 98 
Source: Company data 
(a) FOB at steelmills before tax 
7.6.7. ~arket strategy 
Due to the Brazilian economic stabilization programme and 
higher domestic market demand, the company was able to increase 
sales in 1993. In 1994 sales dropped because of lack of production as 
the blast furnace was under repair. Export sales have been increasing 
during the past years as a direct consequence of the company's policy 
to reduce its dependence on the domestic market during the 
recession period. However, as the domestic market demand has 
improved, the company needs to find a fine balance between its 
exports to traditional consumers abroad and a much more profitable 
internal market. 
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7 .6.8. Relationship with customers 
Beta's customers can be divided into two types: long-term and 
casual. The former are customers with rolling mill installations who 
have either no or insignificant capacity to manufacture semifinished 
products such as billets and blooms. They are unable to produce 
enough to supply the rolling mill. The casual customers are 
steelworks with rolling mills installations and equipment to 
manufacture semifinished products, but are obliged to go to market 
to buy inputs on a casual basis to supply its rolling mills due to 
strikes, accidents, blast furnace repairs and so forth. 
Beta had a major problem in 1993/94 with its biggest customer, 
GMJ siderurgica, over more than a decade. Since the GMJ group 
became Beta's major shareholder, it started to delay payments to Beta 
and caused serious financial problem for Beta. The situation improved 
after 1994 when the GMJ group was obliged to sell its stake in the 
company due to financial difficulties. 
Privatisation has helped Beta to free itself from legal 
constraints that were imposed by government regulations. The 
company claims that it ahs become more responsive to customers and 
seeks to keep up with the customers' needs through a programme of 
regular visits, exchange of experience and knowledge, making 
possible a much closer relationship. 
7. 7. Performance 
Performance is the third component of the company analysis 
framework (see Chapter 4, Figure 4.2). 
7.7 .1. Labour productivity 
The productivity of Brazilian steel companies has a long way to 
go. Labour requirement per tonne of steel produced in Brazil 
remained well above that in the industrialised countries throughout 
the period. However, productivity improvement has been faster in 
Brazil since the beginning of the 1990s. 
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Figure 7.7 shows Beta's productivity from 1990 until 1993. In 
1990, productivity was 206 tonnes per man-year, a very low figure 
even in comparison with other troubled Brazilian steel companies at 
the time. However, in the following three years, productivity rose 66 
per cent in comparison with 1990, reaching 341 tonnes per man-year 
in 1993. Most of this improvement can be explained by the 
reduction of the labour force and improvements in working practices 
and hardware carried out as part of an overall rationalisation and 
downsizing plan, and expansion of the total quality management 
programme throughout the company. 
7. 7 .2. Costs 
Details about Beta's cost structure were not available to the 
researcher when the data collection took place. However, the 
company's statements of income (between 1991 and 1994) offer 
information about the company's costs. It is clear from these figures 
that costs of products and services are too high as a percentage of net 
revenues. They stand for more than 80 per cent. On the other hand, 
Alpha's cost of products and services do not exceed 70 per cent of net 
revenues. As the restructuring programme indicates the company is 
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committed to reducing its costs as a means of overcoming its 
difficulties and increase productivity. 
7. 7 .3. Sales and marketshare 
Sales to domestic and international markets can present a 
picture of the reality both of the Brazilian economy and Beta. After a 
period of disarray, recession and low domestic prices, the strategy 
en.visaged by Beta's management to escape the hardship of the 1980s 
was to concentrate their skills and efforts on increasing sales abroad. 
Figure 7.8 and Table 7.7 show distinctly the steady growth of 
external sales in relation to domestic ones. In 1991, while 42.1 per 
cent of the company's sales were in the Brazilian market, 57.9 per 
cent went abroad. By 1992, the proportion of exports has increased 
even further. By 1993, internal sales fell to 36.4 per cent and 
exports rose again, reaching 63.6 per cent. With these figures, there 
seems to be a clear drive towards the international market, especially 
the South East Asian markets (further details are provided below). 
Increase in exports counter-balanced difficulties in the domestic 
market and raised hard currency badly needed by the company to 
service the heavy debt. 
Table 7.7 displays the sales breakdown by region in terms of 
percentage of tonnage and percentage of revenue. In 1991, in spite of 
domestic sales representing 42.1 per cent of the total tonnage, the 
revenue percentage reached was 46.9 per cent. However, exports had 
a different result. While exports reached 57.9 per cent of the tonnage, 
it stood for just 53.1 per cent of the total revenue. The explanation is 
linked with product prices and profit margins at home and abroad 
and by the types of products. On average domestic profit margins 
tend to be higher than international ones as the company avoid costs 
of transport, and insurance. But when there is a recession in the 
Brazilian market, there is no alternative for the company. It is better 
to export even with smaller profit margins than to keep its products 
in stock. 
After the lifting of the domestic price 
internal market became quite attractive 
controls in 1991, the 
compared with the 
international one, though recently international prices have started to 
increase after a long period of decline (Financial Times, August 1995). 
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Figure 7.8 Sales breakdown by destination 
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Table 7.7 Sales breakdown [tonnage(%) - revenue(%)] 
Region 1991 1992 1993 
* Domestic sales 42.1 46.9 39.7 46.9 36.4 43.1 
* Exports 57.9 53.1 60.3 53.1 63.6 56.9 
* Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Source: Company data 
Table 7.8 shows the first figures of domestic and international 
sales after privatisation. There are no big changes, at least for the 
time being. In the short-term major changes are not expected. 
175 
Table 7.8 Sales breakdown 
Region 
* Domestic sales 
* Exports 
* Total 
Source: Company data 
First quarter/1994 
(OOOt) % 
169.2 
280.5 
449.7 
37.6 
62.4 
100.0 
7. 7 .3.1.Domestic market share 
Second quarter/1994 
(OOOt) % 
174.3 
301.8 
476.1 
36.6 
63.4 
100.0 
Beta has seen its domestic billets and blooms market share 
increase since 1987 (Table 7 .9). At that time, 61 per cent of the 
domestic market belonged to Beta. ·Since then, its share has risen 
continuously to reach 77 per cent in 1991. As a result, 59 per cent of 
all semifinished product domestic sales were made by Beta, in spite 
of a deep recession in the Brazilian market during the 1980s, price 
controls and lack of investment by the Government. The slab sales 
market share was more uncertain, showing greater variations. 
In 1991, domestic sales of billets reached almost 0.68m tonnes, 
representing 46 per cent of the total domestic sales of the company. 
Two years later, in 1993, it reached 0.74m tonnes, 49.1 per cent of 
total domestic sales. · Blooms and slabs together accounted for 5.9 per 
cent and chemical products 4.6 per cent of the domestic sales in 
1991 (Figure 7.9). 
After privatisation, domestic sales figures shown in Table 7.10 
did not change so much in comparison with the previous period. One 
reason, possibly, could be the length of time considered between the 
privatisation date (September 1993) and first and second quarters of 
1994. That period is quite short to forecast any reliable tendency. 
Billets stood for more than 40% of domestic sales in the first quarter 
of 1994. It dropped to 35.3% in the second quarter of 1994. Both 
blooms and slabs in the first and second quarters showed a week 
performance in the domestic market. The reason is because of an 
increase in sales abroad. 
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Table 7.9 Domestic sales marketshare of billets, blooms and slabs 
Total domestic sales Beta domestic sales marketshare 
Year billets slabs total volume billets slabs total 
blooms blooms 
(OOOt) (OOOt) (OOOt) (OOOt) % % % 
* 1987 1199 851 2050 1062 61 39 52 
* 1988 1047 401 1448 867 64 37 60 
* 1989 1049 155 1204 693 65 --- 58 
* 1990 870 315 1185 638 69 7 54 
* 1991 886 406 1292 764 77 1 8 59 
Source: Company data, IBS, BNDES 
Figure 7.9 Domestic sales of commodities 
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Table 7.10 Domestic sales breakdown by product 11 
Product First quarter/1994 Second quartcr/1994 
(OOOt) % (000t) % 
* Billets 155.6 41.4 161.3 35.3 
* Blooms 5 .1 1.4 5.9 1.3 
* Slabs 8.4 2.2 7.0 1.5 
* Chemical 11.3 3.0 12.7 2.8 
Products 
* Others 195.6 52.0 269 .6 59 . 1 
* Total . 376 .0 100.0 456.5 100.0 
Source: Company data 
7.7.4. Exports 
7.7.4.1. Exports by product 
Among the products exported by Beta, billet is the most 
important, accounting for more than 60 per cent of the total. In 1991, 
it represented 63.4 per cent of total volume. 
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Figure 7.10 and Table 7.11 provide the export sales figures by 
product from 1991 until 1993. In 1991, billets and slabs represented 
91% of export. The following year, these two products stood for 97.8 
per cent of export, 63.5 per cent being of billets and 34.3 per cent 
slabs. In 1993, billets increased their share to 69.6 per cent while 
slabs dropped to 25.2 per cent. Blooms export represented a little 
more than 5% of total exports. Chemical products exports were almost 
nil. 
Table 7.11 Export sales breakdown by product I 
Products 1991 1992 1993 
(OOOt) (%va) (OOOt) (%va) (%ha) (OOOt) (%va) (%ha) 
* Billets 667.4 63.4 729.7 63.5 109.3 931.5 69.6 139.6 
* Blooms 82.5 7.8 24.3 2.1 29.5 68 .6 5.1 83.2 
* Slabs 290.7 27.6 393.9 34.3 135.5 336.6 25.2 115.8 
* Chemical ----- ----- 0.6 0.1 ----- 0.4 ----- -----
Products 
* Others 12.3 1.2 0.4 ----- 3.3 1.9 0.1 15.4 
* Total 1052.9 100.0 1148.9 100.0 109 . 1 1339.0 100.0 127.2 
Source: Company data 
Figure 7.1 0 Company's export of steel commodities in 1993 
Slabs 
Billets 
Blooms 
Source: Company dat. 
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7.7.4.2. Exports by country 
Beta exports have been increasing over the last years as a 
direct result of the fall in domestic demand (at least until 1993). The 
same has happened throughout the steel industry. It is hard to find 
any company that did not look at the international market as a 
natural way to compensate for the drop in domestic sales. 
Table 7.12 shows the export volume by country. In 1991, the 
biggest consumer was Korea, accounting for 18.2 per cent of the total 
volume and 17.2 per cent in terms of revenue. The second biggest 
importer was the USA. It stood for 8.8 per cent of volume and 9.0 per 
centof revenue. The next biggest was Malaysia representing 8.7 per 
cent of the total volume and 8.8 per cent in revenue. In 1992, Korea 
reduced its imports to approximately 0.14m tonnes, accounting for 
12.0 per cent of volume and 11.1 per cent in terms of revenue. But 
the biggest buyer that year was Taiwan. 
In 1993, Malaysia increased its purchases enormously. In 
volume terms, sales reached almost 0.24m tonnes, representing 22.7 
per cent in revenue. After the creation of Mercosu 1, Argentina has 
become a much bigger customer. In 1993, it stood for 8.6 per cent in 
volume terms and 9.2 per cent in revenue. 
From these figures, one can infer that there is a growing sales 
trend towards Pacific countries. At this moment, Beta considers that 
region to be one of its most important markets. 
7. 7 .4.3. Exports by continent 
It is too early to say that exports have been affected by the 
restructuring and privatisation programmes undergone by Beta. 
However, after privatisation, the company is seeking new markets 
and trying to increase sales to current customers. 
By 1991, exports to South East Asia and the rest of Asia 
accounted for 67.6 per cent of total volume and 66.7 per cent of 
revenue. Coming in second place was North America with 17.5 per 
cent of imports and 17.8 per cent of revenue. The following year, 
Southeast Asia increased its share from 44.7 per cent to 47.4 per cent 
in terms of volume and from 44.6 per cent to 47.4 per cent in 
revenue. Again, in 1993, Southeast Asia carried on as the biggest 
customer (Table 7.13). 
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Table 7.12 Export volume by country [tonnage (OOOt) - tonnage (%) - revenue (%)] 
Country 1991 1992 1993 
(OOOt) (%) (%) (OOOt) (%) (%) (OOOt) (%) (%) 
* Malaysia 91.7 8.7 8.8 94.1 8.2 8.5 283.3 21.2 22.7 
* Korea 192.1 18.3 17.2 137.3 12.0 11.1 163.6 12.2 10.3 
* Taiwan 60.2 5.7 5.3 143.9 12.5 11.3 190.2 14.2 13.0 
* Argentina 
----- ---- ----
48.4 4.2 4.4 115.6 8.6 9.2 
*USA 92.2 8.8 9.0 89.0 7.8 9.1 47.6 3.6 4.4 
* Singapore 74.8 7.1 7.4 25.1 2.2 2.3 75 .6 5.7 6 .0 
* Canada 12.3 1.2 1.3 31.9 2.8 3.7 44.8 3.4 4.2 
* Others 528.3 50.2 51.0 578.6 50.3 49.6 415.9 31.1 30.2 
* Total 1 os 1.6 100.0 100.0 1148.3 100.0 100.0 1336.6 100.0 100.0 
Source: Company data 
The growmg sales to Asia shows the importance of that market 
for the company as well as an indication of the presence of fast-
growing economies with an increasing purchasing power throughout 
the region. However, in the long-term probably the situation is going 
to change as most of the current importers are building steel works to 
supply their domestic market and exports . 
7. 7 .5. Profitability and asset turnover ratios 
Figure 7.11 sets out some of Beta's main profitability ratios and 
asset turnover. Beta's PBIT/total assets ratio has been quite low. The 
company's ratio is far below the Alpha's ratio. One of the reasons is 
the high cost of production. In 1994, the ratio was worse than 
previous years due to maintenance. PBIT/sales ratio represents the 
gross profit margin on sales. The figures are not impressive. Since 
1991 the ratio has worsened. Again. high cost of products is one the 
main reasons for this performance. Other reasons are related to the 
company's product-mix based on commodities and unstable 
production and sales. 
The sales margin (net profit over sales) has dropped sharply 
over the last four years. In 1991, Beta's sales margin was excellent 
mainly due to high financial gains and lifting of price controls. After 
that the decrease has been steady because of reduction in financial 
gains, high cost of products and restructuring. Return on equity (net 
profit over stockholders equity) presents similar patterns to sales 
margin. The figures are poor. The reasons are the same as mentioned 
above. Beta's Asset turnover is very low. It shows that the company 
needs almost seven years to turn its assets over. Meanwhile, Alpha 
needs only two years. 
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Table 7.13 Export volume by continent [tonnage (OOOt) - tonnage (%) - revenue (%)] 
Continent 1991 1992 1993 
(OOOt) (%) (%) (OOOt) (%) (%) (OOOt) (%) (%) 
* Southeast Asia 469.9 44.7 44.6 544.5 47.4 47.4 809.3 60.6 61.6 
*Asia 240.9 22.9 22.1 170.0 14.8 14.8 248.2 18.6 15.4 
* North America 184.0 17.5 17.8 148.2 12.9 12.9 109.2 8.2 9.9 
* South America 55 .l 5.2 5.3 48.4 4.3 4.2 123.2 9.2 9.7 
* Central America 8.9 0.9 0.9 41.7 3.6 3.7 5.1 0.3 0.3 
* European 80.2 7.6 7.7 168.8 14.7 14.7 41.6 3 .l 3.1 
Community 
* Europe 2.7 0.3 0.7 ----- ----- ----- -----
(Excluding EU) 
* Africa 9.9 0.9 0.9 26.3 2.3 2.3 -----
*Total 1051.6 100.0 100.0 114 7.9 100.0 100.0 1336.6 100.0 100.0 
Source: Company data 
Figure 7.1 1 Profitability and asset turnover ratios 
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7. 7 .6. Profits and Earnings per share (EPS) 
Figure 7.12 sets out the profit performance over a five-year 
period. Beta's profit figures have been quite unstable over time. This 
may be a consequence of market and internal changes. In 1990, the 
company had heavy losses due to mainly low demand, price control, 
and a restructuring programme preparing the company for 
privatisation. The year of 1991 showed a surprising recovery in 
profits due to chiefly the lifting of government price control and 
increase in domestic demand. The following years have shown a deep 
fall in profits. In 1992, profit reached 10 per cent of net revenue 
down from more than 30 per cent in 1991. In 1993, the company's 
profit increase slightly reaching 13 per cent of net revenues. Next 
year, due to maintenance requirements and reduction in production 
and sales, profit dropped to less than 2 per cent of net revenues. 
Figure 7.13 displays Beta's earnings per share over a three-year 
period. The figures reflect the company's net profit results. In 1993, 
year of privatisation, the net income per thousand shares reached its 
peak of US$0.36. Next year, due to a decrease in profits, the EPS 
dropped to US$0.05. It is too early to draw any conclusion. First of all, 
the company needs to sort out its own internal difficulties 
(shareholding, board of directors replacement, reduction of costs, etc) 
to be able to set a clear route ahead. 
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7.7.7. Value added 
Figure 7.14 shows Beta's value added over a four-year period. 
The cost of products and services as a percentage of gross revenues 
has been higher than in Alpha's case. This explain Beta's lower value 
added figures. The value added shows a variation between nineteen 
and thirty five percent of gross revenues, being the worst result in 
1994, due to maintenance. 
Figure 7.14 Beta's value added 
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Beta, since its foundation, has been through a series of 
unwelcome and unexpected hurdles and difficulties. To begin with it 
is worth remembering the year of 1978, when the troubles started. 
Due to the international oil crisis, the Brazilian economy was hit quite 
badly. The financial resources very much needed to undertake the 
project became uncertain and scarce. The Brazilian Government was 
no longer assured of the feasibility of the project as had been 
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planned. The initial plan was to build a steelmill able to produce 1 Om 
tonnes of steel a year. Instead, by 1993, the production of steel had 
reached 2.4m tonnes of a projected capacity of 2m tonnes. 
Before privatisation, Beta carried out several measures 
preparing for a new reality in private hands. First of all, since the 
installation of the rolling mill units for medium shapes and bars and 
for heavy shapes and rail had been suspended, the company needed 
to adapt the size of its workforce to a capacity of 2m tonnes. Units in 
charge of future expansion were decommissioned. In 1990, 40 
functional units connected with the Superintendence of Engineering 
and works were eliminated. 
Beta experienced quite difficult times caused by governmental 
steel industry policy uncertainties, high financial and operational 
costs, price controls, a certain degree of mismanagement, political 
interference, and quite a few changes over the years culminating in 
privatisation in 1993. 
It is important to point out that Beta was the last Brazilian steel 
company to be privatised, in September 1993. As a consequence the 
analysis of the impact of privatisation is difficult to carry out since is 
not enough time has elapsed to obtain a clear picture of the whole 
process and its consequences for Beta. However, some conclusions can 
be drawn since the main preparation (restructuring) for privatisation 
started approximately at the beginning of the 1990s. After the 
change in ownership, the company has more autonomy to establish 
its own aims without government interference. There is more 
flexibility and freedom to make decisions and to deal with the main 
stakeholders; greater customer care and more emphasis on search for 
new markets; greater freedom to advance relationships with banks 
and foreign organizations; more flexibility to contract/dismiss people 
as well as to define policy on wages and salaries. 
The examination of Beta within . the company analysis 
framework has shown some major changes in all three components 
and measures of Figure 4.2. Organizational structure was reduced by 
more than 60 per cent, workforce decreased by about 35 per cent, 
and labour productivity increased by more than 60 per cent. There 
has been an improvement in the relationship with customers ami 
suppliers. However, most of the performance measures have shown 
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very poor results over the last five years. There are not visible 
changes regarding R&D, technological capabilities, and product-mix. 
Beta, being a relatively new steelmill, has more modern 
hardware than most South American steel companies. In spite of 
this, due to lack of sufficient investment since the last decade, 
chances are that in a few years' time the company will need to invest 
a lot of money to keep abreast of the latest technologies. A great 
number of resources will be necessary to boost the computerisation 
and processes of production, energy conservation, and environmental 
protection. As more than half of Beta's production is bound for 
foreign markets, a serious programme of modernization is needed to 
increase quality, productivity and reduce costs. Without that, the 
company probably will lose some of its foreign customers. 
In sum, the case study has demonstrated that Beta's performance was 
poorer than that of Alpha before privatisation. The pressures for 
improvements through restructuring and downsizing, efficiency and 
performance started before privatisation but Beta still has some of 
the weaknesses which it had before. 
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8. ANALYSIS OF THE CASE STUDIES 
8.1. Introduction 
Comparative analysis of the two cases (Alpha and Beta) focuses 
initially on the differences in levels of competitiveness related to 
productivity between them. Subsequently, the analysis examines to 
what extent a change of ownership through privatisation and the 
related restructuring enhanced or hampered such levels of 
competitiveness. Of course, the comparison of two case studies 
inevitably introduces constraints on the generalisations that may be 
gleaned from the analysis (this issue is discussed in Chapter 4). 
Nevertheless, taking two firms in the same sector, subject to the 
same privatisation processes, provides depth and allows a detailed 
examination of context, the role of company history and provides rich 
data on performance and competitiveness. It should also be noted 
that Beta was privatised more recently than Alpha, so some post-
privatisation results cannot yet be known. However, there arc 
sufficient data to allow comparisons between the two firms especially 
at the firm level of analysis. 
8.2. Applying the Company Analysis Framework 
For reasons of difficulty in comparability over time, no analysis 
is made of stock market data or other macro indicators since they 
could produce erroneous post hoc rationalisations in both cases, and 
they go beyond the parameters of the company analysis· framework 
of this study. The comparative results are tabulated on Table 8.1 and 
8.2. In each case the three factors of Management, Competitiveness 
and Performance are utilised to facilitate comparison of Alpha and 
Beta. The three factors are analysed in turn in the following sections. 
Analysis of the macro-economic climate, both nationally and 
internationally, and its implications for the company arc beyond the 
scope of the current research but would, of course, be a key item in 
any future research agenda, especially when a greater number of 
organizations could be compared empirically. That is for the future. 
Fo.r now, the focus is on the three company level factors. 
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Table 8.1 A summary of changes in ALPHA due to restructuring and privatisation and its implications for 
performance and competitiveness within "the company analysis framework" 
GROUP 
• Management 
:MEASURES 
* Ownership 
* Governance 
* Autonomy 
* Incentive 
* Organizational 
structure 
* Strategy 
CHANGFS 
- public to private 
- centralized to more participatory 
decisions 
- dependence to greater autonomy 
and initiative 
- shareholding and 
performance-related pay 
- fewer hierarchical levels 
- functional units were reduced by 
about 50 per cent over a five-year 
period 
- establishment of partnerships and 
alliances. Acquisition of stakes in 
companies 
IMPLICATIONS 
* Greater entrepreneurship, 
flexibility, autonomy, teamworking, 
faster decision making, leaner 
administrative structure, and less 
red tape. Greater freedom to 
establish new partnerships and 
alliances 
------------------------------------- -------------------------------·-----
* Workforce 
* R&D and 
Technological 
capabilities 
* Production 
capacity 
* Finance/ 
Investment 
• Competitiveness/ * Products 
Productivity 
* Price/ 
Deregulation 
* Market 
strategy 
* Relationship 
with customers 
- reduction of workforce by about 
25 per cent over a five-year period 
- no evident changes 
- no evident changes 
- acquisition of shares in companies 
- production of galvanized plates 
started in 1993. 
- lifting of price control in 1991 and 
greater market deregulation 
- improve product-mix through 
higher value-added products 
- greater closeness to customers 
* greater reduction of workforce, 
closeness to customers, market 
deregulation, and improved 
product-mix 
• Performance 
* Labour 
productivity 
* Costs 
* Sales/ 
market share 
* Exports 
* Profitability 
and asset 
turnover ratios 
* Profits/EPS 
* Value added 
- increased by about 20 per cent 
over a five-year period 
- cost of products and services has 
been stable as a percentage of 
net revenue 
- labour cost savings: more than 5 
per cent as a percentage of 
operating costs 
- sales (value) per employee 
increased by more than 
50 per cent over a five-year period 
- market share has been stable 
- exports have been reduced 
- profitability ratios have improved 
since 1991 
- asset turnover has decreased 
- profits as a percentage of net 
revenues have increased by more 
than three times since 1991 
EPS has increased since 1991 
- it has been stable 
* greater labour productivity, 
labour cost savings, sales per 
employee, and profitability 
Table 8.2 A summary of changes in BETA due to restructuring and privatisation and its implications for 
performance and competitiveness within "the company analysis framework" 
GROUP 
• Management 
MEASURES 
* Ownership 
* Governance 
* Autonomy 
* Incentive 
* Organizational 
structure 
* Strategy 
----------------
CHANGES 
- public to private 
- centralized to more participatory 
decisions 
- Board of Directors replaced 
- dependence to greater autonomy 
and initiative 
- shareholding and 
performance-related pay 
- fewer hierarchical levels 
- functional units were reduced by 
about 60 per cent over a four-year 
period 
- establishment of partnerships and 
alliances. 
IMPLICATIONS 
* Greater flexibility, autonomy, 
teamworking, faster decision 
making, leaner administrative 
structure, and less red tape . 
Profound reduction of functional 
units. 
------------------------------------- -------------------------------------
* Workforce 
* R&D and 
Technological 
capabilities 
* Production 
capacity 
* Finance/ 
Investment 
• Competitiveness/ * Products 
Productivity 
* Price/ 
Deregulation 
* Market 
strategy 
* Relationship 
with customers 
- reduction of workforce by more 
than 40 per cent over a five-year 
period 
- no evident changes 
- no evident changes 
- overhauling of the financial 
situation 
- no evident changes 
- lifting of price control in 1991 and 
greater market deregulation 
- improve product-mix through 
higher value-added products 
- greater closeness to customers 
* profound reduction of workforce, 
greater closeness to customers, 
market deregulation. 
• Performance 
* Labour 
productivity 
*Costs 
* Sales/ 
market share 
* Exports 
* Profitability 
and asset 
turnover ratios 
* Profits/EPS 
* Value added 
.. increased by about 60 per cent 
over a four-year period 
- cost of products and services has 
increased as a percentage of 
net revenues 
- labour cost savings: about 30 per 
cent as a percentage of operating 
costs over a four-year period 
- sales (value) per employee 
increased by more than 
75 per cent over a five-year period 
- market share has been stable 
- exports as a percentage of 
total sales have been stable 
- profitability ratios have worsened 
since 1991 
- asset turnover has been stable 
- profits as a percentage of net 
revenues have decreased 
since1991 
- EPS has not been stable 
- it has decreased since 1991 
* greater labour productivity, 
labour cost savings, and sales per 
employee. Profitability have not 
improved 
8.3. Management 
Both Alpha and Beta show very similar patterns on this factor. 
When interviewed, many key respondents indicated that 
management processes (especially changes in human resource 
management practices, organizational structure and strategy) were 
crucially important. Both firms reduced the number of levels in the 
hierarchy and established a new network of partnerships and 
alliances with their new 'flatter' structures. Downsizing of the labour 
force was also common in both cases and an increase in shareholding 
and performance-related pay were also common factors. So the 
'mechanics' of the management strategies were very similar (see 
Table 8.1 and 8.2). Deeper analysis, however, reveals marked 
differences between the ways in which these factors were 
implemented. For example, in Beta, whilst decentralization and 
autonomy were, on the face of things, about equal to Alpha; the levels 
of political interference from Government through decrees and 
directives, the levels of interference from Senior Management in 
decision making were greater, and the degree of workforce flexibility 
and autonomy commensurately lower. The impact of this 'centralized 
management in a decentralized structure' was profound. Employee 
motivation was reduced. Levels of cynicism increased and the 
perception of Beta's corporate image by outside stakeholders was 
reduced, mainly because of the instability provoked by the 
replacement of the Board of Directors, the struggle among 
shareholders and the lack of clear strategic direction. 
8.3.1. Organizational structure 
In Alpha the number of functional units was reduced by about 
50 per cent over the last five-year period. There are also fewer 
hierarchical levels . 
Beta had a more far-reaching reduction of its organizational 
structure than Alpha. The number of functional units - directorates, 
superintendences, departments, divisions, and sections • was reduced 
from 278 in April 1990, to 107 in April 1994. This represents a 
decrease of approximately 60 percent over a four-year period. As a 
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consequence the number of structural layers was reduced 
significantly. 
The greater structural change in Beta raises fundamental 
questions over the influence of both privatisation and management. 
Both firms took approximately the same time to decentralize, so there 
was little question of the pace of change being forced by external 
agency. The structural changes occurred over years rather than 
months . Rather, the taking out of functional units appear to be 
directly a management strategy. In Beta, this meant the 
disappearance of many functions whereas in Alpha the functions 
were generally retained (but the number of people employed was 
reduced). 
By 1990, Beta's management stopped a major expansion 
because of lack of funds. So, a decision to suspend the construction of 
the rolling mill units for medium shapes and bars and for heavy rail 
was made. That decision unleashed major changes throughout the 
company. By the middle of 1990, the organizational structure had 
shrunk by almost 30 per cent. Functional units were reduced mainly 
in areas related to the Superintendence of Engineering and Works 
(reduction of 40 units), Industrial Engineering (decrease of 6 units), 
and Adjunct Directorate (reduction of 4 units). 
One analysis of what one sees in Beta is of management going a 
step too far. Faced with a competitive market and international 
competition, the removal of government's protective mantle 
prompted Beta's management to over-react. The decisions they took 
to take out functions completely may be described as a form of "over-
reach" (Wilson et al, 1996). This process is where organizations can 
'overbalance' from decisions made by their managers. They go a step 
too far, from which it is virtually impossible to retract. The decisions 
are both disproportionate (or out of proportion to the problem in 
question) and become irreversible. Alpha, on the other hand, 
maintained its overall functions profile. It kept changes within 
proportion and, arguably, relatively reversible. So, the major 
influence over structure appears in neither case solely to the 
privatisation. The direction of the structural changes is, of course, a 
function of becoming closer to market, so inevitably decentralization 
is a common management strategy. But the degree to which 
decentralization occurs seems not to be a function of ownership 
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change and market deregulation. It is far more a function of 
management. From this perspective, then, privatisation is more of a 
residual variable. It is the common context for these (and other) 
firms. The immediate influence on structure appears to be 
management. As one shall see in later sections, the impact and effect 
of this management agency on the workforce was deleterious in Beta. 
8.3.2. Strategy 
Alpha's corporate strategy, through its so called "YEAR 2000" 
plan, aims to exploit opportunities related to diversification, vertical 
integration, acquisitions, and partnerships. Potential areas for 
development of new businesses are engineering, data processing, 
equipment, consulting, industrial maintenance, transports and mining. 
Alpha envisages the development of new products such as ceramic 
bricks, fertilizers, pipes, steel structures, chemical products from coal 
and so on. Alpha has been acquiring shares of other companies that 
bear synergy with the company core business. Also, the company 
wants to strength its customer links, improve relationship with 
financial market, increase the output of higher value-added products 
through a technological upgrading. 
Beta's strategy stresses a greater engagement with customers 
and suppliers through partnerships and agreements of mutual 
interest. The company aims to widen its range of steel products that 
are being produced, prioritizing those with higher value-added. 
Both companies' strategies raise basic questions concerning the 
influence of privatisation and management. Decisions on strategy 
appear to be affected by management agency and also by the change 
in ownership. Change in ownership has allowed both firms greater 
freedom and autonomy to establish, for example, partnerships and 
alliances that were quite restricted before privatisation due to 
government regulations. 
Also, analysis of strategies followed by both companies' 
management seems to be greatly influenced by the increased market 
competition, deregulation and a need to exploit the business 
opportunities available. Alpha's management has been particularly 
skillful and diligent in taking advantage of the post-privatisation 
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favourable circumstances. Beta's management also has been able, in a 
smaller scale, to take actions seeking to exploit new business grounds. 
8.4. Competitiveness and productivity 
Influences on productivity · (quantity) mainly internal 
8.4.1. VVorkforce 
Alpha's workforce has been reduced gradually since the 
beginning of the decade. In 1991, the workforce stood for 12,480 
employees. However, in 1995 the number of employees dropped to 
9,890. The company's workforce was reduced by about 25 per cent 
over a five-year period. 
Beta underwent a drastic reduction of its workforce, even 
before privatisation. It reduced its workforce by more than 40 
percent over the last five years. In 1994, the workforce accounted for 
3933 employees down from 6703 in 1989. The uproar caused was 
felt intensely within the company as well as in the surroundings. The 
town that houses the company had problems as many of its residents 
work directly or indirectly for the company. As unemployment rose 
the local businesses saw their sales drop. The major tax contributor to 
the town is Beta. It plays a very important role in the health of the 
local economy. 
As the restructuring program is underway more job losses are 
expected to happen in the coming years. The uncertainties and 
constant changes brought about demotivation and apprehension. Most 
of Beta's employees are disenchanted with the company. Many of 
them have sold their shares acquired during the privatisation. It 
seems that changes brought about by the company's management has 
been disproportionate and the workforce has carried the burden. 
8.4.2. R&D and Technological capabilities 
Technology is another factor considered by both companies to 
be fundamental to any serious improvement in performance and 
.competitiveness. In terms of discourse, one can feel quite impressed 
by the commitment expressed by both firms. But reality is not quite 
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like that. There are palpable differences between the two compames 
relative to their technological apparatus as, for example, in terms of 
having a technology center and technical information department. 
Alpha has a much better technological structure and has been able to 
upgrade some of its products and sell technological assistance 
services more consistently. 
Despite this relative success, there is a group of people in those 
organizations that is firmly against expending resources to develop 
new products and processes. The most common reason put forward is 
that it is much cheaper to buy technology from an outsider than 
develop it. As a short-term approach this can be true. Yet as a long-
term strategy it is questionable as the company will probably never 
be able to have any product at the top of the market range and at the 
same time will depend constantly on the supplier. Continuous 
dependency is a risky strategy as the supplier might change its mind 
and refuse to sell a more up-to-date technology. 
Over the last years, R&D expenses by the two Brazilian steel 
producers have been less than 0.6 percent of total sales. When 
compared with the major Japanese steelmakers, this figure seems 
quite small. In 1987, these companies expended on average about 3.0 
percent of total sales on R&D (Bowonder and Miyake, 1990). So it is 
no surprise why Japanese steel companies are in the forefront of 
technological development, displaying some of the most advanced 
products and processes worldwide. 
Besides R&D, there are other characteristics that describe the 
technology factor. Number of patents, royalty income and licensing, 
percentage of sales and number of qualified scientists and engineers 
are among those features that allow one to measure and evaluate if a 
company is as committed to technology as it says. At present, there 
is an evident difference between the two case studies concerning 
their outcome relative to technological achievements. Alpha has been 
able to develop indigenous technology in its research institute and 
render technological services to some Brazilian and foreign 
companies. On the other hand, Beta is far behind compared to Alpha. 
It has not been able to develop in full its technological capability 
potential primarily due to lack of resources and uncertainties that 
have hampered any serious attempt to set up a technology center. 
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Technological upgrading is another element to be considered. 
Alpha has established major partnerships with Brazilian and foreign 
companies seeking to improve its technological capability. It has a 
long established relationship with a Japanese Steel Corporation which 
has been one the main suppliers of hardware and software in 
technology. These partnerships and its Steel Technology Center have 
been the source that provide the company with the necessary 
conditions to upgrade its range of products. As a result, the mix of 
products available for customers is becoming increasingly more 
sophisticated. Given that, the company aims to further its higher 
value-added products' availability as these products can bring a 
greater profit margin. 
There has been a stronger emphasis on applied research at the 
cost of basic research projects. Alpha's technological capabilities have 
been enhanced through new partnerships established in 1992 with 
British Steel, Ahlstrom Equipment, Hitachi, Nippon Steel, and Chugai-
Ro. The company is investing in new hardware to upgrade the mix of 
products, eg electrogalvanized production line. 
Beta is not very strong in R&D. It lacks an adequate Research 
Centre, a Technical Information Department, and a firm commitment 
from the top management to invest time and money in R&D. Beta's 
technological capability to a certain extent is dependent on other 
Brazilian steelmaker as well as some foreign companies. The company 
does not have as many technological partnerships as Alpha. In this 
moment of transition, it does not seem that enhancing technological 
capability as being a major priority. 
8 .4.3. Production capacity 
Alpha's production capacity remains almost unchanged for the 
time being. However, expansion is underway to match the growing 
demand from carmakers and other sectors. 
Beta's production capacity has been stable around 2.0m tonnes. 
In 1994, as a result of revamping its blast furnace, production 
dropped to 1.65 million tonnes of steel. From 1995 onwards, the 
company expects production to increase faster to meet the increasing 
demand. 
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8.4.4. Finance/investment 
Alpha's investment programme has focused on projects related 
to technological modernization, production capacity maintenance, 
environment protection, and production expansion. It has invested in 
a electrolytic galvanizing line. Also, it has acquiring stakes in other 
companies. 
Beta's has a programme of investment concerning the 
environmental preservation, technological modernization, and 
production capacity maintenance. In 1994, the company carried out a 
major revamping of its blast furnace. 
Influences on productivity (value/unit) 
internal 
8.4.5. Products 
external and 
Alpha has a range of products with higher value-added than 
Beta. The latter produces mainly steel commodities: billets, blooms 
and slabs. The different product-mix affects profitability of both 
companies as the highest value-added products provides greater 
profit margins. 
Alpha is set to continue upgrading its product-mix towards a 
higher value-added range of products, mainly to supply the 
automotive industry. 
8 .4.6. Price/deregulation 
Domestic steel prices had been over a long period of time under 
a severe constraint imposed by the Brazilian government. The alleged 
objective was to help controlling the inflation. While the domestic 
steel prices were kept under artificial cap, the state-owned steel 
companies bore heavy losses. In 1991, after the liberalization of 
prices, steel companies achieved higher profits. 
Privatisation, coupled with deregulation and a market-oriented 
economy approach, has been an important drive to many government 
policies from all over the world. According to Hamish McRae (The 
Independent, 23 July 1996), "the key point is that privatisation is a 
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leveller. For all the flaws of the actual process by which firms are 
privatised and for all the deficiencies in regulation and corporate 
governance that it has revealed, it is one of the key aspects of the 
marketisation of the world economy: the creation oi a more level 
playing field between the developed and the developing world." 
According to Wilson (1992}, the process of deregulation along 
with privatisation has forced changes on many business sectors that 
before were comfortably protected by monopoly rights. Over almost 
two decades the process of deregulation and privatisation have 
profoundly changed the British economic scenario. 
Deregulation of the Brazilian steel industry has been prominent. 
It has provided the necessary conditions to foster competition, 
increase in investment, reduction of import tariffs, and red tape. 
8.4. 7. Market strategy 
Alpha's market strategy has focused on establishing major 
partnerships with customers, suppliers and intermediaries. It bought 
stakes in a number of companies that bear some links with its core 
business. 
Beta's market strategy, over the past years, has been 
concentrated on increasing its sales abroad due to a sluggish domestic 
market. In the domestic and international markets Beta is compelled 
to pursue a cost-based strategy because of the commodity type 
products it manufactures. Now that the internal market is recovering, 
probably the company is going to divert a growing proportion of its 
production to the Brazilian market. Further, partnerships are 
probably going to be established with customers, suppliers and 
intermediaries. 
8.4.8. Relationship with customers 
Both companies are seeking a better relationship with their 
customers. Alpha is doing this through a series of actions such as joint 
programmes, development of products and businesses in partnership 
and technology transfer and collaboration. 
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Beta is looking for a much closer relationship with customers 
through a programme of regular visits, exchange of experience and 
knowledge. 
8.5. Performance 
8.5.1. Labour productivity 
Alpha's productivity has increased steadily reaching 446 
m.tonnes per man-year in 1994. It rose by about 20 per cent over a 
five-year period. Most of the improvement can be explained by the 
reduction of workforce and improvements in working practices and 
hardware. 
Beta's productivity has increased since the beginning of the 
1990s, attaining 341 m.ton per man-year in 1993. It rose by about 
60 per cent over a four-year period. However impressive, the figures 
are well below Alpha's productivity. Most of the improvement 
achieved is deemed to be related to deep cuts in the workforce and 
better working practices and hardware. 
8.5.2. Costs 
Alpha's cost advantage is mainly due to its strategic location 
near deposits of iron ore and major domestic consumers, growing 
productivity, low labour costs and a relatively modern plant. Its cost 
of products and services as a percentage of net revenues has been 
stable. Labour cost savings achieved more than 5 per cent as a 
percentage of operating costs. 
Beta's cost advantage is related to low raw material and labour 
costs, and strategic location. Its cost of product and services as a 
percentage of net revenues has increased. Labour cost savings 
achieved more than 30 per cent as a percentage of operating costs 
over a four-year period. 
8.5.3. Sales/domestic market share 
As the domestic economy shows signs of improvement, Alpha 
has diverted production to supply primarily the internal market, 
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pushed by the car industry. Also, sales (value) per employee rose by 
more than 50 per cent over the last five years. 
Beta's sales have increased steadily from 1991 until 1993. In 
1994, due to maintenance requirements to overhaul the operational 
units of the steelworks, sales dropped to 1.63 million tonnes of steel, 
down from 2.10 million tonnes in 1993. Further, sales (value) per 
employee rose by more than 75 per cent over a five-year period. 
Alpha's domestic marketshare has been stable. It can be 
explained by product quality, price, and delivery. There is an 
increasing in market share on higher value-added products. 
Beta's domestic market share has been relatively stable over 
the last four years. In 1994, it reduced due to a fall in production 
related to the revamping of its blast furnace. 
8.5.4. Exports 
The recovery of the Brazilian economy and increasing steel 
demand, led Alpha to divert a bigger share of its production to the 
internal market at the expense of exports. 
Beta's exports have been on the increase since the outset of this 
decade. In 1994, due to maintenance requirements, exports dropped 
to one of its lowest figures, 0.97 million tonnes of steel down from 
1.34 million tonnes in 1993. However, exports as a percentage of total 
sales have been stable. 
8.5.5. Profitability and asset turnover ratios 
Alpha's profitability ratios have improved since the outset of 
the 1990s. PBIT/total assets and PBIT/sales ratios have increased by 
about 40 per cent over a five-year period. Sales margin rose by more 
than three times and return on equity more than two times over the 
same period. Asset turnover has worsened. It decreased by more 
than 30 per cent. As a whole, these figures show a company with a 
sound situation taking into account a five-year period. 
Beta's profitability ratios have worsened since 1991. PBIT/total 
sales, PBIT/sales, sales margin and return on equity have decreased 
steeply over a four-year period. Asset turnover has been stable. 
These figures are not good. It shows a company undergoing a number 
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of changes such as restructuring, privatisation, replacement of the 
Board of Directors, shareholding disputes, and re-routing of its 
businesses. 
8.5.6. Profits and Earnings per share (EPS) 
Alpha's profits have increased since 1990, when the company 
had losses. In 1993, two years after privatisation, profits reached 20% 
up from 6% of net revenue in 1991. Between 1993 and 1995, profits 
figures have stayed around 20% of net revenue. The company's 
turnover reached $1.9 billion and profits $423 million in 1994. 
Beta's profits, differently from Alpha, have been unstable since 
the beginning of the 1990's. It started with losses in 1990, had a 
steep increase in 1991, to fall again in 1992. In 1994, profits reached 
just 1.8% of net revenues down from 13% in 1993. The company's 
turnover reached $710mi and profits $9.7mi in 1994. 
Alpha's earnings per share (EPS) have increased steadily since 
the beginning of 1990's. It rose fivefold between 1991 and 1994. 
According to figures 6.14 and 6.15, there seems to be a correlation 
between profits and EPS. 
Beta's earnings per share, as happened with profits, have been 
unstable from the outset of the 1990's. In 1993, the year when the 
company was privatised, the earnings per thousand shares reached 
US$0.26 up from US$0.20 in 1992. In 1994, it was US$0.05 per 
thousand shares, around fivefold less than in the previous year. The 
explanation resides in the drop of production and profits. It seems to 
early to foresee any trend related to EPS. 
8.5.7. Value added 
Alpha's value added has been stable around 40 per cent. On the 
other hand, Beta's value added has decreased over the last four years. 
These figures show that Alpha's operating costs have been stable 
while Beta's operating costs have increased. It shows problems 
related to Beta's management. 
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8.6. Conclusions and indications for future research 
Comparisons of the two cases reveals that the influence of 
privatisation at the company level is rarely, if ever, direct. Changes of 
ownership and direction can set the agenda for the direction of the 
changes, but appear not to constrict or restrain managers in their 
choice of implementation of strategies (Wilson, 1992). As Galal (1993) 
states of other "Latin" privatisations "... (it is) merely one act in a 
larger play - a lesson most developing countries have been slow to 
grasp." 
The cases act as examples of relatively more successful change 
(Alpha) and rather less successful change (Beta). The comparisons 
reveal some stark differences between the firms. Most revealing of 
all, perhaps, is the centrally important role played by corporate 
strategy in both cases (a finding supported by Pettigrew and Whipp, 
1990). Both Alpha and Beta had identifiable corporate strategies (see 
Tables 8.1 and 8.2). But privatisation for Alpha meant that its 
managers could shake off some of the shackles of regulation and 
exploit new business opportunities, especially in partnership. 
Company Alpha's strengths in technological and management 
capability and high value added products also contributed to the 
strong productivity and financial performance before, during and 
after privatisation. This performance and the technology collaboration 
with a foreign partner who continued to hold a minor equity stake in 
the company also explain the limited government interference in the 
management of the company before privatisation. 
Alpha claims to be in a better position to use its strengths to 
benefit from improvements in the Brazilian and other Latin American 
economies, developments in the Brazilian automobile, consumer 
durables and construction sectors and Brazil's membership of 
Mercosur. It has become more responsive to customers, more 
entrepreneurial in developing products and seeking out customers 
and has developed closer ties with major customers such as car 
producers. 
Company Beta's performance was weak before privatisation and 
remained weak during ~ the privatisation process and immediately 
after. Before the privatisation weaknesses in management, 
commodity type low value added products and shortage of funds to 
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expand and upgrade capacity were some of the major problems. 
These were compounded by greater government interference 
arguably because the company was more dependent on the 
government for financial support. The poor performance has 
continued after privatisation largely, because the company has not 
been able to improve its productivity sufficiently to be cost 
competitive in commodity type markets. 
For Beta, privatisation merely added to a corporate strategy 
which was arguably already going wrong. Downsizing and the 
reduction of functional specialisation resulted in a marked diminution 
of core competences. Recourse to shareholding strategies brought 
further problems. 
Beta was troubled by shareholding disputes after privatisation. 
Its main shareholder - GMJ - after the change in ownership, turned 
out to be in a big financial crisis. After some months of dispute, 
eventually GMJ was obliged to sell its stake in the company and to 
withdraw its representatives from the Administrative Council and 
Board of Directors. 
Beta claims that the freedom from government ties will enable 
it to be more responsive to customers and changes in market 
conditions. However, because of the nature of its products, lack of 
competitive advantage and poor performance, in the short term, the 
main focus has been on crisis management. 
Both companies accelerated their programme of reducing the 
labour force during the restructuring and privatisation to improve 
productivity and competitiveness. Alpha ahs attained standards 
comparable to industrialised steel producing countries. Beta has had 
to make much bigger cuts in its labour force but its productivity 
levels still remain low in comparison with Alpha and international 
competitors. 
So, at the company level, managerial agency appears to have , 
the greater influence over strategic direction and performance of the 
firm. The process of privatisation has merely given the direction and 
context for those changes. The relative lack of success of Beta, when 
compared to Alpha, appears almost wholly due to management 
strategy rather than privatisation. 
Indeed, there is strong supporting evidence for 
since Beta's management was already pursuing 
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this conclusion 
strategies of 
downsizing and reduction in the functions prior to privatisation 
(whether they were doing this in anticipation of privatisation is 
impossible to tell). So, strategy in Beta post-privatisation became 
dominantly (but not wholly) more of the same. Privatisation provided 
a new context in which the existing portfolio of strategies could be 
pursued in greater breadth and depth. 
To a large extent, the management strategies pursued in Beta 
post-privatisation exacerbated a cost-cutting frame of mind that was 
always in place. For example, labour productivity in both firms rose 
post-privatisation, but Alpha's came from modernization and 
expansionist strategies, whilst Beta's were rooted in cost reduction 
through workforce cuts. Labour cost savings were 30 per cent (of 
operating costs). Alpha's were 5 per cent. Such cost reduction 
strategies have a finite life - there is a point beyond which it is 
impossible to progress - and in Beta's case this seems to have been 
accelerated by the privatisation process. At present, Beta is holding 
ground especially by developing its export markets, but the financial 
performance data indicate a firm which soon may be in trouble. For 
example, PBIT/Sales and PBIT/Sales margin as well as ROE have 
decreased markedly (more than four times) over the last four years. 
Earnings per share have also been inherently unstable in Beta, whilst 
Alpha's have increased steadily. 
Since Chapter Six indicated that overall profits and earnings per 
share seem to be eo-related, the long-term prognosis for Beta does 
not seem particularly good, especially in the context of increasing 
operating costs . 
Returning to the research questions raised at the beginning of 
this thesis, the data from the two Brazilian firms support the view 
that managerial agency rather than privatisation per se is the key 
influence over both what decisions are subsequently taken and over 
long-term performance. This raises a cautionary signal, particularly 
amongst those scholars who are anti-privatisation on social policy or 
political grounds. From this sample, one could conclude that the 
impact of privatisation and performance is relatively slight and 
indirect. There is no indication of 'sudden' exposure to competitive 
markets and the onset of Darwinistic economies of survival. These 
appeared to be happening before privatisation. What privatisation 
did do was to accelerate the change process by forcing management's 
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hand to make quicker decisions - especially over markets and 
customers (Bishop and Thomson, 1992). 
The research agenda for future comparative studies of 
privatisation is clearly not only multi-variate, but also the current 
study would indicate the central and pervasive role of managers and 
management strategy in the ultimate success (or lack of it) of the 
firm. Future research on larger samples of firms in different sectors 
and nations may reveal to what extent these conclusions hold true of 
the privatisation process more generally. 
Based on the analytical framework used in this study as well as 
the conclusions, it is clear that future studies of the effect of 
privatisation on companies should examine a number of quantitative 
variables and qualitative indicators. The company analysis 
framework developed as a part of this thesis provides a useful tool 
for such analysis. Further refinement of the framework would 
require more precise modelling of the quantitative relationships (for 
example between productivity and performance indicators) and more 
systematic and sophisticated mapping of the relationship between the 
qualitative changes and their impact on productivity and 
performance. 
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APPENDIX I 
I.l INTERVIEW SCHEDULE IN ENGLISH LANGUAGE 
Summary of the company 
We would like to know the main characteristics of the firm before 
and after privatisation. Please answer each of the following items: 
1. Company history and position in the steel sector 
* When was the company inaugurated? 
* Where is it located? 
* Other information. 
2. Ownership structure of the firm 
* Percent of capital provided by the Brazilian Government? 
* Percent of capital provided by other main shareholders? 
3. Size of the firm 
* Total capital in $/£ 
* Asset value in $/£ 
* Annual sales in $/£ 
* Annual profit in $/£ 
4. Distribution of the customers 
* Annual sales to Brazilian customers 
* Annual sales to Foreign customers 
- South America 
- North America 
- Europe 
- Asia 
- Other 
5. Distribution of the suppliers 
* Annual procurement from Brazilian suppliers 
* Annual procurement from Foreign suppliers 
- South America 
- North America 
- Europe 
- Asia 
- Other 
6. Main products of the firm 
* Plates in tonnes 
* Hot coils in tonnes 
* Hot sheets in tonnes 
* Black plates in tonnes 
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* Other 
7. Technology 
* What kind of technology has the company adopted? 
- Basic oxygen steel-making process 
- Electric furnace 
- Continuous casting techniques 
- Other 
* Changes in technology 
* Expenditure in R & D 
* Is the company's production line up-to-date in technology 
terms? 
8. Market 
* Who are the main customers? 
* Who are the main suppliers? 
* Who are the main competitors? 
* What is the company's Brazilian market share? 
* What is the company's Foreign market share? 
* What is the growth in sales and market share? Brazilian and 
Foreign? 
* What is the return on capital? 
9. Environment 
* What is the company doing for environmental protection? 
* How much has been invested to protect the environment? 
* What kind of equipment has been installed? 
* What is the company-ecologist relationship like? 
* What does ecology mean to the company? 
10. Organisational structure 
* What are the levels of formalisation: written rules and 
procedures? 
* What is the level of centralisation versus decentralisation? 
* What are the vertical and horizontal channels of information 
and authority? 
* Other information. 
11. Management style 
* What kind of management style has the company: democratic, 
autocratic, paternalistic? 
* What is the nature of supervision: close or responsible 
autonomy? 
12. Finance strategies 
* Sources of funds 
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* Capital structure 
* Dividend policy 
* Other 
13. Marketing strategies 
* For differentiating and positioning 
* For new products and services 
* Through product life cycle 
* For the global marketplace 
* Other 
14. Competitive strategies 
* Rivalry among existing firms 
* Bargaining power of suppliers 
* Bargaining power of buyers 
* Threat of substitute products or services 
* Threat of new entrants 
* Other 
15. Human resources strategies 
* Total number of employees 
* What are the policies and procedures for admission, rewards, 
training, evaluation, promotion, transference, dismissals, etc. 
* Other 
Impact on Privatisation 
1. Description of the privatisation process (both formal and actual): 
main stages, procedures adopted, changes, etc. 
2. Circumstances in which privatisation was introduced: economic, 
political, social, technical. 
3. In what terms (documents, communications, statements, etc.) was 
the decision expressed? Justifications and reasons offered to 
employees, to the public, to the customers, to the suppliers. 
4 . Composition of project or 'expert' teams established to implement 
privatisation? 
5 . Other participants in implementation (including unions and 
employee representatives)? 
6. What are the main shifts related to company's strategies, 
organisational structure, cultural direction? 
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7. Did the company become more market-oriented, less dependent on 
subsidies, increase independence and freedom, improve access to 
capital markets and finance, become more market-sensitive and cost 
consciousness? 
8. Has international expansion been a real possibility after 
privatisation? 
9. What's happening as regards price controls and other restrictions 
on operations? 
10. What is the level of relationship with the government like? 
11. Company objectives before and after privatisation related to 
* export marketshare 
* internal marketshare 
* export sales 
* profitability 
* productivity 
* innovation process 
* technological leadership 
12. Strategies adopted/being adopted before and after privatisation 
related to 
* number of products 
* customer service 
* quality control 
* channels of distribution 
* segments of market 
* delivery 
Competitiveness 
1. What does the company understand by competitiveness? 
2. What is(are) the fundamental(s) issue(s) concerning the company's 
competitiveness? 
3. What have been the measures adopted to increase the company's 
competitiveness? 
4. Circumstances in which competitiveness could be improve? 
5. What are the main factors that can intervene to improve a firm's 
competitiveness? 
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6. What is the significance of the following factors for competitiveness 
improvement: 
* technology, innovation, capital investment, human resources, 
education and training, business environment, government 
policies, management performance, creativity, changing 
environment. 
7. What are the factors used by the company to evaluate 
competitiveness? For example: 
* export/import marketshare, export dependency, export 
growth, profitability, productivity, capital cost, labour cost, price 
competitiveness, technology indicators, economies of scale and 
scope, R & D investment, quality competitiveness, commitment 
to customers and suppliers, closeness to customer, domestic 
market competition, etc. 
8. What is the definition of productivity adopted by the company, 
and how is it related to competitiveness? 
9. What are the main actions carried out by the company to involve 
its personnel regarding the competitiveness issue? 
10. What is the company's competitiveness level compared with that 
of Brazilian and foreign competitors? 
Conclusions 
1. Can you indicate your current position m the company 
(1) President 
(2) Vice President 
(3) Superintendent 
(4) Senior ~anager 
(5) Chief of Department 
(6) Chief of Division/Service 
{7) Other, please specify 
2. How many years have you worked for this company? 
(1) Under 2 years 
(2) 2-5 years 
(3) 6-10 years 
( 4) 11-15 years 
(5) 16 years and above 
3. Have you any comments to make? If so, please state. 
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I.2. INTERVIEW SCHEDULE IN PORTUGUESE LANGUAGE 
SUMARIO DA EMPRESA 
1. HISTORICO DA EMPRESA 
* Quando foi inaugurada? 
* On de esta localizada? 
* Outros dados gerais. 
2. ESTRUTURA SOCIETARIA 
* Principais acionistas antes/depois de 1991 
3. TAMANHO DA EMPRESA 
* Total dos ativos? 
* Vendas anuais? 
* Lucro liquido anual? 
* Capital liquido? 
4. DISTRIBUI<;AO DOS CLIENTES 
* Vendas anuais para clientes brasileiros 
* Vendas anuais para clientes estrangeiros 
- America Latina 
- America do N orte 
- Europa 
- Asia 
- Outros 
5. DISTRJBUI<;AO DOS FORNECEDORES 
* Cornpras anuais de fornecedores brasileiros 
* Compras anuais de fornecedores estrangeiros 
- America Latina 
- America do Norte 
- Europa 
- Asia 
- Outros 
6. PRINCIP AIS PRODUTOS DA EMPRESA 
* Chapa grossa 
* Bobina a quente 
* Chapa fina a frio 
* Outros 
7. TECNOLOGIA 
* Qual o tipo de tecnologia que a empresa vem adotando? 
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* Mudan~as tecnol6gicas sofridas pela empresa nos ultimos anos? 
* Esta a empresa atualizada em termos de tecnologia se 
comparada corn concorrentes estrangeiros? 
* Quanto a empresa dispende em pesquisa e desenvolvimento? 
8. INOV A~AO TECNOLOGICA 
* 0 que a empresa vem fazendo em termos de inova~ao 
tecnol6gica? 
* Pode-se aumentar o nfvel de competitividade atraves dos 
processos de inova~ao tecnol6gica? 
* Acordo de transferencia tecnol6gica entre empresa nacional e 
estrangeira pode ser visto como uma ferramenta para a melhoria 
do processo de inova~ao? 
* 0 que a empresa vem fazendo para melhorar e estimular o 
processo criativo e inovador junto aos seus funcionarios? 
9.MERCADO 
* Quais sao os principais clientes? 
* Quais sao os principais fornecedores? 
* Quais sao os principais competidores? 
* Qual e a participa~ao da empresa no mercado brasileiro? 
* Qual e a participa~ao da empresa no mercado estrangeiro? 
* Qual tern si do o crescimento das vendas e da partici pa~ao de 
mercado? 
10. MEIO·AMBIENTE 
* 0 que a empresa entende por ecologia? 
* 0 que a empresa vem fazendo para melhoria do mcio-
ambiente? 
* Quanto esta sendo investido em prote~ao ambiental? 
* Que tipo de tecnologia ambiental vem sendo implemcntada? 
* Como e o relacionamento empresa-ecologistas? 
11. ESTRUTURA ORGANIZACIONAL 
* Quais sao os nfveis de formaliza~ao: regras cscritas c 
procedimentos? 
* Qual e o n£vel de centraliza~ao versus descentraliza~ao? 
* Quais sao os canais verticais e horizontais de informa~iio e 
autoridade? 
* Outros dados. 
12. ESTILO GERENCIAL 
* Qual e o estilo gerencial que a empresa adota: dcmocr~tico, 
autocratico ou paternaHstico? 
* Qual e o tipo de supervisao: autonomia respons~vel ou 
estrei ta? 
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13. ESTRATEGIA FINANCEIRA 
* Pontes de fundos 
* Estrutura de capital 
* Polftica de dividendos 
* Qual tern sido o retorno sobre o investirnento? 
* Outras 
14. ESTRATEGIA MERCADOLOGICA 
* Qual tern sido a postura da empresa em termos 
rnercadol6gicos? 
* Novos produtos e servi9os, ciclo de vida do produto, mercado 
global, diferencia~ao, etc. 
15. ESTRATEGIA COMPETITIV A 
* Em rela~ao aos competidores atuais 
* Em rela~ao aos fornecedores 
* Em rela~ao aos clientes 
* Em rela~ao a potenciais cornpetidores 
* Amea~a de produtos substitutes 
* Outros 
16. ESTRA TEGIA DE RECURS OS HUMAN OS 
* Nurnero total de empregados 
* Quais sao as politicas e procedimentos para adrnissfio, 
treinamento, avalia~ao, promo~ao, transferencia, recompensa, 
dernissao, etc. 
PRIVA TIZA<;AO 
1. Quais foram as principais razoes/objetivos que justificaram o 
processo de privatiza~ao? 
* Baixa produtividade, elevados custos de produ~fio, dif{ccis 
rela~oes corn o sindicato, baixo retorno sobre o investimento, 
ineficiente uso dos recursos da empresa, debil presta~ao de 
serviyos aos clientes, tornar-se independente do governo, quebra 
do monop6lio/oligop61io, etc. 
2. Descri~ao do processo de privatiza~ao (formal e real): principais 
etapas, procedimentos adotados, mudan~as, etc. 
3 . Circunstancias (contexto, conteudo, processo) nas quais a 
privatiza~ao foi introduzida: economicas, polCticas, sociais, tccnicas. 
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4. Em que termos (documentos, cornunicados, declara~oes, etc.) foi 
expressa a decisao de privatizar? Justificativas e razoes dadas aos 
ernpregados, ao publico, aos clientes, aos fornecedores. 
5. Cornposi~ao do projeto ou grupo de especialistas responsavel pela 
irnplernenta~ao do processo de privatiza~ao? 
6. Outros integrantes no processo de irnplernenta~ao (sindicatos e 
representantes dos ernpregados). 
7. Quais forarn as razoes para o sucesso/insucesso do processo de 
privatiza~ao? 
* Adequada prepara~ao, suporte popular, metodo de venda da 
empresa, gerenciamento correto de todo processo, redu~ao do 
quadro de pessoal, cornpetencia do governo na condu~ao do 
processo, etc. 
8. Corn a privatiza~ao, quais forarn as principais rnudan~as nas 
estrategias da empresa, estrutura organizacional, processo decis6rio, 
dentre outras? 
9. Corn a privatizacao, a ernpresa tornou-se rnais orientada pelas 
necessidades de rnercado, rnenos dependente de subs{dios, tevc 
aurnentada a independencia e liberdade para agir, aurnentou o accsso 
ao rnercado de capitais e financeiro, tornou-se mais preocupada corn 
os custos? 
10. Tern sido a expansao internacional uma possibilidade real ap6s 0 
processo de privatizacao? 
11. Qual e a situacao atual da politica de controle de pre~os e outras 
restri~oes as atividades operacionais? 
12. Corn a privatiza~ao, corno ficou a rela~ao corn o governo? 
13. Objetivos da ernpresa antes e depois da privatizacao, corn relacao 
a: 
* participacao no rnercado 
* participa~ao no rnercado 
* exportayao 
* lucratividade 
* produtividade 
* inova~ao tecno16gica 
* lideran~a tecnol6gica 
externa 
intern a 
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14. Quais foram/sao as estrategias adotadas antes e depois do 
processo de pri vatiza~ao corn rela~ao a: 
* numero de produtos 
* controle de qualidade 
* servi~o ao cliente 
* canais de distribui~ao 
* segmentos de mercado 
* sistema de entrega 
IS. Em linhas gerais, qua1s foram os pr6s e contras de todo o processo 
de privatiza~ao? 
COMPETITIVIDADE 
1. 0 que a empresa entende ser competitividade? 
2. Qual 0 problema basico ligado a questao da competitividade? 
3. 0 que vem sendo adotado no sentido de melhorar o n{vel de 
competitividade da empresa? 
4. Circunstancias nas quais o n{vel de competitividade pode ser 
melhorado? 
5. Quais sao os fatores basicos que interferem na melhoria da 
competitividade empresarial? 
6. Qual o papel que os seguintes fatores podem desempenhar na 
melhoria da competitividade: 
* Tecnologia, inova~ao, investimento de capital, recursos 
humanos, ambiente de neg6cios, educa~ao e treinamcnto, poHtica 
governamental, performance gerencial, ambiente prop{cio as 
mudan~as, creatividade, etc. 
7. Quais sao os fa to res utilizados para se medir o n{vcl de 
competiti vidade? 
* Participa~ao no mercado externo/interno, dcpcndcncia das 
exporta~oes, crescimento das exporta~ocs, lucrati vidadc, 
produtividade, custo de capital, custo de mao-dc-obra, prc~o, 
indicadores de tecnologia, investimento em cicncia c tccnologia, 
economias de escala e escopo, proximidadc corn o clicntc, 
qualidade, comprometimento de longo prazo corn clientcs c 
fornecedores, competi~ao no mercado domcs.tico, etc. 
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8. 0 que a empresa entende ser produtividade e de que forma esta se 
relaciona corn o nfvel de competitividade? 
9. 0 que a empresa vem fazendo para conscientizar/envolver 
gerentes, chefias, funciomirios para a questao da competitividade? 
10. Qual o nfvel de competitividade da empresa em rela¥ao aos 
concorrentes estrangeiros e brasileiros? 
DADOS GERAIS 
1. Qual a sua posi¥ao atual na empresa? 
* Presidente 
* Vice-presidente 
* Superintendente 
* Gerente Geral 
* Chefe de Departamento 
* Chefe de Divisao/Servi¥0 
* Outra, favor especificar 
2. Ha quantos esta trabalhando nesta empresa? 
* menos de 2 anos 
* 2-5 anos 
* 6-10 anos 
* 11-15 anos 
* 16 anos ou mais 
3. ComenHirios finais 
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APPENDIX 11 
TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER 
A number of strands in the strategy and economics literature 
emphasise the importance of capabilities and strategies at the 
enterprise level, including technological aspects, in explaining their 
own performance as well as the performance of the economies in 
which they operate (Rumelt,l984; Teece,1986 and Porter,l990). Lall 
( 1992) considers technology transfer issues for firms in 
industrialising countries which is the focus of this section. 
Technological knowledge is not shared equally among firms . 
Nor is it easily imitated by, or transferred across firms. Transfer 
requires learning as technologies are tacit and their underlying 
principles are not always clearly understood. Acquiring a new 
technology and gaining mastery of it requires appropriate cultural, 
institutional and market contexts, strategies, skills, effort and 
investment by the receiving firm. The extent of competence achieved 
is uncertain and necessarily varies between firms according to the 
existing capabilities, objectives and strategies and the external 
context. These features of the process of technology transfer arc 
recognized by a number of authors (Pavitt, 1985 and Afriyic, 1988). 
Definitions 
The term technology transfer is used to describe the acquisition 
and application of technology. In practice, developing technological 
capabilities are not a one-shot effort as the term technology transfer 
implies. It is a complex long-term process with various levels of 
technological competences such as ability to use the technology, adapt 
it, stretch it and eventually to become more independent by 
developing and designing technology. 
For Dahlman et al ( 1987) and Lall (1992), technology transfer is 
understood as a long-term process of developing technological 
capabilities that demands effort and determination to acquire the 
suitable hardware and knowledge. 
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For many the technology transfer process involves reaching a 
certain purpose, use, and profitability (Dearing, 1993; Gee, 1993; 
Marchetta et al, 1993; Johns, 1992). 
The fundamental problem of technology transfer is related to 
reducing the differences between parts; differences that already exist 
between nations, cultures, institutions, organizations and individuals. 
The aim is to negotiate strategies that help the reduction of these 
gaps among the participants. For Dearing (1993}, the main 
characteristic of technology is its use or purpose. Bearing this in mind, 
technology transfer is the process of communication of information 
that will be put in practice, in use. 
So technology transfer implies the transference of technology 
from where it is created to where it is demanded. Gee (1993) 
understands technology as being a set of knowledge contained in the 
following forms: 
'1. technical ideas, information or data,· 2. people: personal 
technical skills and expertise,· 3. physical models: prototypes, 
designs, computer codes, etc' 
Following the same track, Johns (1992) defines technology 
transfer as being a transfer of a process or particular equipment from 
one company to another. The former is willing to share with the 
latter, its expertise in similar activities. By and large, major 
technology transfers to be successful, should solve the problems of 
distance and also of culture. 
From this stance, Marchetta et al ( 1993) consider the 
technology transfer as a process that brings not only the cultural 
issue to the stage but technical and scientific ·heritage as well. All 
these aspects when well·interconnected are useful to bring ideas to 
the reality of economic activities of production and services. 
Technology transfer effectively has real significance when it is 
capable of satisfying the parts involved through compensating them 
with a certain profitability. 
The issue of technological development, according to Dahlman et 
al (1987), is first related to acquiring the right capabilities to ensure 
efficient production and investment. Second, combining foreign and 
local technological elements in such a way that gradually helps 
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indigenous capabilities to be more efficient. Third, the technological 
capability comes from a long-term commitment to conscious efforts, 
to aggregate skills and the ability to take advantage of challenges and 
new opportunities. Fourth, the economic environment is important as 
an indicator for the economic agents as long as it shows the way firms 
use and adapt technology through incentives and penalties. 
When a company chooses a certain technology, it is looking for 
more than how to do something at particular costs, benefits, and 
engineering norms. It is concerned with acquisition of the right 
capabilities that would enable the company to go ahead to new 
activities. It is not an easy undertaking to decide 
'which technologies to choose, which to abandon, which to 
upgrade, which to replace by newer technologies. Properly 
assessing and choosing new technology thus require substantial 
effort' (Dahman et al, 1987). 
The task of assessing and choosing the best technology that 
satisfies the necessities of a certain environment implies four 
different steps. The first one is related to identifying indigenous 
needs and conditions. It means that the parts involved in the process 
should be aware of the pitfalls connected with transferring 
technologies from one environment to a different one where the 
technology normally needs to be adapted to satisfy the domestic 
demands. The second step in seeking better and more suitable 
technologies is concerned with the amount of information necessary 
to reach all technological possibilities available both at national and 
international levels. The third step is related to choosing from 
amongst all technologies ready for use one tha.t can brings the best 
results in terms of cost-benefit analysis. The last step looks beyond 
the methods of evaluation, aiming to assess various technologies to 
find which ones can offer more possibilities than others. It means 
choosing the technology that brings about most benefits both to the 
company and to society as a whole (Dahlman et al, 1987). 
In other words, technology transfer is not just buying a package 
containing instructions, data and so on and then doing-it-yourself. To 
be successful it needs much more than that. It requires a great deal 
of expertise, preparation, open-mindeness, technical education and 
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training, internal culture towards technology, and a minimum 
infrastructure to give support to people and to build a information 
system able to record all the main stages of the process over time. It 
demands a long-term commitment and all kinds of resources 
(material and human) to obtain an expected result through the 
technology transfer process pyramid. 
Technology transfer and levels of capability 
Developing technological capabilities is not a one-shot effort as 
the term technology transfer implies. It is a complex long-term 
process with various levels of technological competencies such as the 
ability to use the technology, adapt it, stretch it, and eventually to 
develop, design and sell it. Table All, which sets out different levels 
of process and product capabilities, is used as a framework for 
explaining developments in a Brazilian steel company. At the simple 
routine level, operating a process requires some fine-tuning. solving 
any small problems that arise, effective maintenance and ensuring 
that quality is up to standard. Learning and developing an 
understanding of the process technology are important aspects of this 
phase. Minor adaptations to products to suit market needs and 
understanding product design are also parts of learning during this 
phase. 
The assimilation and capabilities required during the 'basic' 
phase enable development of the 'intermediate' stage. The term 
'equipment stretching' in the exhibit refers to expansion in capacity 
and production through changes in operations and technological 
enhancements without major investment expenditure. Such 
adaptations clearly require a thorough understanding of the 
processes being adapted. Another feature of this phase is often 
improvements in the quality of the product. In addition, the 
capabilities developed in relation to the initial processes and products 
enable a better understanding of what technologies and products arc 
required and their assimilation. 
There are also differences between the three phases in the 
'management and control' requirements and the nature of 'external 
linkages.' With management and control, the emphasis at the basic 
stage is on making things work efficiently at the factory floor level. 
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However, at the intermediate level, monitoring productivity changes 
resulting from adaptations and using the evidence from such 
monitoring to make further improvements becomes more important. 
At the basic as well as the intermediate stage, the enterprise has to 
remain sensitive to market conditions with the objectives of 
maintaining and enhancing the competitiveness of its products in 
price and quality and developing new products and markets. At the 
'advanced' stage even closer co-ordination is required between 
process and product innovation and commercial and marketing 
strategies. The direction of research and innovation efforts is guided 
by identification of profitable markets and customers. 
The external linkages with technology suppliers are clearly 
important at the basic stage during which they are often responsible 
for the supervision and training of the employees of the technology-
acquiring firm working on relatively routine tasks. Generally, the 
more complex the technology and the lower the technological base 
from which the acquiring firm starts, the longer the period of 
supervision and training will have to be. At the intermediate stage, 
the relationship with technology suppliers is more of a partnership 
and at the advanced stage the technology-acquiring firm may itself 
become a seller of technology. At the intermediate as well as the 
advanced stage, depending on market conditions, the technology-
acqmnng firm may also form strategic alliances with technology 
suppliers, competitors and customers to develop new products, 
processes and markets. 
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Table Al Levels of technqlogical capabilities 
LEVEL 
OF 
CAPABILITY 
BASIC 
SIMPLE ROUTINE 
(Experienced based) 
INTERMEDIATE 
ADAPI1VE 
DUPLICATIVE 
(Search based) 
ADVANCED 
INNOVATIVE RISKY 
(Research based) 
PROCESS 
Debugging, 
balancing, quality 
control, preventive 
maintenance, 
assimilation of process 
technology 
Equipment stretching 
process, adaptation 
and cost saving, 
licensing new 
technology 
In-house process, 
innovation, basic 
research 
PRODUCT 
Assimilation of 
product design, minor 
adaptation to market 
needs 
Product quality 
improvement, 
licensing and 
assimilating new 
imported product 
technology 
In-house product 
innovation, basic 
research 
MANAGEMENT 
AND 
CONTROL 
Work flow 
scheduling, time-
motion studies, 
inventory control 
Monitoring 
productivity. 
improved 
co-ordination 
Co-ordinating R&D 
and 
commercial 
strategies 
EXTERNAL 
LINKAGES 
Technology suppliers 
provide supervision 
and training, limited 
local procurement of 
goods and services 
Partnership 
relationship with 
technology suppliers, 
increased local 
procurement, 
technology transfer to 
local suppliers 
Turnkey capability 
licensing own 
technology to others, 
co-operative R&D and 
commercial 
relationships with 
suppliers, competitors 
and customers 
Source: Adapted from S. Lall, 'Technological capabilities and industrialisation' World Development, Vol. 20 No 2, 1992 
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